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Abstract
Research has shown that some teachers are dramatically more effective than others and further, that
these differences are among the most important schooling factors affecting student learning.
Accordingly, shifts in policy have resulted in the development of new performance management systems
with the goal of improving teacher effectiveness. Although a growing body of research has begun to
examine the impact of recent systems, we have very limited knowledge on how these systems influence
teachers' motivation and improvement. This dissertation moves the body of research forward by using
expectancy-value theory and mixed-methods analysis to examine the impact of INVEST, a new teacher
evaluation system in Aldine ISD in Houston, Texas, on teacher motivation, effectiveness, and retention. It
also explores how individual personality characteristics, school organizational factors, and evaluation
system features influence these outcomes.
It employs a mixed methods design, utilizing the strengths of both methodological approaches. The
quantitative research captures broad-based results from a teacher survey given to the population of
teachers pre- and post- pilot and uses difference-in-differences analysis to examine the impact of the pilot
on key outcomes (i.e., motivation, effectiveness, and retention) and multiple regression analysis to
examine which predictors (at the individual, school, and system level) influenced outcomes. This analysis
is supplemented by the qualitative research which draws from a small purposive sample of teachers to
gain an in- depth understanding of how the policy influenced teachers' experiences.
Analyses revealed that overall INVEST had a negative impact on teachers' belief in their abilities
(expectancy) and no significant impact on the importance they placed on their work (value), their
effectiveness, or their decision to remain in teaching. However, teachers' responses varied considerably
based on their individual characteristics (e.g., teachers' grit), their school's conditions (e.g., leadership),
and their system perceptions (e.g., understanding, accuracy of measures, quality of feedback). The
extensive data collected in this analysis offer a rich picture of the implementation of new performance
management systems. Thus, it provides both policymakers and researchers with a better understanding
of how new policies impact teacher's behavior and the influence of various characteristics (at the
individual, school, and system level).
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ABSTRACT
TEACHERS’ MOTIVATIONAL RESPONSES TO NEW
TEACHER PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:
AN EVALUATION OF THE PILOT OF ALDINE ISD’S INVEST SYSTEM
Claire Robertson-Kraft
Richard M. Ingersoll
Research has shown that some teachers are dramatically more effective than
others and further, that these differences are among the most important schooling factors
affecting student learning. Accordingly, shifts in policy have resulted in the development
of new performance management systems with the goal of improving teacher
effectiveness. Although a growing body of research has begun to examine the impact of
recent systems, we have very limited knowledge on how these systems influence
teachers’ motivation and improvement. This dissertation moves the body of research
forward by using expectancy-value theory and mixed-methods analysis to examine the
impact of INVEST, a new teacher evaluation system in Aldine ISD in Houston, Texas, on
teacher motivation, effectiveness, and retention. It also explores how individual
personality characteristics, school organizational factors, and evaluation system features
influence these outcomes.
It employs a mixed methods design, utilizing the strengths of both methodological
approaches. The quantitative research captures broad-based results from a teacher survey
given to the population of teachers pre- and post- pilot and uses difference-in-differences
analysis to examine the impact of the pilot on key outcomes (i.e., motivation,
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effectiveness, and retention) and multiple regression analysis to examine which
predictors (at the individual, school, and system level) influenced outcomes. This analysis
is supplemented by the qualitative research which draws from a small purposive sample
of teachers to gain an in- depth understanding of how the policy influenced teachers’
experiences.
Analyses revealed that overall INVEST had a negative impact on teachers’ belief
in their abilities (expectancy) and no significant impact on the importance they placed on
their work (value), their effectiveness, or their decision to remain in teaching. However,
teachers’ responses varied considerably based on their individual characteristics (e.g.,
teachers’ grit), their school’s conditions (e.g., leadership), and their system perceptions
(e.g., understanding, accuracy of measures, quality of feedback). The extensive data
collected in this analysis offer a rich picture of the implementation of new performance
management systems. Thus, it provides both policymakers and researchers with a better
understanding of how new policies impact teacher’s behavior and the influence of various
characteristics (at the individual, school, and system level).
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CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
Research has demonstrated that some teachers are dramatically more effective
than others, and further, that these differences are among the most important schooling
factors affecting student learning (Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004;
Sanders & Rivers, 1996). Despite this variation in teacher effectiveness, performance
management systems have historically demonstrated little or no connection between
teacher evaluation results and student learning gains (Peterson, 2000; Weisberg, Sexton,
Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009). Rather than rewarding excellence based on performance, two
factors currently drive teacher pay raises in the vast majority of U.S. districts: years of
experience and the acquisition of education credentials (Podgursky & Springer, 2006).
While proponents of the single salary schedule contend that this continues to promote
equity, reformers argue that teachers should not be paid based on these factors, given
what we now know about the significant variability in teacher effectiveness (Hanushek,
Kain, O’Brien, & Rivkin, 2005; Odden, 2008).
The U.S. Department of Education’s guidelines for awarding grants from the
Race to the Top Fund directly challenged the current system. To make their applications
competitive, states were required to develop systems for using student growth data – as
one of multiple measures – to evaluate and reward highly effective teachers. These shifts
in policy have resulted in a flurry of activity surrounding the development of new teacher
performance management systems. In the past few years alone, over 40 states and dozens
of districts have made changes to their policies, increasing the emphasis on student
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growth in teacher evaluation and ramping up the consequences attached to that
evaluation. Forty-four states now require teacher ratings to be based on multiple
measures of performance and 41 of these states mandate that student growth be a part of
teacher evaluation systems. An increasing number of states and districts are also linking
teacher evaluation results with tenure decisions and compensation reform (Doherty &
Jacobs, 2013).
Unlike historical studies, recent research has demonstrated a positive, though
relatively small, correlation between principal observation of teachers and student
progress (Kane & Staiger, 2012; Sartain, Stoelinga, & Brown, 2011). However, the
results of these new performance management systems’ impact on student achievement
have varied depending on how systems are designed. Studies of performance-based pay
initiatives have demonstrated that bonus systems (where teachers receive a reward for
students’ growth) have limited to no effects on student learning (Glazerman & Seifullah,
2010; Springer et al., 2010). Conversely, several recent studies focused on more
comprehensive new teacher evaluation systems demonstrate a positive impact in the early
stages of implementation (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Steinberg & Sartain, forthcoming
2014; Taylor & Tyler, 2011).
What is unclear is why certain changes may or may not be occurring, as most of
these studies do not systematically explore how teacher motivation and behavior resulted
in observed outcomes. Prior research on teachers’ attitudes demonstrates that their
support for these types of reforms varies considerably depending on how the system is
designed and implemented (Ballou & Podursky, 1993; Farkas, Johnson, & Duffett, 2003;
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Goldhaber, 2009; Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2000). Though there is some
research on motivational responses to accountability policies (Finnigan & Gross, 2007;
Kelley et al., 2000), most studies of performance management systems do not take into
consideration how design features, as well as individual and organizational
characteristics, affect teacher attitudes and subsequently influence motivation.
This dissertation will move the body of research on performance management
policies forward by examining the impact of INVEST, a new teacher evaluation system
in the Aldine Independent School District (ISD), Houston, Texas, on teacher motivation,
effectiveness, and retention, and exploring how individual personality characteristics,
school organizational factors, and evaluation system features influence these outcomes.
In particular, I will explore several research questions. The first research question
examines the implementation of the new evaluation system and teachers’ attitudes
towards the policy. The second research question explores the new system’s impact on
teacher motivation, effectiveness, and retention. The final set of research questions
investigates the relationship among all three of these outcomes (teacher motivation,
effectiveness, and retention) and measures of individual personality characteristics (i.e.,
the Big Five, grit), school organizational factors (i.e., school climate indicators), and
evaluation system features (e.g., perceptions of the measures and process). The
dissertation is divided into the following chapters:


Chapter 1. Review of the Literature. In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of
the history of performance management systems, examine the empirical evidence
on these systems’ potential for increasing teacher quality, and finally, explore
3

what we can learn from theory about teachers’ likely motivational responses. I
develop a conceptual framework, derived from the literature on motivational
theory, to frame how we might expect teachers to respond to new performance
management initiatives.


Chapter 2. Methods and Data Collection. I then turn my attention to the
particulars of my proposed dissertation study and outline the three research
questions I will address through my analysis. These questions fill existing gaps in
the literature, particularly with regard to the impact of new evaluation systems on
teacher motivation.



Part One Findings: Overall
o Chapter 3. Research Question 1: System Implementation Descriptive
Analysis. In this chapter, I share descriptive data on system
implementation and explore trends in teacher attitudes. I then provide an
overview of variation at the individual and school level.
o Chapter 4. Research Question 2: Overall System Impact. After
presenting the descriptive results, I evaluate the impact of the new
INVEST system on teacher motivation, effectiveness, and retention. I
examine quantitative data analyzed through the difference-in-differences
approach to estimate the treatment effect and supplement this quantitative
analysis with qualitative data gathered through teacher interviews.
o Part Two Findings: VariationChapters 5, 6, and 7. Research Question 3:
Variation in Implementation and Impact. In these chapters, I explore
4

how variation in individual characteristics (Chapter 5), school
characteristics (Chapter 6), and system characteristics (Chapter 7)
influence the outcomes discussed in Chapter 4. I use multiple regression
analyses to examine which factors best predict outcomes of interest – e.g.,
teacher motivation, effectiveness, and retention – and use the qualitative
data to explain these trends.


Chapter 8. Discussion and Implications. To close, I revisit the framework
developed in Chapter 1 for understanding the impact of new systems on teacher
motivation, effectiveness, and retention. With this framework in mind, I discuss
the various implications of my work for policymakers and practitioners and
identify areas for further research.

Research Overview
The Need for New Performance Management Systems
Broadly speaking, performance management systems aim to address the problem
of teacher quality. Over the past decade, a growing body of research evidence has
demonstrated that teacher effects can have a substantial impact on student progress
(Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011; Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006; Kyriakides &
Creemers, 2008; Rockoff, 2004). Unfortunately, teachers vary considerably in their
effectiveness, and students from low-income families are less likely to have access to
high quality instruction than their peers in higher-income communities (Walsh, 2007).
The problem of teacher quality is multi-faceted and, consequently, policymakers have
come to understand it in different ways. Some argue that policy should focus on
5

attracting more high quality candidates into the profession and encouraging them to teach
in schools with the highest need. Others contend that policymakers conceptualizing the
problem solely as one of recruitment fail to recognize that the shortage is not a result of
too few quality teachers entering the profession, but rather is exacerbated by the alarming
proportions in which they leave. And yet others assert that if the system cannot accelerate
teachers’ improvement or maximize their potential, recruiting and retaining more
teachers will not adequately address the issue. Thus, the “problem” of teacher quality can
be conceptualized as one of inadequate recruitment, high turnover, or a lack of
improvement (Johnson, Berg, & Donaldson, 2005).
Historically, teacher performance management systems have not been
intentionally designed to respond to any of the conceptions of the teacher quality problem
and thus do not meaningfully differentiate performance or reward excellence (Peterson,
2000). Indeed, in The Widget Effect, The New Teacher Project researchers discovered
that more than 99% of teachers in examined districts were rated satisfactory and that this
tendency had fostered an environment where policymakers treat teachers as
interchangeable parts (Weisberg et al., 2009). To respond to these shortcomings,
reforming teacher performance management systems (i.e., evaluation, compensation,
support, dismissal) has become central to policy conversations at the national, state, and
local level.
Advocates of these new systems argue that better differentiating performance and
aligning consequences directly with outcomes will address the “teacher quality problem”
through both a selection and a motivation effect. A system which aligns performance and
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rewards will attract individuals who are particularly skillful at the outcome being
rewarded, and this selection effect will have a positive impact on the labor market
(Podgursky & Springer, 2006). Clear performance expectations and aligned incentives
will in turn motivate current teachers to change their behaviors and remain in the
profession (Odden & Wallace, 2007). For the purposes of this analysis, I will focus
specifically on the motivation effect of new performance management systems on the
existing teacher corps. This is not to suggest that the selection effect is not an equally
important outcome to consider, and future work should certainly explore the effect these
initiatives have on potential recruits.
Key Elements of New Performance Management Systems
Various forms of performance management have come and gone in waves over
the years. In the early 1900s and then again in the 1950s and 1980s, policymakers
designed new merit-based pay systems to improve teacher quality, largely in response to
fear over intensified international competition. Despite their initial popularity, the
evaluation criteria in these systems were perceived as subjective, and they subsequently
failed to engender broad-based support. Additionally, districts faced considerable
implementation challenges including difficulties in reliably training evaluators, union
opposition, instability in leadership, and a lack of sustainable funding (Johnson, 1984).
Largely structured as top-down initiatives, these programs neglected to secure support
from influential constituencies such as teachers and without a clear rationale for why
rewards were disseminated to some teachers and not others, policies engendered low
morale (Cohen & Murnane, 1985; Darling-Hammond & Berry, 1988). Combined with
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funding challenges and lack of sustained leadership, performance management initiatives
have historically been transient in nature (Johnson, 1984).
In an era of high stakes accountability, policymakers face intensified pressure to
improve test results and consequently an increasing number of districts are again in the
process of developing performance management systems (Doherty & Jacobs, 2013;
Podgursky & Springer, 2007). These efforts have been accelerated by the U.S.
Department of Education’s Race to the Top Fund guidelines released in 2009 and
subsequently by the No Child Left Behind waiver requirements. To make their
applications competitive, states were required to develop new systems that addressed
teacher evaluation, compensation, and professional development. The fundamental aim of
these new systems is to provide a mechanism for differentiating teacher effectiveness for
accountability purposes, while simultaneously driving improvements in practice. To
accomplish this goal, advocates have called for a balanced approach, using multiple
measures to gauge teacher effectiveness and recognize outstanding performance (Aspen
Institute, 2011).
Though these new systems vary considerably, most share a number of core design
features. First, they use multiple measures of teacher performance – typically a student
growth or value-added model and a robust observation framework. To respond to the
shortcomings of previous attempts at measuring teachers’ impact on students, valueadded models attempt to control for the other school- and student-based factors
influencing outcomes, thus isolating the impact of the teacher on student progress (Goe,
2008; Lockwood & McCaffrey, 2008; Meyer & Christian, 2008). On the observation
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side, new systems employ comprehensive frameworks that capture a more complete
picture of teaching behaviors than previous observation systems, differentiate
performance across a number of levels, and provide timely and detailed feedback about
specific teachers’ strengths and areas for improvement (Milanowski, Heneman, &
Kimball, 2009). Additionally, these performance management systems tend not to be
focused on evaluation alone, but rather are part of a more comprehensive approach,
including other reforms with the objective of increasing teacher quality (e.g.,
compensation, professional development) (Odden & Wallace, 2004).
Empirical Evidence: What Do We Know about These Systems’ Impact?
Designing new performance management systems has been at the heart of
education reform efforts for the past century; yet, surprisingly little information exists
about how these new approaches work in practice. The basic logic undergirding these
systems is that through improved evaluation, policymakers will be able to better identify
highly effective and ineffective teachers, as well as capture important information on all
teachers’ areas of need. Policymakers can then use this knowledge to design specific
policy interventions – e.g., pay for performance, enhanced professional development,
remediation for struggling teachers, dismissal of ineffective teachers – that will build
both teacher motivation and capacity and ultimately, improve the quality of instruction.
Determining Validity and Reliability of Measures
A considerable amount of the research on these new systems has focused on the
validity and reliability of the performance measures. History has made clear that defining
high quality teaching is an unusually challenging task because it requires making
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judgments on an issue for which there is considerable disagreement. Many scholars
contend that quality teaching takes on different characteristics in different contexts and as
a result, good teaching does not lead to successful teaching absent the right conditions for
learning (e.g., student engagement, parental support, sufficient resources) (Berliner,
1976; Fenstermacher & Richardson, 2005). Thus, developing measures of performance is
particularly challenging in education because goals are complex and effective instruction
cannot be attributed to the teacher alone (Harris, 2011; Kelly, 2011). In an attempt to
address this concern, most new performance management systems employ multiple
measures. Below, I will draw from the empirical literature to investigate the validity and
reliability of these various measures for use in high-stakes contexts.
Value-Added. Proponents of value-added models (VAMs) contend that these
modeling techniques control for other factors influencing outcomes, and thus can isolate
the impact of the teacher on student learning (Goe, 2008; Meyer & Christian, 2008).
Though the use of VAMs continues to receive attention, research on the validity of these
measures is quite polarized. Some researchers caution that measuring teacher
effectiveness through student test score gains has significant methodological and practical
challenges (Baker et al., 2010; Rothstein, 2008; Rothstein, 2009), while others contend
that despite limitations, these measures are the best predictors we have about future
student performance (Glazerman et al., 2010; Kane & Staiger, 2012). These debates
center around the value we should place on students’ test scores as a measure of
performance and the extent to which student growth offers a valid and stable measure of
teacher effectiveness.
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The first set of researchers’ concerns deals with how best to assess student
performance. At the most basic level, different tests measure different content, and some
researchers have questioned whether existing assessments truly measure outcomes we
value. In a recent study, Jennings and Corcoran found that the teacher effect is 15-30%
larger on the high stakes test than on low stakes tests, suggesting that teacher effects may
not persist across assessments (Jennings & Corcoran, 2011). In another analysis, they
discovered that while teacher effects on math and reading value-added scores were highly
correlated, correlations with social/behavioral skills tended to be much lower, implying
that value-added outcomes may not be strongly associated with other measures believed
to lead to long-term success (Jennings & Corcoran, 2011). Conversely, a recent analysis
discovered that students assigned to higher value-added teachers were more successful
over the long-term and had higher rates of college attendance, more substantial salaries,
and better life outcomes (Chetty et al., 2011).
Regardless of whether test score growth predicts other valued outcomes,
researchers have also raised concerns over the validity and reliability of value-added
measures when used for high stakes purposes. Most notably, students are not randomly
distributed across classrooms, and selection into classrooms based on unobservable
characteristics (e.g., principals’ sorting of teachers based on unobserved student
characteristics) could bias results (Rothstein, 2008; Rothstein, 2009). Though this is an
inherent limitation of value-added measures, several studies have suggested that the
selection based on unobservables is small and that the quality of teaching (as measured
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by value-added assessment) does not differ systematically across types of schools and
students (Kane & Staiger, 2008).
Researchers have also raised questions about the extent to which value-added
estimates can provide a reliable inference about a teacher’s effectiveness (Koedel &
Betts, 2007). Several studies have demonstrated that value-added estimates for teacherlevel analyses are subject to random error (Lockwood & McCaffrey, 2008; Schochet &
Chiang, 2010). Others recognize these limitations but contend that the stability of VAMs
is comparable to standards of evaluation in other fields and provides a more reliable
picture of teacher performance than existing indicators (Glazerman et al., 2010; Kane &
Staiger, 2012). As recent research has made clear, the specifics of how growth models are
constructed (e.g., whether they control for individual and/or school covariates) can yield
different results on both teacher and school effectiveness (Ehlert, Koedel, Parsons, &
Podgursky, 2013).
Teacher Observation. Skeptics of using value-added assessment believe teaching
is more complex than can be captured by student performance on standardized
assessments and argue that teachers should be assessed based on their actions, not just
their outcomes. In response, many states and districts are now employing more
sophisticated teacher performance assessment systems as the basis of high-stakes
decisions (Milanowski et al., 2009; Gallagher, 2004; Jacob & Lefgren, 2008). Recently,
researchers at the Gates Foundation reviewed several such systems through the Measures
of Effective Teaching Project – e.g., The Framework for Teaching developed by
Charlotte Danielson – and discovered a positive, though relatively small, correlation
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between observation results (conducted by external raters rather than principals) and
student learning (Kane & Staiger, 2012).
When used in high-stakes environments, researchers have contended that
observation measures should be viewed as systems, not merely instruments (Hill,
Charalambous, & Kraft, 2012). To maximize reliability, evaluators should receive
adequate training in the evaluation system and demonstrate their competency level before
decisions are used for high-stakes outcomes (Hill et al., 2012; Kane & Staiger, 2012).
However, inter-rater agreement, while important, should not be the sole reliability metric.
Indeed, teaching behavior can vary from day to day and week to week, meaning that one
observation is unlikely to provide an accurate view of teacher performance, particularly if
it is announced and the teacher can prepare in advance. Recent research has demonstrated
that reliability can only be achieved through multiple observations of practice (Hill et al.,
2012; Kane & Staiger, 2012), and unfortunately, some evidence suggests that using
principals as the primary evaluators can lead to leniency and limit score differentiation
(Milanowski et al., 2009; Weisberg et al., 2009). In short, though there has been
considerable research focused on these performance measures, much remains to be
learned about their validity and reliability. Although these new measures may be able to
better differentiate between teachers’ practice, researchers should continue to closely
monitor how they impact teachers’ motivation and in turn influence their effectiveness.
Impact
Teacher evaluation tools should not only be assessed on their ability to accurately
differentiate teacher performance, but also on how well they inform and support teacher
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development. As discussed above, much of the current research on performance
management systems has focused on the validity and reliability of various measures, yet
considerably fewer studies have examined the impact these systems have on teacher
effectiveness and, in turn, student progress. To complicate matters, the growing body of
rigorous research that does exist reveals mixed results. This section will examine the
existing literature and explore possible explanations for the discrepancy in findings
across studies.
In their 2006 review, Podgursky and Springer reported on rigorously conducted
studies employing a treatment and control design and found that in most instances,
performance incentives were associated with increased student achievement. Because
treatments varied considerably from study to study, conducting a meta-analysis was not
possible, but the majority of studies examined found that the incentives had a direct effect
on the variable being incentivized. Specifically, Lavy (2007) investigated a tournament
designed to raise pass rates on high school exit exams in low socioeconomic status high
schools in Israel. Teachers participating in the program were ranked based on exit exams
and received substantial bonuses. At the close of the year, participant teachers’
performance increased when compared to control teachers. In their study of the impact of
similar systems in the United States, Figlio and Kenny (2007) analyzed data from the
national cross-sectional analysis on schools, students, and families and discovered that
test scores were higher in schools that offered individual financial incentives for good
performance.
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Several other evaluations have discovered positive outcomes. A study by Dee and
Keys (2004) examined the relationship between teachers’ evaluation results (and
corresponding placement on a career ladder) and student achievement gains using
Tennessee Project STAR data. They found that teachers with higher status were more
effective, as measured by gains in student progress. In Little Rock, researchers used a
difference-in-differences approach to analyze the impact of a new performance
management system and discovered that students of participating teachers made larger
test score gains than students taught by teachers in the comparison group (Winters,
Greene, Ritter, & Marsh, 2008). A similarly positive effect was found among teachers
who opted to participate in the Denver ProComp program, which differentiated teacher
compensation based on a variety of performance measures (Wiley, Gaertner, Spindler, &
Subert, n.d.).
However, other research on performance incentives has suggested the opposite to
be case. In the first randomized control study of performance pay initiatives ever
conducted in the United States (of the Project on Incentives in Teaching – POINT –
experiment in Nashville), researchers found that teacher performance pay did not raise
student test scores. Teachers were eligible for up to $15,000 as an incentive and lesser
amounts were rewarded for lower thresholds. The only effect was observed in fifth
graders taught by teachers who received bonuses, but the gains in student achievement
did not persist into the subsequent year (Springer et al., 2010). Another recent evaluation
study conducted on the Teacher Advancement Program, where schools were randomly
assigned once they had volunteered to participate in the program, also discovered no
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evidence that the performance management system increased student achievement or
teacher retention (Glazerman & Seifullah, 2010).
More recently, studies of new teacher evaluation systems in Cincinnati,
Washington, D.C., and Chicago have yielded positive outcomes even in the early years of
implementation. In Cincinnati, Taylor and Tyler (2011) found that students taught by
teachers after they participated in the pilot of the Danielson Framework for Teaching
scored about 10% of a standard deviation higher on standardized math achievement tests
than similar students in the pilot period. Dee and Wyckoff (2013) employed a regression
discontinuity design to evaluate the effect of Washington, DC’s IMPACT system on lowperforming teachers whose ratings placed them at the threshold (that would result in
dismissal) and high-performing teachers (whose ratings meant they received a large
financial incentive). Results indicated that dismissal threats increased the voluntary
attrition of low-performing teachers by 11 percentage points and improved the remaining
teachers’ performance by .27 of a teacher-level standard deviation. Higher performing
teachers at the threshold were also considerably more likely to improve their
performance. In a randomized control study of Chicago Public Schools’ Excellence in
Teaching Project, Steinberg & Sartain, forthcoming 2014) discovered that schools
piloting the new evaluation system performed better in reading and math than non-pilot
schools during the pilot and subsequent year. These effects were particularly salient in
higher achieving and lower poverty schools.
Why the discrepant results? For one thing, the direct evaluation literature on
performance management systems is highly diverse in terms of methodological rigor.
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Some studies are purely observational and do not attempt to control for other
confounding variables that may impact results. To complicate matters, participation in
many programs is voluntary, which means any observed effect could be due to the
characteristics of those teachers who opt into the program. In these cases, it is not
possible to separate the selection effect of those choosing to participate from the impact
of the program itself (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).
But perhaps more importantly, the system’s role in improving performance is
complicated by the fact that initiatives vary considerably in their design (Johnson &
Papay, 2009). Some of the initiatives discussed above are solely performance pay
systems, which are fundamentally different in their design compared to more
comprehensive systems rooted in improving teacher practice. Taylor and Tyler (2011)
distinguish between investment in human capital and short-term accountability effects as
two possible goals of policies. They contend that the effects of a system will be more
likely to persist if the evaluation spurs employees’ investment in human capital. The early
findings from Washington, DC’s IMPACT evaluation suggest that reforms with
significant consequences both in the positive direction (additional pay) and in the
negative direction (threat of dismissal) can also impact teacher behavior. Given the many
ways programs could be designed, simply knowing whether new performance
management systems have an impact on teacher and student outcomes does not provide
the information necessary to understand the nature of this impact. Despite decades of
interest, there is only limited research on teachers’ perceptions of different system design
features and why different system designs yield differing results.
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To truly understand the impact of new performance management systems,
researchers must also investigate how teachers’ responses to new policies are influenced
by individual characteristics and school organizational factors. Existing studies have
demonstrated that teachers’ responses to new systems vary considerably (Goldhaber,
DeArmond, & DeBurgomaster, 2007), yet there is limited systematic research on teacher
motivation in response to new policies. Research needs to move beyond exploring how
the general pool of teachers feels about new systems to begin to understand how new
evaluation systems affect teacher motivation and how this motivation varies across
subgroups of teachers working in different types of contexts.
Conceptual Framework: Understanding Teacher Motivational Responses
In this analysis, I draw from a substantial body of motivational literature to
develop a conceptual framework for better understanding the factors influencing teacher
responses to performance-management policies and how these responses translate into
instructional improvements. Originating with Vroom (1964), expectancy-value theory
posits that individual performance in an organization is a function of ability and
motivation (Lawler, 1983; Vroom, 1964). Motivation, or the process governing the
choices individuals make, is influenced by the value of certain outcomes and the
perceived relationship between actions and outcomes. In other words, how individuals
initially respond to performance management policies can best be understood in terms of
two sources of motivation – the desirability of a particular outcome and a person’s belief
that with increased effort, they can achieve that outcome (Vroom, 1964).
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As discussed by Achtziger and Gollwitzer (2010), initial motivation is distinct
from the volition required to sustain changes in practice. To achieve goals, individuals
must shift from a deliberative to an implemental mindset and engage in self-regulatory
planning. Ultimately, achieving expertise is the end result of individuals’ prolonged
efforts to improve performance while negotiating motivational and external constraints
(Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993). In short, individuals need to be motivated to
change behavior, design initial plans of action, and then consistently and strategically
work to improve performance.
Initial Motivation: An Overview of Expectancy-Value Theory
Eccles, Wigfield, & Schiefele (1998) have elaborated the general expectancyvalue theory into a more comprehensive theoretical model linking motivational choices to
two sets of beliefs: the expectation of success that an individual has and the importance
or value the individual associates with various activities. At its most basic level, this
expectancy-value model can be reduced to two central questions: “Can I do the task?”
and “Do I want to do the task?” Though the focus of this work has been on students, the
same general principles can be applied to teachers. If teachers do not think they are
capable of achieving the expectations, they will be unlikely to change their behavior.
Further, teachers who believe they can make necessary changes but do not value the task
itself or the outcomes associated with the task are also unlikely to alter their motivational
responses.
Expectancy. Historically, expectancy perceptions are said to be governed by the
expectation that a given performance will produce particular outcomes (Vroom, 1964).
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Bandura, who has written extensively on individual motivation and behavioral change,
emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between these more traditional outcome
expectations and perceived self-efficacy. General expectancies about the effectiveness of
effort (i.e., outcome expectations) document whether an individual thinks a given
behavior will lead to certain outcomes. To the contrary, self-efficacy captures a person’s
belief about his/her own level of competence in a particular situation. Though both are
important to consider, Bandura’s research demonstrates that self-efficacy better predicts
performance outcomes (Bandura & Locke, 2003). Believing that actions can result in
outcomes will not necessarily lead an individual to sustain personal effort in the face of a
specific challenge (Bandura, 1977). More recent research on expectancy value models
(Eccles et al., 1998) has similarly focused on self-efficacy perceptions (i.e., “Can I do the
task?”) and discovered they lead to improved student performance and motivation to take
on more challenging tasks. Research has also demonstrated that self-efficacy consistently
predicts levels of student achievement. In other words, more efficacious teachers produce
stronger gains in student achievement than teachers with lower efficacy (Goddard, Hoy,
& Woolfolk Hoy, 2004; Tschannen-Moran,Woolfolk Hoy, & Hoy, 1998).
To build self-efficacy, individuals need to receive consistent information about
how their performance relates to a specific set of standards (Bandura, 1982; Bandura &
Schunk, 1981). This form of proximal goal-setting provides individuals with immediate
feedback on their performance related to expectations (Bandura & Locke, 2003).
Achieving these interim goals leads to increased satisfaction, which, in turn builds
interest in the task itself (Bandura & Schunk, 1981). Some evidence suggests that
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feedback framed as gains towards goals can better sustain motivation than negative
feedback, which has the potential to reduce individuals’ level of expectancy. However,
researchers have also determined that individuals react differently to negative feedback
depending on prior levels of self-efficacy (Gist, 1987). In other words, individuals higher
in self-efficacy will be more likely to set ambitious goals and respond positively to
negative feedback by attributing failure to actions within their control and focusing
efforts on improving performance (Bandura, 1993; Bandura & Locke, 2003).
Value. To be motivating, individuals must not only believe they can make
changes in their behavior but also value the process and/or outcomes associated with
increased effort. Eccles and colleagues contend that the perceived value of any given
activity can be determined by four constructs: (1) the intrinsic interest one expects to get
from a specific task; (2) attainment value, or the extent to which a task is consistent with
an individual’s self-image; (3) the utility value of the task for achieving long-range goals,
and (4) the perceived cost of a particular action (Eccles, 2007; Wigfield, Eccles,
Schiefele, Roeser, & Davis-Kean, 2006). These same constructs provide a useful
framework for considering the value teachers place on new performance management
systems.
Intrinsic value refers to the interest an individual takes in executing a given task.
Individuals’ intrinsic interest is maximized when they are pursuing tasks that are
enjoyable and aligned with their personal preferences. While everyone may agree that
certain tasks are inherently interesting, some individuals will inevitably be more likely to
find specific tasks (e.g., sports, arts) more interesting than others. Psychologists have also
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demonstrated that regardless of the specific task, individuals are intrinsically motivated to
fulfill basic human needs (Wigfield et al., 2006). In particular, self-determination
theorists have demonstrated that activating the basic psychological needs of autonomy
(our desire to be causal agents of our own lives), competence (our desire to experience
mastery), and relatedness (our desire to interact and be connected to others) fosters higher
levels of value for particular tasks. In the case of performance management systems,
some teachers may receive inherent enjoyment from being competent or feeling valued
by others, which will motivate them to work harder to meet performance targets.
However, Deci and Ryan (2000) would argue that this intrinsic value is only activated if
teachers feel they have control over their own actions under new systems.
Even if individuals are not intrinsically interested in specific tasks, they can still
find value in their long-term benefits – i.e., attainment or utility value (more generally
understood as extrinsic motivation). Attainment value is the link between specific tasks
and individuals’ needs and identities, while utility value refers to whether the task will
help individuals achieve their long-term goals (Eccles et al., 1998; Wigfield et al., 2006).
In the case of performance management policies, teachers who want to be perceived as
effective in their role by others will place higher value (i.e., attainment value) on reaching
performance targets. Additionally, those who desire to move into a leadership position
within their school will likely be more motivated to achieve greater recognition (i.e.,
utility value).
When determining whether to act, motivational theorists contend that individuals
will weigh the value (i.e., intrinsic interest, attainment, and utility value) with perceived
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costs. Cost can be affected by any number of factors, including anxiety about failure or
the perceived loss of time for activities that are of greater interest (Eccles et al., 1998;
Wigfield et al., 2006). In the context of new performance management systems, teachers
might not desire recognition for fear of creating animosity among their colleagues and
jeopardizing their ability to collaborate in meaningful ways. Alternatively, they might
value being perceived as competent but opt instead to spend more time with their
individual families for whom they have greater interest and commitment.
In sum, teachers’ motivation will be a function of their expectancy and the value
associated with specific performance outcomes. Teachers must believe they can achieve
the expectations or task at hand and believe that doing so will result in something of
value, either an immediate sense of satisfaction or a step in the right direction toward
achieving a long-term benefit.
Factors Affecting Motivation
Expectancy-value theory posits that individuals’ motivational responses to
external influences will be a function of both personal factors and environmental
conditions (Bandura, 1977). In other words, not all teachers will respond to the same
policies in an identical fashion. Indeed, teachers’ motivational reactions to new
performance management policies are likely influenced by perceptions of the system, as
well as differences in individual characteristics and school-based factors.
Perceptions of System Features. Teachers’ perceptions of new systems will be
influenced by their level of understanding of – and the value they place on – the
principles undergirding the new system. According to expectancy-value theory, goals will
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only be motivating if they align with individual values, so teachers must believe they will
gain some sort of intrinsic enjoyment from achieving results or that reaching higher
levels of performance will lead to longer-term benefits. To maximize motivational
responses, teachers must value performance metrics and believe they are accurate
perceptions of their performance. Additionally, theory makes clear that an individual’s
motivation is strengthened when performance goals are clearly defined. This clarity
allows individuals to determine the value they attribute to particular goals and how likely
they are to achieve them with increased effort (Locke & Latham, 1990). If systems
become too complex, they run the risk of resulting in a lack of clarity and corresponding
decrease in motivation.
Individual Characteristics. To be motivating, performance management systems
must be congruent with the expectancies and preferences of the individuals they are
designed to impact. Given this, we should expect motivational responses to performance
management policies to vary across subgroups of teachers – in particular, by years of
experience, effectiveness, and personality. Researchers have demonstrated that selfefficacy increases with demonstrated success (Bandura, 1977; Gist, 1987) and further,
teachers improve their effectiveness considerably in the first few years in the profession
(Hanushek, 1996; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2004). As a result, many novices will likely have
lower levels of expectancy than more experienced teachers. Similarly, since highly
effective teachers will have achieved greater success in the classroom, they are also likely
to have higher expectancies regarding their abilities to meet new performance outcomes.
Research has also demonstrated that individual differences in teacher personality
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influence teachers’ level of engagement in their work (Teven, 2007) and attitudes
towards the implementation of new systems (Somech, 2010). Although many personality
inventories exist, the five-factor theory – emotional stability, extraversion,
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience – has emerged as the
foundational approach to describing personality traits (Goldberg, 1990; John &
Srivastava, 1999; McCrae & Costa, 1987). It is likely that certain Big Five traits
influence teachers’ responses (e.g., teachers who are more open to new experience may
be more receptive to change).
Organizational Factors. Research on levels of expectancy in schools has
demonstrated that teachers’ sense of efficacy can also be influenced by school-level
variables. The most prominent of these factors include the presence of a professional
community, the quality of principal leadership, and the level of teacher involvement in
decision-making structures (Kelley et al., 2000; Rosenholtz, 1989). Researchers have
discovered that professional community can be a strong predictor of teacher expectancy,
as teacher efficacy beliefs are higher in schools where teachers work collaboratively to
enhance practice (Tschannen-Moran et al., 1998). Effective principals are able to create a
clear vision for success and invest teachers in a common purpose, thus deepening the
sense of professional community and increasing expectancy perceptions. Rather than
creating a top-down culture, effective principals offer teachers meaningful involvement
in the decision-making process, which in turn, increases the value they place on policies
(Ashton & Webb, 1986; Tschannen-Moran et al., 1998).
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Effectiveness: Translating Motivation into Improved Performance
Even if teachers are motivated to increase effort, expectancy-value theory does
not posit that this alone will lead to improvements in performance. Indeed, this initial
motivation must be translated into actions designed to impact practice and then these
actions must be sustained over time. Goal setting (a product of initial motivation) and
goal striving (resulting from volition) are governed by distinct psychological processes.
As described by Achtziger and Gollwitzer (2010), when individuals move from the
deliberation (or goal-setting) to the action (or goal-striving) phase, they commit to a
specific goal and develop implementation intentions for translating that goal into action.
A substantial body of literature has demonstrated that goals are achieved when
accompanied by planning for particular action and changes to practice.
Merely practicing, however, does not lead to maximal performance. Instead,
according to psychologist Anders Ericsson, who has studied the development of
expertise, individuals must engage in deliberate practice to improve performance. Unlike
traditional practice, deliberate practice requires working at the edge of one’s abilities,
receiving immediate feedback on performance, and repeatedly executing the same or
similar tasks. Individuals acquire expertise gradually, and new challenges must take into
account pre-existing knowledge, as well as be scaffolded and sequenced over time.
Engaging in deliberate practice requires intense concentration in the face of challenge
(Ericsson, 2006) and immediate and specific feedback to accelerate the growth process
(Ericsson, Nandagopal, & Roring, 2009). This type of practice, though not pleasurable,
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has resulted in the development of expertise across a variety of different fields (Ericsson
et al., 1993).
Perceptions of System Features. Both theory and research demonstrate that the
effectiveness of performance management systems will ultimately depend on how well
they are implemented within a particular context. Goals will be more motivating when
workers not only value the performance criteria but also receive consistent information
about how their performance relates to a specific set of standards. Setting and achieving
interim goals increases motivation and in turn, builds interest in the task itself (Bandura,
1982). In other words, evaluation cannot lead to improvements in performance unless
teachers receive meaningful feedback and consistent support to implement necessary
changes in their practice. Research has also demonstrated that individuals’ motivational
responses can be influenced by their level of participation in the decision-making
process. Increased involvement builds trust and engenders overall commitment to new
systems (Lawler, 1983).
Individual Characteristics. Research has demonstrated that certain individuals
will be more predisposed to sustain motivation and, thus, improve practice over time
(Achtziger & Gollwitzer, 2010). Because teaching is extremely challenging work, it
seems logical that grit, defined as perseverance and passion for long-term goals, would
have an important impact on teachers’ volition. Two separate studies have shown that grit
predicts teaching performance indexed as the academic gains of teachers’ students. The
first study used a self-report questionnaire (Duckworth, Quinn, & Seligman, 2009) and
the second developed a résumé coding process to capture evidence of grit in college
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extracurricular activities (Robertson-Kraft & Duckworth, 2014). Mediation analysis
confirms that the effect of grit on outcomes is through cumulative effort: gritty
individuals tend to work harder than their peers, and they remain committed to chosen
pursuits over sustained periods of time (Duckworth, Kirby, Tsukayama, Berstein, &
Ericsson, 2010). Gritty individuals not only show up, but they deliberately set long-term
objectives and maintain effort towards achieving them, even in the absence of positive
feedback (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007). Following this logic, we
would expect gritty teachers to remain committed to their students, set long-term
objectives for the year and beyond, and sustain efforts toward improving their practice to
reach these objectives.
Organizational Factors. In addition to being influenced by individual differences,
teachers' ability to sustain improvements in practice is a function of their working
environment. Engaging in deliberate practice is incredibly challenging and at least in the
early stages, virtually impossible to do alone. Indeed, in order to successfully improve
practice, teachers need consistent feedback on their performance. Given the design of
new evaluation systems, the principal is most likely responsible for providing this type of
support, though peer colleagues offer another possible source of coaching. According to
theory, support will be most effective when it is provided on a targeted individual basis,
but structures for professional learning may also have the potential to accelerate teacher
improvement.
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Retention: Avoiding Burnout and Staying Committed to the Profession
To sustain commitment to the profession over time, teachers must maintain initial
motivation and avoid experiencing burnout. In the psychological literature, job burnout
has been a critical concept for understanding individual's work experiences. Over time,
individuals who experience burnout fail to sustain the hard work necessary to have a
meaningful impact. In general terms, burnout is defined as "a state of exhaustion in which
one is cynical about the value of one's occupation and doubtful of one's capacity to
perform" (Maslach, Jackson, & Leiter, 1996, p. 20). It is characterized by emotional
exhaustion, negative perceptions and feelings about clients or patients, and a crisis in
professional competence (Schaufeli, Leiter, & Maslach, 2009).
Burnout is a three-dimensional construct of exhaustion, cynicism, and inefficacy,
and the opposite of engagement, which includes energy, involvement, and efficacy.
When energy translates into exhaustion, individuals feel fatigued when they even think
about having to go to work, and the costs associated with increased job expectations do
not appear worthwhile. This exhaustion stems from the fact that individuals no longer
feel optimistic or involved in their work and consequently, exerting additional effort
seems futile. Individuals reduce their initial expectancies when they realize they cannot
make their desired impact, which in turn, can feel like an attack on their professional
identity. With their sense of competence challenged, individuals decrease the value they
place on their work and are generally less likely to persist over time (Maslach et al.,
1996). Of course, burnout is not the only factor that influences turnover. However, it may
be associated with the implementation of a new evaluation system that considerably

29

increases expectations for teachers and is thus a relevant construct to examine in the
context of this analysis.
Perceptions of System Features. Research demonstrates that two distinct systemlevel factors contribute to burnout – the imbalance of demands over resources and a
conflict in values between the employee and employer (Schaufeli et al., 2009). When
employers place increased demands on employees without additional support, it can lead
to intensified burnout, particularly when available resources are insufficient to meet the
additional requirements. Employees’ frustration with a potential lack of resources
worsens when there is value conflict. In other words, if individuals do not share the same
values as their organizations, this lack of alignment intensifies burnout experiences and
leads to higher rates of employee turnover.
Individual Characteristics. Burnout is not a negative disposition, but rather the
erosion of a level of positive engagement. Burnout research originated in the 1970s to
examine the psyche of the idealistically motivated young people who had entered human
services professions but over time became disillusioned by the systemic factors that stood
in the way of their ability to make an impact. This "frustrated idealism" characterized the
burnout research, as individuals lost both their energy and sense of value for their work.
This experience is not unlike the plight of the urban teacher who enters the profession
eager to make an impact and confronts the challenges associated with educating
disadvantaged populations. Given this, we may expect to see some burnout among
novices who have a particularly low threshold for challenge (i.e., low grit). Additionally,
research has also discovered that individuals experience burnout when they feel the level
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of recognition is not commensurate with their hard work; indeed this "lack of
reciprocity," as termed by Schaufeli et al. (2009), has been shown to foster burnout. As a
result, we would also expect more seasoned veteran teachers who continue to work hard
year after year but feel less recognized for their efforts to experience burnout.
Organizational Factors. Teachers' long-term engagement in their work and
ultimately, their decision to remain in the profession can be affected by a variety of
working conditions. Many of these factors are similar to those influencing initial
expectancy, including the presence of professional community, the quality of
administrative support, and the level of faculty influence. Indeed, researchers have shown
that increased opportunity to collaborate with colleagues can sustain teacher engagement,
while principals play an essential role in maintaining teacher morale and preventing
burnout in the face of significant challenge (Johnson et al., 2005). Moreover, teachers'
satisfaction and subsequent decision to remain in the profession is positively associated
with measures of autonomy and faculty influence (Ingersoll, 2001; Ingersoll, 2006).
Additionally, teachers have cited a variety of sources contributing to their dissatisfaction,
e.g., unsafe environment, inadequate resources, challenging teaching assignments, and
intrusions on instructional time (Ingersoll, 2001), all of which contribute to a mismatch
between demands placed on teachers and appropriate resources. Of course, gritty
individuals may persist even in the fact of these challenges, but, in the aggregate,
teachers' ability to sustain initial motivational responses and avoid experiencing burnout
will likely be influenced by their level of satisfaction with the school environment.
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Summary: Conceptual Framework Derived From Motivational Theory
In sum, expectancy-value theory provides a useful framework for examining the
impact initiatives have on teachers’ responses to new system. To alter teacher motivation,
policies must influence teachers’ expectancy that they can reach specific targets (“I can”)
and build the value associated with achieving certain levels of performance (“I want”).
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Figure 1-1. Expectancy-value framework for understanding teacher motivation
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To sustain changes in practice, they must subsequently support teachers to engage in
implementation planning and provide the targeted and consistent feedback necessary to
improve practice and sustain commitment over time. It is essential that researchers
investigate how teachers’ perceptions of system features, as well as their individual
characteristics and school-based organizational factors, affect both initial motivation,
sustained volition, and commitment. See Figure 1-1 for an explication of how
expectancy-value theory interprets teachers’ reactions to new performance management
policies and the impact that these reactions have on subsequent improvement in practice.
Nascent Research Base: What Do We Know about Teachers’ Motivational
Responses?
The research conducted on performance management systems provides some
information on how these initiatives impact teacher motivation; however, these data are
limited in scope. Historically, scholars have documented that performance management
policies encounter intense resistance from some teachers, most notably the teachers’
unions (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). In 2003, the Public Agenda Foundation conducted a
nationally representative survey and found that only 47% of teachers supported
financially rewarding those whose students made more academic progress, and further,
many teachers in focus groups expressed a visceral reaction to the idea of linking pay
with performance (Farkas et al., 2003).
Researchers have documented that teachers react negatively to policies for a
variety of reasons – e.g., they do not understand how the policy is designed to operate,
they believe policymakers are impugning their level of effort, or they perceive
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performance metrics to be unattainable. Research on Florida’s performance management
initiatives – STAR (Special Teachers are Rewarded) and MAP (Merit Award Program) –
discovered how little teachers appeared to even understand how the two recent initiatives
operated. Perhaps in part due to their limited understanding, the majority of teachers
disagreed that STAR would be able to distinguish between levels of performance (Jacob
& Springer, 2007). In the evaluation of the first year of the Texas Educator Excellence
Grant (TEEG) program, the majority of teachers (85%) reported that they were already
working as hard as they could before TEEG implementation, and as such, only 25%
reported that they changed their behaviors as a result of the program (Springer et al.,
2008). In another study evaluating the impact of school-based incentives on teacher
motivation in Kentucky and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Kelley, Heneman, and Milanowski
(2000), observed that individual teachers’ expectation that they could achieve desired
outcomes was weaker than initially anticipated.
In contrast, other research has found teachers to be more receptive to changes in
performance management. In the evaluation of TEEG, Springer et. al., found that 71% of
teachers strongly desired to earn a TEEG bonus and 60% agreed that the TEEG program
did a good job of identifying effective teachers. Additionally, more than 90% of the
respondents thought increasing student test scores should be of either moderate or high
importance in teacher evaluation, making it the highest ranked measure out of 17
indicators (2008). Research has also demonstrated that perceptions among the teacher
corps may be changing; indeed, younger teachers are more likely to seek out
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opportunities for diverse roles and be in favor of alternate forms of compensation (Blair,
2002; Farkas et al., 2003; Qazilbash, 2007).
As expectancy-value theory would predict, this nascent research base suggests
that teachers’ attitudes and responses depend on how performance management systems
are designed and implemented. In a recent analysis of theories undergirding teacher
evaluation systems, Firestone contends that current policies focus primarily on economic
approaches to motivation, which emphasize extrinsic incentives (e.g., performance pay,
firing ineffective teachers) as opposed to intrinsic approaches, which underscore the
importance of building teacher autonomy and support. Though these approaches are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, evaluation used for accountability purposes has the
potential to undermine the intrinsic incentives that give teachers a sense of control over
meeting their own standards of competence (2014). While a growing body of research
has begun to examine the impact of recent evaluation systems on student outcomes (Dee
& Wyckoff, 2013; Steinberg & Sartain, forthcoming 2014; Taylor & Tyler, 2011), we
have limited information on how specific policy design features (e.g., specific measures,
observational processes, uses for evaluation) influence teachers’ motivation (both
extrinsic and intrinsic) to improve their practice.
Expectancy-value theory also suggests that teachers’ responses will vary
considerably as a function of differences in individual teacher characteristics and schoolbased organizational factors affecting the process of implementation. Unfortunately, most
studies do not take into consideration how new initiatives differentially affect teacher
attitudes and subsequently influence motivation and behavioral change (Goldhaber et al.,
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2007). Additionally, while there are many studies detailing the importance of school
working conditions (Ingersoll, 2001; Ingersoll, 2006; Johnson et al., 2005), existing
research does not examine which working conditions motivate teachers in the context of
new performance management systems. In the small number of studies where these
questions have been investigated, results have not been analyzed within a motivational
framework, making it challenging to interpret the divergent findings. Without a deeper
understanding of this variation in teachers’ motivational responses, system designers do
not have enough information to create and implement new performance management
initiatives that influence teachers’ motivation and subsequent changes in behavior.
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION
This study fills these gaps in the existing research base by investigating the
impact of a new teacher evaluation system in the Aldine ISD, INVEST, on important
teacher outcomes. In particular, I investigate several key research questions.
1. What are teachers’ attitudes towards the new INVEST system? What are their
initial perceptions of the new system’s design and implementation?
2. What impact does INVEST have on teachers’ motivation and teacher outcomes of
interest (i.e., effectiveness and retention)?
a. Motivation, as measured by teachers’ self-reported expectancy and value:
i. Expectancy. Do teachers believe in their ability to impact their
students’ progress? Do they believe they will be able to perform
well on the system?
ii. Value. Do teachers value being good at their work? Do teachers
value performing well on the new evaluation system?
b. Effectiveness, as measured by the Aldine Growth Model (a measure of
teachers’ impact on student growth on standardized exams)
c. Retention, capturing teachers who left the district at the end of the 20122013 year
d. How is teachers’ level of motivation associated with their effectiveness
and retention?
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RQ2a

Teacher
Motivation
-Expectancy
_-Value

RQ2d

RQ1
Teacher
Outcomes of
Interest

New
Performance
Management
System

RQ2b& 2c
-Effectiveness
-Retention

-INVEST

Sources of Variation
Individual
Characteristics
(e.g., personality)
RQ3a

Organizational
Factors
(e.g., school climate)

System Features
(e.g., measures,
processes, uses)

RQ3b

RQ3c

Figure 2-1. Alignment between research questions and motivational framework
3. To what extent are teachers’ system motivation, effectiveness, and retention
influenced by individual characteristics, school organizational factors, and
system features?
a. Individual characteristics – teachers’ personality (i.e., grit, Big 5)
b. School organizational factors – principal leadership, level of positive

support, level of control support, quality of professional community
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c. System (design and implementation) features – e.g., perceptions of
accuracy and fairness, the quality of feedback, level of understanding of
the new system
Methodology
To answer these research questions, I employ a mixed methods design to analyze
the impact and implementation of INVEST, a new teacher evaluation system which was
piloted in Aldine ISD during the 2012-2013 year. According to Creswell and Clark
(2006), mixed methods research focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both
quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. By bringing various
perspectives to bear on a policy problem, mixed methods research triangulates data and
allows for stronger generalization (Creswell & Clark, 2006).
In this study, I collected quantitative and qualitative data simultaneously, which
allowed me to utilize the strengths of both approaches. My quantitative research captures
broad-based results from the population of teachers, whereas my qualitative research
draws from a small sample and provides a more in depth understanding of how
individuals experience policy implementation. For Research Question 1, I used
descriptive quantitative data to explore key trends in teachers’ responses and
supplemented this data with rich qualitative data to understand the rationale and
motivation behind teachers’ attitudes. For Research Question 2, I relied on quantitative
data to examine the overall impact the new system has on teachers’ motivation (as
captured by survey data), effectiveness (as measured by the student growth measure of
the teacher evaluation system), and retention (as reported in administrative data). I
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supplemented these data with interview data on teachers’ perspectives of the system’s
impact. For Research Question 3, I again employed mixed methods to understand how
outcomes were influenced by system, individual, and school characteristics. Quantitative
data provided information on which system, individual, and school factors were most
predictive of each of the key outcomes of interest, while qualitative data explored why
these factors are so pivotal to teachers’ responses to INVEST. In sum, the quantitative
indicators provided an overall sense of the new system’s impact, while the qualitative
data elaborated on why particular effects were observed and how individual and school
context shaped responses.
District and System Background
Located in Houston, Texas, Aldine ISD serves an urban population of
approximately 64,000 students. More than 84.9% of all Aldine students are classified as
economically disadvantaged and receive Title I support, and the racial composition is
70.8% Hispanic, 25.1% African-American. Additionally, 31.9% of the students in Aldine
ISD receive support from the Limited English Proficiency or Bilingual programs. Aldine
ISD is the recipient of numerous awards including the 2009 nationally recognized Broad
Prize for making progress in closing the achievement gap among students of different
ethnic groups and socioeconomic statuses and takes a great pride in their approach, which
they call the “Aldine way.” Rather than relying on outside leadership, Aldine has a homegrown approach to leadership and celebrates its consistent and stable leadership at the
administrative level.
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Design work on the new teacher evaluation and development system, INVEST,
began in September 2011, with the support of Operation Public Education, an external
consulting group based at the University of Pennsylvania that I have worked with since
2007. The district used a volume I co-edited, A Grand Bargain for Education Reform:
New Rewards and New Supports for New Accountability (Hershberg & Robertson-Kraft,
2009), as its guide throughout the design process. This process was inclusive, involving
teachers, administrators, and community members. District leadership established three
work groups – Teacher Practices, Student Impact, and Other Staff – to work through the
many complex decisions required for designing an evaluation system and used the
district’s democratic process to identify participants for these work groups. Each of
Aldine ISD’s 74 schools elects five representatives, including two teachers, one
paraprofessional, one parent, and one business community member to constitute the
Vertical Education Advisory Committee (VEAC). From its members, this group then
elects a district-wide body, the District Education Advisory Committee (DEAC). The
work groups were composed of VEAC and DEAC volunteers, plus educators with
expertise in specific areas (e.g., technology) recruited by administrators. Each work
group had between 30 and 60 people depending on the group’s purpose, and each met
five times over the course of the 2010-2011 school year to design the new system.
The work group recommended specific policy decisions to the district leadership
team (which was composed of area superintendents and human resources personnel):


Observation. The district adopted Charlotte Danielson’s Framework for Teaching.
Originally developed in 1996, the Framework has been used nationally to
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document and develop teacher practice. It consists of four broad domains –
Planning and Preparation, Classroom Environment, Instruction, and Professional
Responsibilities – further divided into 22 components and a performance rubric
that differentiates four levels of performance – Unsatisfactory, Basic, Proficient,
and Distinguished.


Student Growth. To measure teacher performance based on student growth, the
district decided to use a student growth percentile measure based on the Colorado
Growth Model (Betebenner, 2009). The model compares the change in each
student’s achievement score to all other students in Aldine who had similar
achievement scores in the previous year. Each student receives a student growth
percentile and the teacher is assigned an overall SGP based on the median SGP of
all their students. TAKS/STAAR (the state achievement test in Texas) was used to
calculate SGPs in grades 4-9 (and where available in high school subjects), and
Stanford/Aprenda was used in grades K-3.



Educators Outside of Tested Subjects. The Danielson rubrics, processes, and
protocols were modified to evaluate performance of staff whose work falls
outside measures of student growth. The recommendation was made that these
educators would also set Student Growth Objectives (SGOs), based on a process
pioneered by the Denver Public Schools, to measure their students’ progress over
the course of the year.

At the end of the year, teachers were rated Highly Effective, Effective, Needs
Improvement, or Ineffective based on meeting pre-determined conditions on each
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measure. The “Final INVEST Rating” was drawn from scores on both observation and
student growth (either student growth percentiles or student growth objectives). To be
Highly Effective overall, a teacher must be rated Highly Effective in both measures, and to
be Effective, a teacher must be rated Effective in both measures. Teachers will be rated
Needs Improvement or Ineffective if they have received this rating in either of the
measures. It is important to note that in the pilot year, the district leadership decided that
only the Danielson Framework would be used for consequence (i.e., to put teachers on a
professional growth plan) and in the first year, the Student Growth Percentile measure
would be reserved for professional development.
INVEST was viewed as a fairly radical departure from the previous appraisal
system, Professional Development and Appraisal System (PDAS). Given the significance
of the change, district leadership chose to pilot the system so they could incorporate
feedback from key stakeholders before rolling out district-wide in 2013-2014. Table 2-1
below depicts the key differences between the current system (PDAS) and the new
INVEST system:
Table 2-1
Key Differences between PDAS and INVEST
Current System (PDAS)

New System (INVEST)

Measures PDAS evaluates teachers based on
principal observation ratings. The
ratings are a composite of nine
different domains and three
different levels of performance.
PDAS does not provide a rubric
for principals to use when
differentiating teacher
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INVEST will evaluate teacher
performance based on scores on two
measures:
 Observation based on
Charlotte Danielson’s
Framework for Teaching.
Each of the 22 components
will be accompanied by a

performance.


Processes All teachers are evaluated once
during the course of the year.
Principals conduct walkthroughs
but there are no requirements on
how frequently these
walkthroughs must be conducted.
The model is not differentiated
based on teacher experience.
There are no formal requirements
for conferencing between
evaluators and teachers.

detailed rubric that can be
used to assess performance.
Student growth based on a
student growth percentile
model (for teachers in tested
subjects) and a student
growth objectives model (for
teachers outside of tested
subjects)

This model is differentiated to meet
the needs of novice and experienced
teachers. There will be two tracks –
one for novice teachers (in their first
three years in the classroom) and one
for experienced teachers (more than
three years of experience when
teachers have received nonprobationary status).
 Track 1. Novice teachers will
receive three informal
walkthroughs each semester
and one formal observation
each semester.
 Track 2. Experienced
teachers will receive three
informal walkthroughs each
year (two in the first semester
and one in the second
semester). They will receive
one formal observation which
can occur at any point during
the year.
All teachers will take part in a goalsetting conference at the beginning of
the year and a summative
conversation at the end of the year,
and each formal observation will be
accompanied by both a pre- and postconference, where evaluators and
teachers will discuss progress toward
goals.
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Uses

Teachers are currently placed on
TINAs (Teachers in Need of
Assistance) if they are deemed to
be underperforming. There are no
clear guidelines for why a teacher
should be placed on a TINA and
in practice, principals use them
very infrequently.

Teachers identified in Needs
Improvement either through
walkthroughs or formal observations
will be provided with additional
support through an individual
support plan (ISP) customized to
meet their needs.
Teachers who continue to not meet
standards of practice after four to six
weeks will be placed on a
professional growth plan (PGP)
which will articulate the
consequences and disciplinary
actions that would occur if
performance is not adequately
improved. If these goals are not met,
teachers will be recommended for
non-extension or non-renewal.

Training

Teachers will receive a beginning
of the year training in PDAS.

Teachers will receive a beginning of
the year training on INVEST. All
pilot schools will also receive access
to the following professional
development resources provided by
Teachscape (and aligned to the
Danielson Framework):
 The Framework for Teaching
Proficiency System, an online
administrator certification
process.
 The Framework for Teaching
Effectiveness Series, which is
a self-guided, online training
system for teachers that
features master-scored
benchmark videos.
 Reflect Live, a complete
evaluation management
system that combines live
observation and video-based
observation into one
platform.
_____________________________________________________________________
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Taylor and Tyler (2011) distinguish between investment in human capital and
short-term accountability effects as two possible goals of teacher evaluation policies. In
Aldine, both are simultaneously at work. INVEST has several overarching goals:


Differentiating and Improving Instructional Practice. The new evaluation system
was designed to differentiate and improve teachers’ instructional performance
using the Framework for Teaching. Whereas in 2010-2011, 96% of teachers were
simply rated “satisfactory,” one of the goals of this new system was to increase
dialogue about improving practice and provide a more accurate picture of teacher
performance across the district’s schools.



Increasing the proportion of highly effective and effective teachers. To raise the
quality of the district’s teaching force, another goal of the new system was to
increase teacher effectiveness. This growth will be accomplished by identifying
teachers in need of improvement, providing targeting support, and dismissing
those who are unable to improve the quality of instruction.



Reducing teacher retention (of high performers). The final system’s goal was to
increase teacher satisfaction and thus reduce the rate of teachers who leave the
Aldine ISD, particularly among highly effective educators.

Sample
In spring 2012, Aldine ISD strategically selected 34 of the district’s 74 schools to
participate in the Year 1 pilot of INVEST. The goal was to ensure that the selected
schools were as representative of the district schools as possible to learn how the
initiative would work in a variety of settings. To accomplish this goal, district leadership
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strategically selected schools that varied along a number of dimensions – i.e., level
(elementary, middle, high), student performance level (on both achievement and growth
measures), demographics (percent LEP, percent economically disadvantaged). Though
the pilot schools were not randomly selected, there were no statistically significant
differences between the pilot and control schools on key baseline measures. All of the
schools in the AISD are Title I, meaning they have a significant percentage of students
who are low-income and on free and reduced priced lunch. Additionally, the district is
composed almost entirely of minority students, though there is variation in the percentage
of African-American students and Hispanics across campuses. During the 2012-2013
year, there were 4,397 teachers teaching in these 74 schools and 1,883 or 43% of these
teachers were in pilot schools. This sample includes teachers outside of traditional
subjects (e.g., art, music), as well as other staff (e.g., counselors, nurses).
From the 34 pilot schools, I identified six schools for in-depth qualitative data
collection. The sampling strategy was used to capture variation across levels (e.g.,
elementary, high) and school performance levels (e.g., both higher-performing and lowerperforming schools). The goal was to create an overall case study sample that was as
diverse as possible, representing different school environments. The school selection
process is summarized in the Table 2-2 below.
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Table 2-2
School Selection Process

Level

Lower Performing

Higher Performing

Elementary

X

X

Intermediate

X

X

High School

X

X

Quantitative Methods and Analysis
Measures
Teachers provide critical information on the rollout of implementation efforts and
the new initiative’s impact on their effort and attitudes. As such, a major source of data
for this study was a teacher survey I administered to the population of teachers in Aldine
ISD in both pilot and non-pilot schools. This survey provided critical information at the
beginning of the year that I compared with information at the end of the year to assess the
impact of the pilot on teacher motivation. It also provided critical information on how the
impact of the pilot was influenced by characteristics of both individual teachers and
schools.
Survey questions fell into one of several categories: (1) teacher motivation, (2)
individual teacher characteristics, (3) school working conditions, and (4) attitudes toward
teacher evaluation. At the beginning of the year, the survey included questions on teacher
motivation, individual personality characteristics, school working conditions, and a few
questions on teachers’ attitudes toward evaluation. Since teachers had not yet experienced
the new evaluation system, these questions asked for perceptions of evaluation in more
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general terms. At the end of the year, the survey included the same questions on teacher
motivation and school working conditions, as well as a more extensive set of questions
on attitudes toward teacher evaluation and specific questions on the new INVEST system
(for teachers in pilot schools). Since personality characteristics are relatively stable, these
questions were not included on the end of year survey. A more detailed description of
measures is included in Table 2-3. I modified several of these measures – i.e.,
expectancy, value, the Big 5, grit, administrative leadership, control, support, and
professional community –from pre-existing scales. Table 2-3 also reports the Cronbach’s
Alpha associated with the relevant scales from this survey administration.
Table 2-3
Survey Measures Used in Analysis
Measure

Cronbach’s
Alpha

Survey Item

Individual Personality Characteristics
Teaching Grit

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree).







Right now, my interest in teaching is about
the same as it was before the school year
began
I am working as hard as I did at the beginning
of the school year
Lately, setbacks have not discouraged me
Every day, I actively try to improve my
teaching
At the moment, nothing is more important to
me than improving my teaching
In my work, I always persevere, even when
things do not go well
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.75

Overall Grit

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree).

.68

I see myself as someone who:
 Is not discouraged by setbacks
 Finishes whatever I begin
 Is diligent and an extremely hard worker
 Had been obsessed with a project for a short
time but later loses interest
 Often sets a goal but later chooses to pursue a
different one
 Has difficulty maintaining focus on projects
that take more than a few months to complete

Conscientiousness How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree).

.59

I see myself as someone who:
 Does a thorough job
 Does things efficiently
 Tends to be lazy

Extraversion

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree).

.71

I see myself as someone who:
 Is talkative
 Is outgoing, sociable
 Is reserved
Agreeableness

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree).
I see myself as someone who:
 Has a forgiving nature
 Is considerate and kind to almost everyone
 Is sometimes rude to others
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.59

Emotional
Stability

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree).

.60

I see myself as someone who is:
 Worries a lot
 Relaxed, handles stress well
 Gets nervous easily
*Note: this scale was reverse coded for ease of
comparison
Openness

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree).

.65

I see myself as someone who is:
 Is original, comes up with new ideas.
 Has an active imagination
 Values artistic experiences

School Working Conditions
Quality of
administration

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):




Positive support

The administration’s behavior toward staff is
supportive and encouraging
My principal enforces school rules for student
conduct
The principal knows what kind of school he
or she wants and has communicated that
vision

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):




.83

I receive a great deal of support from parents
for the work that I do
Necessary materials are made available
I am given the support I need for students
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.57

with special needs
Level of control

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):




Presence of a
Professional
community

I have control over selecting content, topics,
and skills taught in my classroom
I have control over selecting teaching
techniques
I have control over disciplining students

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):




.59

.68

Rules for student behavior are consistently
enforced by teachers
There is a great deal of cooperative effort
among staff members
Most of my colleagues share my beliefs about
the central mission of the school

Teacher Evaluation Attitudes
Quality of
Evaluation
Measures

How Much Do You Agree that the Evaluation
Measures Were (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):





Fairness of
Evaluation
Process

Specific and clear
Accurate and fair
Comprehensive
Student-centered

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):




.91

Overall the evaluation system was fair
The observation accurately captured my
performance
I agree with my evaluator’s assessment of my
performance
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.90

Frequency of
Evaluation

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):



.89

My evaluator spent adequate time this year
observing me
My evaluator spend adequate time meeting
with me to discuss my practice

Number of observations and number of conversations
Quality of
Feedback and
Growth

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements About the Teacher Evaluation System
(strongly disagree; disagree; neutral; agree; strongly
agree):




.84

Encouraged my professional growth
Provided feedback that identified specific
areas for improvement
Resulted in changes in my practice

Teacher Perceptions of INVEST (Pilot Schools Only)
Level of
Understanding

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):





Positive Goalsetting

.84

The information I received about INVEST at
the beginning of the year provided me with an
understanding of the new evaluation system
The information I received about INVEST
throughout the year improved my
understanding of the new evaluation system
The Teachscape modules provided me with
an understanding of the Danielson component
of the new evaluation system
The Student Growth percentile modules
provided me with an understanding of the
SGP component of the new evaluation
system.

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):
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.76




Accuracy of
INVEST
Measures

The goal-setting/action planning process at
the beginning of the year helped me focus my
goals for improving my teaching performance
This year, because of INVEST, I set more
challenging goals for myself than in previous
years

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):




Overall the Danielson Framework measure
used to evaluate my teacher performance
under INVEST provides an accurate and
comprehensive picture of my teaching.
o Domain 1 (Planning and Preparation)
is accurate and fair
o Domain 2 (Classroom Environment) is
accurate and fair
o Domain 3 (Classroom Instruction) is
accurate and fair
o Domain 4 (Professional
Responsibilities) is accurate and fair
Student Growth Percentiles are an accurate
and fair measure of my teaching performance

Positive Impact of How Much Do You Agree With the Following
INVEST
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree):






.92

INVEST provides specific feedback on areas
to improve my teaching
INVEST provides the support I need to
improve my teaching
INVEST will help me improve my teaching
INVEST will support teacher development
INVEST will lead to improvements in student
growth and achievement

Teacher Outcomes
Motivation
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.93

Personal
Expectancy
(belief in ability)

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree).




Personal Value
(value for work)

I can get through to the most difficult students
I can promote learning when there is a lack of
support from home
I can motivate students who seem to have lost
interest in school work

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree)




Compared to my other roles in life (e.g.,
parent, friend, community member), it is
important for me to be an effective teacher
In general, I find teaching to be interesting
work
I enjoy being a teacher

System
Expectancy
(belief in ability
on INVEST
system)

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree)

System Value
(value for
INVEST system)

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree)





Changes in
Practice

It is possible to reach the Highly Effective
level on the new INVEST system

I want to be considered Highly Effective on
the new INVEST system

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree)


.74

I implemented changes in my practice as a
result of the new evaluation system

55

.66

Retention
Teacher Burnout

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree)




Teacher Turnover
Intentions

I feel emotionally drained from my work
I feel fatigued when I get up in the morning
and have to face another day
I feel frustrated by teaching

How Much Do You Agree With the Following
Statements (strongly disagree; disagree; neutral;
agree; strongly agree)




I will probably look for a new job in the near
future
At the present time, I am actively searching
for another job
I do not intend to leave teaching at my school

________________________________________________________________________
In addition to this survey data on teachers, I used longitudinal administrative data
collected by the district from the 2010-2011, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013 school years on
teacher effectiveness and retention. These measures are captured in Table 2-4.
Table 2-4
Administrative Data
Effectiveness
Observation
(Danielson) –
pilot schools only

Teachers’ score on the Danielson Framework for Teaching



Average score over four components of the Danielson
Framework (on a scale of 1-4)
Teachers’ overall rating (Ineffective, Needs
Improvement, Effective, Highly Effective)
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Student Growth
Percentile –
teachers in tested
subjects

Teachers’ score on the Student Growth Percentile



Teachers’ median student growth percentile for their
class (on a scale of 1-100)
Teachers’ overall rating (Ineffective, Needs
Improvement, Effective, Highly Effective)

Retention
Teacher Retention Teachers’ retention



School-level aggregate teacher turnover rate (available
for 2010-2011, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013 school year)
Teacher-level turnover (only available for 2012-2013
school year) – whether the teacher stayed teaching in
the district

Administrative data also provided information on school demographics, such as
ethnicity (percent African-American and Hispanic), free and reduced price lunch status (a
proxy for poverty), and the percentage of Limited English Proficient (LEP) students. As
demonstrated in Table 2-5, these data were used to ensure that student and teacher
covariates were balanced across pilot and non-pilot schools. For student covariates, nonpilot schools had a slightly higher percentage of LEP students, though this difference was
not statistically significant. There were no statistically significant differences between
pilot and non-pilot schools in terms of ethnicity or the proportion of students who
qualified for free and reduced priced lunch (i.e., low income), nor were the differences
between pilot and non-pilot schools’ student growth (aggregated at the school level) from
the previous school year (2011-2012) significant. For teacher covariates, the pilot and
non-pilot schools also appeared to be fairly balanced, which is important since the
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Table 2-5
Comparison of Pilot and Non-Pilot School Characteristics
Pilot Schools
____(N=34)____
Variable

M

SD

Non-Pilot Schools
_____(N=40)_____
M

pvalue

SD

Student Growth*
Reading

49.31

7.13

48.50

8.86

.50

Math
Student
Demographics
AfricanAmerican
Hispanic

48.62

11.06

48.29

11.74

.84

27.3%

20.28

27.6%

16.34

.94

68.6%

21.05

67.9%

17.02

.88

Low-income
Limited English
Proficient
Teacher
Demographics
Ethnicity (white)
Gender
(female)*
Certification
(traditional)
Average years

85.1%

8.36

86.1%

7.32

.61

31.3%

22.66

34.4%

23.02

.57

10.51

2.26

9.69

2.35

.14

First five years

40.8%

13.75

44.3%

14.22

.28

9.75

4.30

10.26

4.64

.63

Turnover 2012

34.2%

36.0%

.26

79.7%

76.9%

.03

58.3%

57.5%

.69

Note. Student growth data only exists for school with tested subjects, N = 29 for pilot
schools, and N = 34 for non-pilot schools.
intervention targeted teacher practice. There were slightly higher percentages of white and male
teachers in non-pilot schools compared to pilot schools, but only the gender difference was
statistically significant. Since the pilot differentiated support along years of teaching experience,
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it is important to note that though pilot teachers are slightly more experienced than non-pilot
teachers, these differences were not statistically significant.

I also examined covariate balance on measures of school working conditions and
initial perceptions of teacher evaluation. As demonstrated in Table 2-6, none of the
differences between pilot and non-pilot teachers’ attitudes towards working conditions
and perceptions of evaluation was significant. Across the board, pilot schools appeared to
score slightly higher on measures of school climate, though these differences were not
statistically significant. Teachers in pilot schools had slightly lower beginning of the year
perceptions of evaluation measures, as well as attitudes towards the fairness and
supportiveness of the process. This could be a function of the fact that teachers in pilot
schools were aware of the fact that their evaluation system was changing and had
received an initial introduction to INVEST at the time of survey administration.
Nonetheless, these differences were not statistically significant.
Table 2-6
Comparison of Pilot and Non-Pilot Schools School Climate at Baseline

Pilot Schools
(N=34)
M
SD

Variable
Climate
Administration
4.07
Support
3.42
Professional Community 3.81
Control
3.65
Perceptions of Evaluation
Growth
2.74
Observation
3.35
Fairness
3.74
Professional Growth
3.64
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Non-Pilot Schools
(N=40)
M
SD

p-value

0.28
0.25
0.25
0.17

4.01
3.39
3.76
3.63

0.27
0.25
0.27
0.20

.36
.51
.42
.52

0.28
0.24
0.17
0.25

2.81
3.41
3.80
3.73

0.26
0.26
0.19
0.21

.28
.34
.20
.08
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In any intervention analysis, the concern is that the sample participating in the
pilot may have different characteristics from the population as a whole and that any
observed treatment effect will be incorrectly attributed to the intervention. These analyses
suggest that though the pilot schools were not chosen at random, they are fairly
representative of the district as a whole on student characteristics, teacher demographics,
and school climate indicators. While we cannot conclude that they were not substantively
different on unobservable characteristics, this baseline equivalence strengthens the
inference we can draw from the impact analysis.
Procedures
In the summer of 2012, I shared an initial draft of the teacher survey with district
leadership for feedback. After making minor modifications, I piloted the survey with
approximately 30 teachers in the Philadelphia region. This piloting process ensured that
questions were phrased clearly and captured sufficient variation in teacher responses. To
ensure the survey was a minimal administrative burden and protected teachers’
confidentiality, I created a cover page accompanying each survey that assigned each
teacher a unique teacher ID, which I then matched with the district database. Upon
receipt of the survey, teachers could remove the cover page with identifying information
and keep for their records such that all survey results will be deidentified moving
forward. Teachers were provided with an overview of the project and an informed
consent letter, both of which were approved by the University of Pennsylvania
Institutional Review Board.
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Table 2-7
Comparison of Respondents Completing Both Surveys and Non-Respondents
Respondents
(N=2662)
Variable

M

Non-Respondents
(N=1735)
SD

M

SD

Ethnicity*
Percent White

36.3%

33.5%

Percent Hispanic

24.3%

22.8%

Percent AA

34.6%

39.7%

2.8%

2.0%

Male

22.3%

21.3%

Female

77.7%

78.7%

Asian
Gender

Experience
Years in district
Years in teaching

8.14

7.14

8.13

7.24

11.28

8.86

11.20

8.78

3.19

.33

3.22

.44

Performance
Observations

Student Growth *
51.61
13.07
48.64
13.46
____________________________________________________________
Note. N = 1652 for Observations and N = 906 for Student Growth
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
At the end of August, Aldine ISD principals administered the finalized beginning
of the year survey I developed to their teachers during a campus professional
development. In total, 3647 surveys were completed, out of a population of 4178
teachers, for a response rate of 84%. At the end of May, principals administered the end
of year surveys I developed to the same population of teachers in addition to 219 new
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hires to the district (for a total sample size of 4397 teachers), and 3254 surveys were
completed for a response rate of 74%. In total, 2662 teachers completed both the
beginning and end of year samples for an overall response rate of 61%. Of the 2662
teachers, 59% (or 1565) were in control schools and 41% (or 1097) are in pilot schools.
As demonstrated in Table 2-7, respondents who completed both surveys were
more likely to be White and when in tested subjects, were more likely to perform well on
the student growth measure, than teachers who did not respond to the survey. However,
though these differences are statistically significant, they are relatively small in
magnitude. There were no significant differences on any other demographic or
performance indicators, suggesting that respondents are fairly representative of the
population of teachers.
Analysis
I used responses from these surveys to assess teachers’ attitudes toward the new
evaluation system, as well as to investigate how their motivation and performance were
influenced by individual characteristics and perceptions of school-based organizational
factors. To answer Research Question 1, I summarized the level and distribution of
responses to each survey question and compared results across different types of schools
(e.g., high versus low performing) and types of teachers (e.g., novice versus experienced,
effective versus ineffective). After assessing the reliability of the motivation, personality,
and school climate scales (presented in Table 2-3 above), I used exploratory factor
analysis to determine how the questions on teachers’ attitudes toward evaluation could be
reduced to a smaller number of components. Using the Kaiser criterion, I kept any factor
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with a corresponding eigenvalue greater than 1 and then created factor scores
representing each individual’s placement on the factor that could be used in subsequent
analyses.
Following this descriptive analysis, I assessed the impact of INVEST on teacher
motivation, teacher effectiveness, and teacher retention (Research Question 2) using a
quasi-experimental technique called difference in differences (DID). To examine the
impact of a treatment, DID presumes that we must compare the treatment group after
treatment both to the treatment group before treatment and to some other control group.
In this study, the treatment group was those schools piloting the INVEST system, while
the control group was those implementing the traditional teacher evaluation system.
Subtracting the pre-treatment difference in outcomes from the post-treatment difference
eliminates one kind of selection bias, namely the kind related to time-invariant individual
characteristics. In other words, if what differentiates pilot and non-pilot schools is fixed
in time and any changes are identical between the two groups, subtracting the pretreatment differences eliminates selection bias and produces a plausible estimate of the
impact of the INVEST initiative.
A causal interpretation of the difference-in-differences estimator rests on one —
untestable — assumption: that in the absence of the policy the pilot schools would have
continued to have the same rate of change in the outcome variable (i.e., teacher
motivation, effectiveness, retention) as the control schools. One way to examine this
assumption is to examine pre-treatment trends between pilot and non-pilot schools for the
outcome of interest. As demonstrated in Figure 2-2, the pilot schools had a lower
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turnover rate than non-pilot schools at the end of the 2011 school year (8.04% compared
to 9.44%), but this percentage increased at a slightly faster rate during the 2011-2012
year (the year prior to the pilot) in pilot schools (+1.71 compared to .82). This provides
some evidence that for the retention outcome, the difference-in-differences assumptions
may not hold. Teacher motivation and effectiveness data were only available for the year
prior to the pilot, so unfortunately this analysis could not be conducted for these
outcomes.

Teacher Turnover
15
14
13

13.17

12

12.26

Turnover ( Pilot
Schools)

11
10
9
8

9.44

10.26
9.75

Turnover (Non-Pilot
Schools)

8.04

7
6
5
2011

2012

2013

Figure 2-2. Percentage of teacher turnover over time
Note: This figure represents the percentage of teacher turnover at the end of each year
(2010-2011, 2011-2012, 2012-2013). The pilot was implemented in the 2012-2013
school year.

To attempt to account for differences between the initial composition of treatment
and control groups that may influence this rate of change, I ran my analyses with and
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without school fixed effects and controlled for teacher characteristics (e.g., years of
experience). However, I am still unable to account for time-varying unobservable
characteristics. For the causal interpretation to hold, these time-varying characteristics
must affect the pilot and non-pilot schools in the same way.
The basic difference-in-differences model takes the following form:

Y=

+

*T+

*P+

* (T * P) + Γ*X + ε

Y represents the outcome variable of interest in each set of schools over the course of the
2012-2013 school year – and teacher motivation (operationalized by survey questions on
expectancy and value) and teacher effectiveness and retention (using administrative
records). T is a time dummy, P is a pilot dummy, and T*P is the interaction of the time
dummy and the pilot dummy.

is the baseline average for the non-pilot schools,

represents the change in outcomes over the year in the control group,

represents the

differences between the pilot and non-pilot schools before the implementation of
INVEST, and

represents the impact of INVEST. X is a vector of covariates that may

affect outcomes (e.g., student demographics, school performance, leadership quality,
teacher demographics) and Γ is the coefficient associated with these covariates. The
approach is further explicated in Table 2-8 below:
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Table 2-8
Difference-in-Differences Approach
Outcomes

Non-Pilot Schools

Pilot Schools

Pre-INVEST

A

B

Post-INVEST

C

D

Coefficient

Calculation
A
C–A
B–A
(D-B) – (C-A)

To answer Research Question 3, I explored variation in teachers’ responses to the
policy. First, I used multiple regression analyses to evaluate how teachers’ individual
characteristics (i.e., grit, Big 5, experience), school-based organizational factors (i.e.,
school climate, leadership), and attitudes towards system features (e.g., perceptions of
accuracy and fairness, quality of feedback and growth) predicted the three outcome
variables of interest – teacher motivation, teacher effectiveness and retention. I began
with a basic model controlling for demographic characteristics and added in sets of
predictors to assess the additional predictive power of various types of factors – i.e.,
individual characteristics, school characteristics, and system characteristics.
Qualitative Data: Methods and Analysis
Though this quantitative analysis supplies data on the impact of INVEST in
Aldine ISD, it does not provide a fine-grained analysis of how teachers experienced the
new policy. To gather more in-depth information on how the pilot impacted teachers’
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motivational responses, I conducted qualitative research in a subset of six pilot schools.
These data were used to supplement the more comprehensive information from the
teacher survey. At each of these six schools, I interviewed the administrator and six
teachers, selected purposively to vary across performance levels (i.e., effectiveness levels
based on SGP data from 2011-2012) and experience levels (i.e., novice vs. experienced
teachers). See Table 2-9 below for a demonstration of how teachers were chosen for
participation in the study.
Table 2-9
Teacher Selection
Performance Level

Novice

Experienced

Ineffective

X

X

Effective

X

X

Highly Effective

X

X

I interviewed administrators and participating teachers at the end of the first
semester of implementation (late November/early December) and the end of the year
(May) to capture feedback at various stages of the implementation process.


Round 1. In late November/early December 2012, I conducted interviews with
administrators and teachers in the six case study schools to capture initial
feedback on the new teacher evaluation system.



Round 2. In early May 2013, I conducted the final round of interviews with
administrators and teachers in case study schools, to capture feedback after
teachers had received their end of year review.
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Each interview lasted approximately 30 minutes. During these interviews, I
gathered information on teachers’ and administrators’ perceptions of the new evaluation
system and its impact: specifically: (1) questions related to the value teachers and
administrators placed on the new measures; (2) questions related to the perceived impact
the new system would have/was having on teacher motivation, behavior, and
performance; and (3) factors affecting implementation of the new system. All interview
protocols were grounded in the research questions but also included open-ended
questions to allow interviewees to guide the conversation. All protocols were shared with
district leadership for feedback and then piloted before being used in actual case study
settings. The piloting process ensured that questions were phrased clearly and able to
gather the desired information.
I also reviewed district documents and attended monthly meetings of the
leadership team over the design and pilot school years (2010-2013). These meetings were
used to collect additional information on the goals and design process undergirding the
new evaluation system. Another purpose was to document district leaders’ experiences
implementing the new evaluation system, by identifying which aspects were challenging
and how the district addressed those challenges, as well as which factors affected the
success of the implementation roll-out.
After conducting this data collection, I generated three data sources from the
interviews: interview notes, interview transcripts, and memos. I drafted memos following
each visit and included initial impressions from the interviews regarding key issues such
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as school culture, themes across teacher reactions, and/or interactions with staff. Finally,
there were digital recordings for interviewees who consented to be audiotaped.
To help ensure interviewees felt comfortable being candid about their
perspectives on the new system, I assured them that neither their names nor the names of
their schools would be revealed in any official report. Interviewees were also informed
that their responses would be aggregated with others in the school and district to get an
overall picture of INVEST. All interviewees were given detailed consent forms which
had been approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board. To
protect the confidentiality of interview data, I stored data, including recordings and
transcripts, on a password protected server and removed identifiers from all analysis.
To aggregate information from interviews, I used Atlas.ti qualitative software to
create a coding scheme for interview transcripts that included both inductive and
deductive codes. I applied this coding scheme to create a case study of each school in the
analysis. These case studies mirrored the questions in the interview protocols and
systematically examined how each school implemented the new INVEST system and
how teachers responded to the key features of the new system. After completing an
individual case study for each school, I investigated how implementation varied across
different types of schools (i.e., by level, performance) and how school-level
characteristics (e.g., leadership, professional community) contributed to this variation.
After completing case studies for each of the six schools, I analyzed the coded
transcripts for trends in responses across teachers. Using Atlas.ti, I created codes that
captured teachers’ responses to INVEST, as well as their individual personality
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characteristics (i.e., grit, Big 5). I assessed each individual teacher across each of the
codes and used this data to create five teacher profiles which categorized teachers’
responses to INVEST. Each profile was assigned a name that described their reaction –
the invested teacher, the sponge teacher, the burnt-out teacher, the insulted teacher, and
the skeptical teacher. Two research assistants working on the project also reviewed the
data and confirmed the placement of each teacher, corroborating the usefulness of the
profile categorization. Data collection methods are summarized in Table 2-10 below.
Table 2-10
Data Collection

Sample Size

Collection Schedule
Total N

Pilot Schools

Non-Pilot
Schools

Teacher survey

34

40

N = 4397

Administrator/
teacher
interviews

6

--

N = 42

Measure

Summer/
Fall 2012

Winter
2013

X

Spring 2013

Summer/
Fall 2013

X
X

X

Student records

Student achievement and
demographic data for all
students

X

X

Employee
records

Administrative data for all
teachers and principals

X

X

Performance
evaluation
system results

Evaluation system data for all
teachers

X
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PART ONE FINDINGS: OVERALL
INVEST was piloted in 34 of Aldine ISD’s 74 schools during the 2012-2013
school year following an intensive year of work group meetings, which involved teachers
and administrators in the design of the new system. For teachers in pilot schools,
INVEST replaced the previous evaluation system, the Professional Development and
Appraisal System (PDAS) and evaluated teachers on two measures of teaching
performance, the Danielson Framework (observation) and Student Growth Percentiles
(student growth). However, during the pilot year, only the observation measure was used
for accountability purposes (i.e., to place struggling teachers on improvement plans). The
system was differentiated to meet the needs of new and experienced teachers, with
additional observations and conversations for novices. To support rigorous
implementation, principals were required to pass a certification exam on the new
Danielson Framework using an external process provided by Teachscape. All teachers
viewed the same videos as administrators and then took part in a goal-setting process,
where they reflected on their practice and set performance goals for the year.
This first part of the dissertation draws on both quantitative and qualitative data to
provide an overview of the overall trends gathered on system implementation and impact.
I use survey data to compare the experience of teachers in pilot schools who completed
the beginning and end of year surveys (N = 1097) with teachers in non-pilot schools
remaining under the traditional PDAS system who also completed both surveys (N =
1565). This data was supplemented by qualitative teacher interview data collected in
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pilot schools (N = 36) as well as informal interviews and meetings with the district
leadership team. The results are divided into two sections.


Chapter 3: System Implementation Descriptive Analysis. This chapter answers
Research Question 1, by examining overall trends in teachers’ attitudes towards
INVEST. I use both quantitative and qualitative data to describe how teachers
experienced the pilot year of implementation.



Chapter 4: Overall System Impact. After presenting descriptive results, this
chapter investigates the impact of INVEST on teacher motivation, effectiveness,
and retention (Research Question 2). I use the difference-in-differences approach
to estimate the pilot’s impact on each of these outcomes and then examine the
qualitative data to better understand how teachers’ attitudes translated into these
results.
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CHAPTER 3: SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
After administering a beginning of the year survey to establish baseline
equivalence in fall 2012, I gathered data in two phases: winter 2012 and spring 2013. In
Phase 1 (November-December), I collected qualitative data on early implementation of
the new system through interviews with teachers and administrators in six case study
schools. In Phase 2 (May), principals administered a confidential end of year survey I
developed to capture information on teachers’ attitudes towards specific aspects of the
new system. During this phase, I also revisited the same case study schools to gather data
on how teachers’ perceptions had changed over the course of the school year. This
chapter provides an overview of the key descriptive data on system implementation, by
exploring overall trends, as well as investigating how these overall trends varied based on
subgroups of teachers and schools. Accordingly, it is divided into two sections:


Section 1: Overall Trends. This section provides an overview of the key
descriptive results (both quantitative and qualitative) from the two phases of data
collection. It highlights overall perceptions of evaluation and explores how these
attitudes changed over the course of the year.



Section 2: Subgroup Analysis. This section explores variation in teachers’
responses to the new system across specific subgroups of teachers and schools. It
uses quantitative survey data and qualitative interview data to investigate how
perceptions varied across subgroups of teachers (i.e., experience, effectiveness) as
well across types of schools (i.e., school level, school performance).
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Section One: Overall Trends
Phase 1: Mid-Year
When I first visited schools in November and December, INVEST was still in the
early months of its first year of implementation. As may be expected with the roll-out of
any new system, many principals had struggled to consistently execute INVEST’s
increased requirements, in particular the additional observations under the new system. In
the words of one principal, INVEST was a “complete shift from PDAS [the old system]”
which made it “a heck of a lot of work” (School 5, Principal). All of the principals I
interviewed noted the considerable time they were spending on each teacher observation
compared to previous years, due to additional expectations around detailed scripting of
the lesson and logging results into the Teachscape technology platform. The increased
time demands, particularly as they were learning the new system, made it challenging for
many of the pilot principals to maintain their schedule for evaluations. Consequently,
several of the teachers I interviewed mid-year had yet to be observed or receive feedback
on their instruction. During interviews, rather than report on their experiences with actual
implementation, these teachers instead shared their anticipated expectations. Though
responses varied, several trends emerged as consistently influencing teachers’ attitudes
towards the new system in these early months of implementation – level of understanding
of the purpose of the new system, attitudes toward system accuracy and fairness, and
opinions on the quality of feedback and opportunities for professional growth.

74

Understanding/Purpose. Prior to the launch of the pilot, the district leadership
created a centralized handbook and PowerPoint explicating the features of INVEST.
These materials focused on the need for change and provided a description of the new
evaluation measures, in an attempt to build teachers’ understanding of – and investment
in – the new system. In particular, the INVEST brochure (developed explicitly for teacher
communication) emphasized the importance of supporting teacher development and
advancing high expectations for both students and educators. When compared to the prior
Professional Development and Appraisal (PDAS) system, the brochure stated that “the
new system (INVEST) will foster professional conversation, provide more thorough
observations, and give teachers the opportunity for growth” (INVEST teacher brochure).
During the week prior to the start of the school year, principals were expected to share
this information on the purpose and design of the new system with their staff during
orientation sessions.
Even with the existence of these centrally developed resources, principals’
presentation to their teachers on the purpose of the new system varied considerably. As a
result, at the beginning of the year, teachers initially had two very different
understandings of the purpose of INVEST – there were those who believed the system
would result in improved teaching and learning and those who believed the system was
designed primarily as a tool to hold teachers accountable for their performance. Though
there was some overlap between the categories (where teachers believed the system could
realize both goals), the majority of teachers I interviewed appeared to either view the
system as designed for one purpose or the other. Teachers who believed the system was
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intended to support professional growth shared that INVEST was a tool to support
teachers’ development: “The purpose of INVEST is to see exactly where our strengths
are, what we can do to build on those, and what are weaknesses are. It helps make us
into the best teacher we can be” (School 1, Teacher 3). In contrast, other teachers shared
that INVEST initially increased teachers’ anxiety as it was “just another way to make the
teachers accountable.” To intensify these fears, some teachers reported hearing rumors
that INVEST was devised to make it easier for leadership to not renew contracts given
budgetary challenges at the state level: “Like most people in the teaching profession now,
I was thinking it is a tool to get rid of teachers or make it harder for them to achieve high
standards” (School 5, Teacher 3).
Differences in teachers’ responses appeared to be associated with the district’s
decentralized communication strategy. Though resources had been developed at the
district-wide level, the end of year survey revealed that only 15% of teachers in pilot
schools reported consistently accessing the district’s online portal or website for
information on INVEST. Instead, teachers primarily relied on their principals to provide
information on the purpose and expectations of the new system. Though there was
considerable variation in the quality of principal communication across schools (which
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5), as demonstrated in Table 3-2, overall only
54% of the teachers in pilot schools reported receiving information at the beginning of
the year that provided them with an understanding of the new evaluation system.
In an attempt to build understanding, district leadership had required teachers to
watch a series of modules on the Danielson Framework (the same Teachscape modules
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that administrators watched during their certification process) that lasted 16 hours.
Though these modules were intended to invest teachers in the new system by providing
them with detailed information on system expectations, for many teachers, they had the
adverse effect. One teacher shared how the workload heightened frustration and led
teachers to believe the system was focused on accountability: “It’s just so much extra
work. This is just ridiculous is the word I keep hearing. We’re already doing so much as
it is and then they’re like, do all this on top of it [referring to the modules] because we
want to evaluate you, which is unfair” (School 5, Teacher 2). Indeed, across the board,
teachers and administrators believed that the expectations at the beginning of the year
were too demanding and the timeline was rushed, which made the introduction of the
new system quite overwhelming. The majority of teachers complained that INVEST had
increased expectations without providing additional time to meet those expectations or
reducing other responsibilities.
Unlike the Danielson Framework, teachers had not received substantive training
on Student Growth Percentiles (SGP measure) by November/December, so many also
raised questions about how student growth would factor into their overall evaluation.
These questions varied considerably, but most commonly were concerned with the rigor
of the new state-mandated assessment and how the metric could be expected to account
for the fact that students had such significantly different starting points. Unlike with the
Danielson Framework, most teachers’ questions were hypothetical, as they still knew
very little about how the SGP measure would work in practice.
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Accuracy/Fairness. Despite their frustration with the increased expectations for
the workload under the new system, the majority of teachers and principals found the
Danielson Framework to be an accurate and fair measure of teaching performance.
According to teachers’ perspectives, the Framework was comprehensive, specific and
student-centered, all of which contributed to initial positive perceptions. As one teacher
noted, the comprehensive nature of the Framework meant the rubric captured her daily
performance as a teacher, “It really allows you to see what a teacher should be doing
every single day… Those four domains really capture what a teacher does” (School 1,
Teacher 3). Many teachers were especially appreciative of the specificity of the
Framework, because it meant they knew exactly what was expected of their performance:
“It’s black and white. You can really see what they’re looking for …and know exactly
what actions are expected for each component” (School 4, Teacher 4). Additionally,
teachers believed that unlike PDAS, the Framework challenged them to create studentcentered classrooms and empower their students as learners. As one teacher remarked, “I
like the fact that it is more centered on the students. To earn 4s, you have to get the
students generating the conversation… you know, it’s forcing the teachers to become
facilitators and empowering student” (School 1, Teacher 6).
In addition to appreciating the observation measure, teachers also shared positive
perceptions of the observation process itself. Under the new INVEST system, teachers
reported that observation would be based on evidence, rather than administrator’s
subjective opinion. Indeed, instead of just marking a score on a checklist (as was the case
with PDAS), principals were required to provide detailed scripting of the lesson and
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attach specific pieces of evidence to their observation ratings on each of the components.
As a result, teachers believed the process would be more “rigorous,” “intense,” and
“structured.” Administrators also reported that the new evaluation process helped
decrease their own level of bias, “PDAS had room for the individual observing you and I
didn’t agree with that. In INVEST, evidence has to be shown, which teachers like. It takes
out any bias from what is observed… You focus on the facts. It’s not about opinions”
(School 3, Principal).
Feedback/Growth. Given the increased observation requirements associated with
INVEST, teachers generally anticipated receiving more detailed and frequent feedback
on their performance. Unlike PDAS which was recorded manually, INVEST instituted a
new online system, Teachscape, where principals could leave detailed feedback on
teachers’ performance aligned to specific components of the Danielson Framework.
Despite the presence of these systems and structures, schools were overwhelmed by the
timeline in the early months of implementation, which meant that many of teachers I
interviewed had yet to receive an observation. As such, their perceptions of the feedback
process remained primarily hypothetical in nature.
Principals and teachers both shared that the most significant benefit of INVEST
would be its potential to increase dialogue about teaching practice. One teacher shared: “I
think that’s really important for us as teachers to have that opportunity to tell them, you
didn’t see this but this is what I’ve been doing... I think it has opened up the
communication lines, which is really positive” (School 1, Teacher 1). Teachers reported
several opportunities to share input, both during the pre-conference phase and through the
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goal-setting and reflection processes. For many veteran teachers, this was the first time in
years they had been asked to reflect on their performance. Some veterans found this
process to be frustrating and time consuming, while others felt empowered by the
opportunity to drive their own self-reflection. As one veteran teacher shares, “I’ve never
done this type of reflection before. It’s good because it helped me actually stop and be
honest with myself about where I need to improve” (School 1, Teacher 6). I will explore
this variation across individuals in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Phase 2: End of year
At the end of the year (in May), I interviewed the same subset of teachers and
administrators in pilot schools to gather information on how teachers’ perceptions had
shifted over the course of the pilot year along the same themes identified in Phase 1 –
level of understanding/purpose, system accuracy/fairness, and opinions on the quality of
feedback/professional growth opportunities. This data was supplemented by the end of
year survey data, which I used to compare pilot teachers’ perceptions of INVEST to
teachers remaining under the traditional PDAS system. As presented in Table 2-3, the
survey collected information on teachers’ perceptions of system design and
implementation (outlined below). Some of the questions were asked of both pilot and
non-pilot school teachers, while other questions were only asked of teachers in pilot
schools. All measures were captured on a scale of 1-5 (1 being strongly disagree and 5
being strongly agree).
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Quality of Evaluation Measures (all teachers) – whether teachers agreed the
evaluation measures were specific and clear, accurate and fair, comprehensive,
and student-centered



Fairness of Evaluation Process (all teachers) – whether teachers agreed the
evaluation process was fair and accurately captured their performance



Frequency of Evaluation (all teachers) – whether teachers agreed that evaluators
spent adequate time observing them and meeting with them to discuss their
practice.



Number of Observations (all teachers) – the number of observations teachers
reported receiving over the course of the year



Number of Conversations (all teachers) – the number of conversations teachers
reported receiving over the course of the year



Quality of Growth and Feedback (all teachers) – whether teachers agreed that
the evaluation system encouraged their professional growth, provided feedback
that identified specific areas for improvement, and resulted in changes in practice



Level of Understanding (pilot teachers only) – whether teachers agreed that the
communication and training they received on INVEST helped to build their
understanding of the new system



Positive Goal-setting – whether teachers agreed that the goal-setting process
helped them focus their efforts for the year and set more challenging goals
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Accuracy of INVEST Measures – whether teachers agreed that the Danielson
Framework and Student Growth Percentiles measure were accurate and fair
measures of their performance



Positive Impact of INVEST – whether teachers agreed that INVEST provided
specific feedback and support to improve teaching and would support teacher
development
Since data was collected in May, I had expected that the system would have been

fully implemented by this point of the year. However, I learned in interviews and
informal conversations with district leadership that principals continued to struggle with
implementation fidelity until the end of the year, and as such, had not always completed
final end of year conversations by mid-May. As a result, though all teachers had more
experience with the system than they did at the beginning of the year, some still had
questions about how the system would play out for them at the end of the year.
Understanding/Purpose. Over the course of the year, district leadership
attempted to respond to variation in teachers’ initial perceptions of the system’s purpose
by offering additional INVEST training. In particular, they developed a series of online
modules and an assessment on Student Growth Percentiles, which provided answers to
many of the questions raised in the interviews and also created a series of presentations
that administrators could use throughout the year with their teachers to build
understanding of the system as a whole. Despite additional training, as demonstrated in
Table 3-2, teachers’ perceptions of the quality of ongoing communication throughout the
year were slightly lower (M = 3.26) than they had been at the beginning of the year (M =
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3.31), with only 51% of teachers reporting that the ongoing information they received
about INVEST improved their understanding of the new system. In some cases, the
additional information resulted in a better understanding of the rigor of the new system’s
expectations, which unintentionally heightened concern and frustration. This was
particularly the case with SGPs, where after viewing the online modules, many teachers
believed the student growth measure would not be able to control for factors outside of
their control (e.g., student behavior, student attendance).
In spite of district leadership’s efforts, teachers continued to have varying
perceptions of the purpose of INVEST at the end of the year. As demonstrated in Table
3-2, at the end of the year, teachers were more likely to believe that INVEST would serve
as an effective accountability tool (M = 3.41) than a tool for improving teaching (M =
3.09). For some teachers, this accountability was an important and necessary way to
ensure improved student achievement, while for others, it was viewed as a tactic for
demonizing teachers. One particularly frustrated teacher shared: “INVEST has been used
as a hammer to drive it all. INVEST is being used as a club against teachers, as a
bullying tactic, as a weapon, so it’s exacerbated problems that were already in
existence” (School 6, Teacher 2). Other teachers did not see accountability and
improvement as mutually competing purposes: “I guess the purpose of it was to pinpoint
the needs in the classroom as far as the student growth and teacher growth. So they were
trying to see whether or not your kids grew, not necessarily if they’re perfect, but have
they grown from year to year…and to support your growth as a teacher” (School 3,
Teacher 6). As demonstrated in Table 3-2, notwithstanding some teachers on either
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extreme, close to half of surveyed teachers were neutral on whether INVEST would have
an overall positive impact on the district (39%). Indeed, the modal category of teachers
was fairly skeptical about the system’s implementation and still in the process of forming
their opinions.
Accuracy/ Fairness. As was the case at the beginning of the year, perceptions of
the accuracy and fairness of the evaluation measures were central to teachers’ overall
attitudes toward INVEST. However, teachers’ perceptions of the measures had changed
over the course of the year. As demonstrated in Table 3-1, teachers in pilot schools had
lower perceptions of both evaluation measures and processes (across all survey
questions) compared to teachers in non-pilot schools. This result was somewhat
surprising, given what many teachers and principals shared at the beginning of the year
regarding the shortcomings of the prior PDAS evaluation system and the initial
possibility of the new evaluation measures and processes under INVEST. Of particular
significance, teachers in pilot schools rated the overall fairness of the new evaluation
system at M = 3.39, compared to M = 3.86, for teachers in non-pilot schools, p < .05.
The interview data shed some light on what contributed to the shift in teachers’
concerns over the accuracy and fairness of the new system. In general, teachers were still
fairly positive about the specific domains of the Danielson measure. They maintained that
the measure was “specific and evidence-based” and appreciated the “clarity of
expectations” the rubric offered for evaluating their performance. However, after having
received several observations (which had not yet happened at the beginning of the year),
they expressed considerable frustration with Level 4 or the “Distinguished Level” of the
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framework, sharing that the expectations were “unrealistic,” “impossible to attain,” and
even “absolutely outrageous.” The Distinguished Level required teachers to create
student-centered classrooms, where students were responsible for taking ownership over
their own learning process (through group and independent work, as well as studentdriven questions). After realizing what these expectations meant in practice, many
teachers did not believe they were reasonable for students who were often significantly
below grade level.
Though teachers still had fairly positive perceptions of the Danielson measure
overall (with the exception of Level 4 performance), they raised new concerns over the
process of implementation, which contributed to overall perceptions of system fairness.
One teacher shares, “When I was observed, I didn’t feel like everything that they saw
reflected what I had to do in the classroom because depending on what day they walked
in, I was doing different things. I don’t feel like they got a very good picture of what I
actually do in the classroom” (School 4, Teacher 6). In particular, teachers (such as the
one above) reported being concerned about the accuracy and usefulness of walkthroughs,
which typically lasted for only 15 minutes. Even though these walkthroughs failed to
capture a full lesson cycle, teachers were still scored on all components of the
Framework. Additionally, INVEST considerably increased teachers’ workload. At the
end of the year, teachers were required to compile an artifact binder with detailed
documentation of their performance on Domains 1 and 4. For many teachers, INVEST
became synonymous with “increased paperwork” which they did not view as fair given
already overwhelming demands on their time.
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Feedback/Growth. At the beginning of the year, teachers in pilot schools had high
hopes for the type of feedback and quality of support they would receive on the new
system. However, due to challenges with the fidelity of implementation, many principals
reported struggling to meet the new system requirements. At the end of the year, teachers
in pilot schools rated the quality of feedback and opportunities for professional growth
significantly lower than teachers in comparison schools. In particular, as demonstrated in
Table 3-1, pilot teachers reported significantly lower perceptions of the feedback and
opportunities for growth (M = 3.37) than comparison teachers (M = 3.64), p < .001. In
pilot schools, two of the lowest scored survey items were the level of support offered by
the new system (M = 3.01) and the system’s ability to impact teacher development (M =
3.16).
As a result of implementation challenges, teachers did not typically receive the
specific and actionable feedback they anticipated at the beginning of the year. Though
teachers continued to believe that the Danielson Framework provided clear expectations,
they did not generally report knowing how to effectively improve performance to meet
the new and demanding standards (particularly Level 4 performance). Given their
initially high expectations, many of the teachers I interviewed at the end of the year were
frustrated that the system did not deliver on its promise of specific and actionable
feedback. Despite these overall trends, the qualitative data suggest that there was
considerable variation in implementation, which contributed to divergent results. In the
section below, I will introduce some variation across teacher and school subgroups and
revisit this in more detail in Part 2 of this dissertation.
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Table 3-1
Teachers’ Survey Perceptions of Evaluation in Pilot and Non-Pilot Schools
Measure
Quality of Evaluation
Measures

Overall Mean
Scale (1-5)
3.77
(0.82)

Pilot Mean
Scale (1-5)
3.53***
(0.88)

Non-Pilot Mean
Scale (1-5)
3.94***
(0.73)

Fairness of Evaluation
Process

3.70
(0.91)

3.40***
(0.93)

3.91***
(0.83)

Frequency of
Evaluation

3.83
(0.96)

3.68***
(0.99)

3.93***
(0.92)

Reported Number of
Observations

4.16
(4.45)

3.91*
(4.18)

4.34*
(4.63)

Reported Number of
Conversations

2.76
(2.68)

2.75
(1.87)

2.76
(3.14)

Quality of Feedback
and Growth

3.54
(0.83)

3.38***
(0.88)

3.65***
(0.78)

Note. N = 2662. All survey questions were asked on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being Strongly
Disagree and 5 being Strongly Agree. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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Table 3-2
Teachers’ Survey Perceptions of INVEST-Specific Features in Pilot Schools
Measure

Level of Understanding
Initial understanding
At the beginning of the
year
Ongoing communication
Throughout the year
Quality of observation
training
Teachscape modules
Teachscape online system
Ease of use
Quality of SGP training
Student Growth modules
Useful Goal-Setting
Goal-setting focused efforts

Overall
Mean
Scale (1-5)

% Strongly
Disagree

% Disagree

% Neutral

% Agree

% Strongly
Agree

3.31
(1.06)

6.78

16.64

23.61

44.52

8.46

3.26
(0.98)
3.33
(0.98)

6.48

17.04

25.65

45.19

5.65

6.11

12.21

30.34

45.05

6.29

3.31
(1.11)
3.32
(0.98)

7.88

17.42

19.93

45.23

9.55

5.09

12.22

34.26

42.41

6.02

5.46

14.81

29.17

44.26

6.30

8.62

22.24

33.83

29.84

5.47

9.06

15.65

38.45

33.21

3.63

4.44

8.78

31.98

47.69

7.12

4.90

9.90

32.65

45.88

6.66

5.37

11.75

33.95

42.92

6.01

4.54

10.19

31.88

46.15

7.23

9.65

21.80

38.78

25.14

4.64

3.99

13.81

30.58

44.39

7.23

7.98

20.50

38.78

27.83

4.92

9.39

15.06

37.55

32.81

5.20

8.26

12.26

37.98

36.86

4.64

10.67

17.25

40.07

27.55

4.45

14.11

17.73

38.07

24.98

5.11

3.31
(0.98)
Set challenging goals
3.01
(1.04)
Accuracy and Fairness of INVEST Measures
Danielson Overall
3.06
(1.00)
Danielson Domain 1:
3.44
Planning and
(0.91)
Preparation
Danielson Domain 2
3.40
Classroom Environment
(0.93)
Danielson Domain 3
3.32
Instruction
(0.95)
Danielson Domain 4
3.41
Professional
(0.93)
Responsibilities
Student Growth Percentiles
2.93
(1.02)
INVEST Growth and Impact
Quality of feedback
3.37
(0.95)
Level of positive support
3.01
(1.00)
Positive impact on my
3.09
teaching
(1.03)
Positive impact on
3.17
development
(0.99)
Positive impact on students
2.98
(1.03)
INVEST Overall Positive
2.89
Impact
(1.09)

Note. N = 1097. All survey questions were asked on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being Strongly
Disagree and 5 being Strongly Agree.
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Section Two: Subgroup Analysis
Individual Variation
To be motivating, performance management systems must align with the
expectancies and values of individual teachers. As a result, initial motivational responses
to performance management policies will vary across subgroups and certain individuals
will be more likely to improve practice over time. Both the qualitative and quantitative
data suggest that teachers’ perceptions of INVEST differed across dimensions of their
effectiveness and experience. Teachers who did not reach the Highly Effective Level but
felt their performance warranted that distinction were subsequently frustrated by the
system. This was particularly the case for veteran teachers, who appeared not to be as
open to the new system as novice teachers. This section explores this variation across
subgroups of teachers.
Teacher Effectiveness. As demonstrated in Table 3-3 below, teachers who
reached Level 4 (Highly Effective status) on the Danielson Framework tended to have
better perceptions of the new evaluation system across the board than teachers at the
lower levels of performance. In particular, Level 4 teachers viewed the evaluation
measures as more accurate and likely to capture their teaching effectiveness, M = 3.86,
when compared to Level 2 (Needs Improvement status) teachers, M = 3.15, p < .001. The
contrast between Level 4 teachers and the other levels was even more pronounced for
perceptions of the fairness of the evaluation process. Though on average, the mean
perception of fairness of the new evaluation system was 3.41, Level 4 teachers were more
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likely to believe the evaluation process was fair (M = 3.92) particularly compared to
Level 1 teachers (M = 2.65) and Level 2 teachers (M = 2.74), p < .001. Interestingly,
though Level 4 teachers were more likely to report that they received an adequate number
of observations and conversations over the course of the year than teachers at other levels
of performance, there were no statistically significant differences between the reported
number of observations and conversations across levels of performance. Indeed, though
the difference was not statistically significant, Level 1 teachers received more
observations and conversations than their higher performing counterparts, suggesting that
the issue was not observational frequency but rather, teachers’ perceptions of
observational accuracy. In terms of perceptions of the system’s positive impact, Level 4
teachers were more likely to view INVEST as leading to opportunities for professional
growth though these differences were not as pronounced as other system attitudes.
It is perhaps not surprising that teachers who reached higher levels of
performance on INVEST were more likely to report that the system fairly captured their
performance. Indeed, motivational theory would predict that we would value the
accuracy of a system that affirms our personal competence. In interviews, the majority of
teachers who had reached the Highly Effective status on the Danielson Framework shared
that they felt validated for their hard work, which many believed had gone unrecognized
under the prior PDAS evaluation system (since the majority of teachers received the
highest ratings). In contrast, the veteran teachers who had always reached the highest
level of performance under the PDAS system (Exceeds Expectations) but were not
receiving Level 4 status on INVEST were more likely to be frustrated by the new system.
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Table 3-3
Individual Variation in Survey Perceptions by Teacher Performance Level on Danielson
Framework

Perceptions

Teachers in All
Schools
Quality of
Measures***
Fairness of
Process***
Frequency of
Evaluation***
Reported Number
of Observations
Reported Number
of Conversations
Quality of
Feedback and
Growth
Teachers in Pilot
Schools
INVEST Level of
Understanding
INVEST Positive
Goal-Setting
Accuracy of
INVEST
Measures***
INVEST Growth
and Impact*
Positive Impact of
INVEST*

Mean
Scale (1-5)

Danielson Observation Rating
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
N=17
N=100
N=806

Level 4
N=115

3.54
(0.87)

3.22
(1.42)

3.15
(0.85)

3.55
(0.85)

3.86
(0.80)

3.41
(0.93)
3.70
(0.98)
3.94
(4.23)
2.77
(1.88)
3.38
(0.89)

2.65
(1.27)
3.09
(1.29)
3.65
(1.97)
2.94
(1.34)
3.22
(1.11)

2.74
(0.94)
3.38
(1.10)
4.04
(1.93)
2.72
(1.50)
3.35
(0.81)

3.43
(0.88)
3.72
(0.95)
4.03
(4.67)
2.77
(1.87)
3.36
(0.90)

3.92
(0.76)
3.97
(0.90)
3.20
(1.95)
2.77
(2.33)
3.59
(0.83)

3.31
(0.82)

3.32
(0.95)

3.16
(0.80)

3.32
(0.82)

3.43
(0.80)

3.17
(0.91)
3.27
(0.79)

3.47
(1.07)
3.50
(0.98)

3.06
(0.93)
3.01
(0.76)

3.17
(0.91)
3.27
(0.79)

3.26
(0.90)
3.45
(0.70)

3.20
(0.82)
2.89
(1.09)

3.54
(0.87)
3.41
(1.06)

3.04
(0.84)
2.73
(1.08)

3.20
(0.82)
2.87
(1.09)

3.31
(0.75)
3.08
(1.09)

Note. Estimates were adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Scheffe method.
The only differences that are statistically significant are between Level 4 and other levels
of performance. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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As the principal at the higher performing intermediate school described, “we have
winners in our building and we have people who are leaders and they all want to be
distinguished, so that’s the biggest thing that’s been a challenge is hurt feelings” (School
4, Principal). Rather than examine internal causes, many of these veterans attributed their
lack of top performance to the unfairness of the system’s measures and processes.
Though perceptions of evaluation varied considerably across teacher
performance levels on the Danielson Framework, there were no statistically significant
differences for any of the evaluation attitudes between teachers with different scores on
the Student Growth Percentiles metric. In other words, while highly effective teachers on
the Danielson Framework had more favorable attitudes towards the new evaluation
system, highly effective teachers on the SGP metric did not react similarly. This can
likely be attributed to the fact that teachers had yet to receive their SGP scores when they
took the survey, so they were unaware of their performance on the metric. At the
beginning of the year, Highly Effective teachers on the Danielson Framework did not
appear to have more positive perceptions of the observation measure than their lowerperforming counterparts. Rather, it was their actual success on the observation framework
that appeared to influence their positive perceptions. If this logic holds, we would expect
that once teachers see their SGP scores, those that reached Highly Effective status will
have more positive perceptions of the accuracy of this measure as well.
Teacher Experience. Consistent with prior research (Johnson, 2005), first year
teachers tended to have better perceptions of the new evaluation system’s ability to help
them grow their practice. Most notably, as demonstrated in Table 3-4, first year teachers
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reported receiving more specific and quality feedback than teachers with additional years
of experience (M = 3.82 compared to M = 3.51, p < .001), which contributed to the fact
that they viewed INVEST as supporting their growth and development. This was perhaps
not surprising given the requirements of the new system. Since first year teachers were on
Track 1, principals were expected to observe and meet with them more frequently over
the course of the year, and in practice, first year teachers reported receiving more
observations (on average 4.69 compared to 4.12) and conversations (3.16 compared to
2.71) than their more experienced counterparts.
However, first year teachers’ generally positive receptivity was not merely due to
the fact that they received additional feedback on their practice under INVEST. Rather,
they had a very different attitude towards the new system all together. As one first year
teacher put it best, “as first year teachers, we don’t know any different than INVEST and
we just want to be better” (School 3, Teacher 4). Indeed, at the beginning of the year, first
year teachers were very open to the new policy, because INVEST was the only system
they had experienced and given their newness to the profession, they recognized the need
to improve their performance. Principals, such as the one from School 5 quoted below,
wished all their teachers would have reacted to INVEST in similar fashion to their
novices:
So I wish I had a building full of new teachers. Because they just eat it up. They
want to be better. They want to know. They want to make sure every i is dotted
and every t is crossed and they’re fresh and energetic and they just want to know
what they have to do to do it right. Those are the ones that are asking all the
questions because they just want to know what do I need to do to be better
because I know I have a lot to learn. And this system really teaches them. PDAS
just wasn’t that kind of system. It wasn’t laid out that way.
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As this quote demonstrates, first year teachers’ initially positive mindsets were reinforced
by the additional feedback they received under the new system.
Table 3-4
Individual Variation in Survey Perceptions by First Year Teacher Status

Evaluation Attitudes
Teachers in All Schools
Quality of Evaluation
Measures*
Fairness of Evaluation
Process
Frequency of Evaluation
Number of observations*
Number of conversations*
Quality of Feedback and
Growth***
Teachers in Pilot Schools
INVEST Level of
Understanding
INVEST Positive GoalSetting
Accuracy of INVEST
Measures
INVEST Growth and
Impact*
Positive Impact of
INVEST

Mean
Scale (1-5)

Experience
First Year
2+ Years
N=183
N=2284

3.77
(0.82)
3.70
(0.91)
3.83
(0.96)
4.16
(4.52)
2.76
(2.60)
3.53
(0.83)

3.88*
(0.79)
3.80
(0.89)
3.86
(1.00)
4.69
(3.05)
3.16
(1.87)
3.82
(0.78)

3.76*
(0.82)
3.69
(0.91)
3.83
(0.95)
4.12
(4.62)
2.72
(2.75)
3.51
(0.83)

3.29
(0.82)
3.15
(0.91)
3.25
(0.79)
3.19
(0.82)
2.88
(1.09)

N=81
3.26
(0.84)
3.28
(0.86)
3.39
(0.70)
3.39
(0.82)
3.06
(1.13)

N=935
3.29
(0.82)
3.14
(0.92)
3.24
(0.80)
3.17
(0.81)
2.86
(1.09)

Note. Estimates were adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Scheffe method.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. The statistically significant differences are between
first year teachers and their more experienced counterparts.
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School Variation
In addition to variation at the individual level, research has also demonstrated that
teachers’ responses to new systems can be influenced by school context. Though certain
individuals may react differently within the same school, in the aggregate, teachers’
responses will likely vary depending on the type and performance level of the school.
The quantitative and qualitative data suggest that teachers’ perceptions of INVEST
differed across level of schooling, and to a lesser extent, by school performance. This
section explores this variation across subgroups of schools.
School Level. Both sources of data suggest that teachers at the high school level
(both ninth grade and senior high school) had lower perceptions of INVEST than other
levels of schooling. Ninth grade teachers reported receiving fewer observations and
conversations than teachers in lower levels of schooling, which confirms qualitative data
that ninth grade principals had more significant challenges with implementation fidelity.
Both ninth grade principals I interviewed shared that they had struggled to maintain the
implementation timeline due to their many other responsibilities. Based on interview
data, it appeared that principals at higher levels of schooling had extra responsibilities
when compared to their counterparts at elementary schools; however, it is not clear what
led to these differing expectations across school levels.
High school teachers also appeared to react differently to the new system
expectations regardless of the frequency of their observation. As demonstrated in Table
3-5, high school teachers reported lower perceptions of understanding of INVEST, less
investment in goal-setting under the new system, and more concerns over the quality of
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Table 3-5
Variation in Teachers’ Survey Perceptions by School Level
Level
Evaluation
Attitudes
Teachers in All
Schools
Quality of
Evaluation
Measures
Fairness of
Evaluation
Process*
Frequency of
Evaluation***
Number of
Observations
Number of
conversations
Quality of
Feedback and
Growth***
Teachers in Pilot
Schools
INVEST
Level of UnderStanding***
INVEST Positive
GoalSetting***
Accuracy of
INVEST
Measures
INVEST Growth
and Impact***
Positive Impact of
INVEST***

Mean
Scale
(1-5)

Pre-K

Elem

Intermediate

Middle

Ninth

High
School

N=183

N=967

N=355

N=369

N=139

N=523

3.77
(0.82)

3.75
(0.81)

3.81
(0.85)

3.83
(0.73)

3.71
(0.84)

3.72
(0.76)

3.73
(0.81)

3.70
(0.91)

3.76
(0.85)

3.76
(0.92)

3.64
(0.88)

3.65
(0.93)

3.47
(0.82)

3.69
(0.94)

3.83
(0.96)
4.16
(4.46)
2.76
(2.69)
3.54
(0.84)

3.93
(0.82)
3.75
(1.88)
2.55
(1.95)
3.52
(0.80)

3.92
(0.90)
4.36
(5.40)
2.69
(1.99)
3.61
(0.83)

3.83
(0.95)
4.29
(2.52)
2.96
(1.87)
3.65
(0.80)

3.75
(0.98)
4.05
(4.96)
2.78
(2.60)
3.45
(0.82)

3.54
(1.04)
3.18
(2.17)
2.31
(1.re)
3.29
(0.88)

3.76
(1.03)
4.33
(4.43)
3.00
(4.40)
3.49
(0.86)

N=81

N=362

N=251

N=154

N=117

N=82

3.31
(0.82)

3.22
(0.74)

3.33
(0.84)

3.48
(0.75)

3.31
(0.79)

3.24
(0.84)

2.93
(0.82)

3.16
(0.91)

3.26
(0.80)

3.14
(0.97)

3.35
(0.82)

3.13
(0.86)

3.14
(0.90)

2.73
(0.90)

3.26
(0.79)

3.27
(0.91)

3.21
(0.80)

3.43
(0.71)

3.26
(0.78)

3.27
(0.77)

2.98
(0.82)

3.20
(0.81)
2.89
(1.09)

3.17
(0.77)
2.90
(1.09)

3.18
(0.83)
2.78
(1.08)

3.42
(0.72)
3.23
(1.02)

3.18
(0.86)
2.75
(1.16)

3.18
(0.74)
2.97
(0.91)

2.79
(0.88)
2.54
(1.15)

Note. Estimates were adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Scheffe method.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. The only differences that are statistically significant
are between Ninth Grade and High School and other levels of schooling.
feedback they received during the evaluation process. As a result, it is perhaps not
surprising that high school teachers were significantly less likely to view the new system
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as supporting professional growth, M = 2.79, and less likely to have a positive impact on
the Aldine ISD, M = 2.54.
Though there was variation, the high school teachers I interviewed tended to be
more skeptical about INVEST’s usefulness and questioned its potential to have a positive
impact on student learning. One skeptical high school teacher shared:
I think initially for myself I thought, wow, this would be really good in the
elementary setting. And then for it to grow as they grow in the system because I
have high school students now that are juniors, they would be like, what? They
have not had that environment of working together and taking the ownership. I’m
sure there’s a way to rein it back in, but for them, especially if you have high
school students that are on the fence about their education, they would be really
hesitant and that will become another barrier and then we’re talking about
evaluating the teacher and the students’ reluctance would be a great factor for me.
Definitely with the elementary kids and then being ground level and their little
natures anyway is to want to work together (School 6, Teacher 4).
As this quotation demonstrates, high school teachers’ concerns were often rooted in their
belief that high school classrooms should be structured differently than elementary
classrooms, given the age and needs of the students. Indeed, high school teachers were
more likely to report concerns over student motivation, which contributed to their
concerns over the feasibility of creating student-led classrooms.
School Performance. Based on the state of Texas’s rating system, Aldine schools
received one of three designations at the end of the 2011-2012 school year – Acceptable
(average performance compared to other schools in the state), Recognized (above average
performance compared to other schools in the state), and Exemplary (exceptional
performance compared to other schools in the state). Both the quantitative and qualitative
data suggested that teachers at higher performing schools appeared to have lower
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Table 3-6
School Variation in Survey Perceptions by School Performance Rating
Evaluation
Attitudes
Teachers in All
Schools
Quality of
Evaluation
Measures
Fairness of
Evaluation
Process**
Frequency of
Evaluation**
Quality of
Feedback and
Growth
Teachers in Pilot
Schools
INVEST Level of
Understanding
INVEST Positive
Goal-Setting**
Accuracy of
INVEST
Measures*
INVEST Growth
and Impact**
Positive Impact of
INVEST**

School Performance Rating
Acceptable
Recognized

Exemplary

N=481

N=1134

N=252

3.78
(0.81)

3.80
(0.77)

3.74
(0.83)

3.89
(0.86)

3.71
(0.91)

3.75
(0.88)

3.63
(0.92)

3.87
(0.95)

3.83
(0.96)
3.55
(0.83)

3.80
(1.01)
3.53
(0.82)

3.81
(0.91)
3.53
(0.83)

4.03
(0.91)
3.69
(0.87)

N=207

N=701

N=66

3.33
(0.82)
3.17
(0.91)
3.28
(0.77)

3.29
(0.86)
3.13
(0.91)
3.24
(0.79)

3.36
(0.82)
3.22
(0.89)
3.30
(0.76)

3.13
(0.72)
2.85
(1.08)
3.07
(0.79)

3.22
(0.81)
2.91
(1.08)

3.16
(0.85)
2.87
(1.12)

3.27
(0.78)
2.96
(1.06)

2.92
(0.84)
2.52
(1.07)

Mean
Scale
(1-5)

Note. Estimates were adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Scheffe method.
Teachers in Pre-K centers and one new school are excluded from the analysis because
they did not have performance data in the 2011-2012 school year.
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. The only differences that are statistically significant are
between Recognized and Exemplary Schools.
perceptions of INVEST on certain measures. As demonstrated in Table 3-6, though there
were no significant differences between Acceptable and Recognized schools, teachers in
Recognized schools tended to have better perceptions of INVEST compared to teachers
in Exemplary schools. In particular, teachers at Recognized schools reported being more
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likely to engage in goal-setting (M = 3.22) compared to teachers at Exemplary schools (M
= 2.85), p < .01 and believed that INVEST measures accurately captured performance,
(M = 3.30 compared to M = 3.07), p < .01. As a result, teachers in Recognized schools
had better overall perceptions of INVEST’s potential for growth and impact than teachers
in Exemplary schools.
At first glance, this finding is somewhat puzzling. Indeed, policymakers would
probably expect higher performing schools to have more positive reactions to new
systems. However, upon further investigation, it is consistent with what the principal in
School 4 shared about the culture on higher performing campuses. Recall her statement
that “we have winners in our building and we have people who are leaders and they all
want to be distinguished, so that’s the biggest thing that’s been a challenge is hurt
feelings.” Based on interview data, it appeared that in previous years, higher-performing
schools had more teachers rated at the top level of the PDAS system. During the pilot
year of implementation, teachers at the high-performing schools I visited remarked that
the principal had very high expectations for performance. As a result, high performing
pilot schools seemed to have more teachers who did not reach their desired level of
performance (Level 4) under the new system, which likely contributed to less positive
perceptions.
Summary
In sum, teachers’ attitudes towards the new system at the beginning of the year
were mixed and subsequently shifted over the course of the year. Across the board,
teachers in the early months of implementation were overwhelmed by the timeline and
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increased expectations associated with INVEST. Yet despite the additional workload, the
majority of teachers appreciated the clarity and comprehensive nature of the new
observation measure (the Danielson Framework) and the detailed and evidence-driven
nature of the new observation process (utilizing the online Teachscape system).
Seemingly, their attitudes toward the new system were influenced by their understanding
of the system’s purpose. Teachers who believed INVEST was designed to support their
professional growth were more likely to report being invested in the system’s potential,
compared to teachers who believed the system was designed primarily as an
accountability tool. Due to challenges with the fidelity of implementation in the first few
months of the year, teachers’ attitudes were still primarily based on their initial
understanding and yet to be influenced by substantial experience with the new system.
At the end of the year, teachers in pilot schools had lower perceptions of
evaluation when compared to teachers in non-pilot schools across all survey metrics –
quality of evaluation measures, fairness of the evaluation process, frequency of
evaluation, and quality of feedback and growth. One plausible explanation for this
finding could be that the substance of INVEST actually fell short of the quality of the
previous PDAS system. Though some of the teachers I interviewed were unquestionably
frustrated by aspects of the new system (e.g., unrealistic performance expectations,
increased workload), only two of the 36 interviewed teachers shared that they preferred
the PDAS system over INVEST, making this an unlikely possibility. However, certain
design features of INVEST (i.e., level of understanding of the purpose, perceived
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accuracy of the new evaluation measures, and the quality of feedback and support) did
indeed appear to influence teachers’ responses to the new policy.
Another plausible explanation could be related to teachers’ individual responses
to change. The modal survey response for the majority of teachers’ perceptions of
INVEST was “neutral,” suggesting that many teachers were skeptical and still unsure of
the potential impact of the new system. As with any significant change, we might
naturally expect initial resistance. However, there was considerable variation in how
teachers responded to INVEST. In particular, subgroup analysis revealed that highly
effective and first year teachers appeared more likely to respond positively to the new
system’s expectations.
A final explanation is rooted in the implementation process at the school level. At
the beginning of the year, many teachers and principals had high expectations for the
system’s promise; however, INVEST did not live up to its potential for many teachers
due to challenges with the fidelity of implementation across schools. As both the
quantitative and qualitative data made clear, high school teachers were less likely to
report being satisfied with the new evaluation system and were particularly concerned
about the attainability of the INVEST measures at the secondary level. The pattern of
perceptions based on school performance is less clear, but evidence does seem to suggest
that teachers at higher performing schools may be more frustrated by failing to meet the
expectations of the new system and in turn, had less positive attitudes towards INVEST.
In short, though there were trends in overall teacher attitudes, there was
considerable variation at the individual, school, and system level that appeared to
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contribute to teachers’ responses to the new system. I will explore how these three
sources of variation influenced outcomes in Part Two of this dissertation, but first, in
Chapter 4, I turn my attention to how initial attitudes toward INVEST translated into
teacher motivation, effectiveness, and retention.
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CHAPTER 4: OVERALL SYSTEM IMPACT
The descriptive analysis presented in Chapter 3 offers a foundation for
understanding the implementation of the new system. It makes clear that teachers’
perceptions of INVEST were influenced by their beliefs in its purpose, their judgments of
the accuracy and fairness of the evaluation measures and process, and the quality of
feedback and opportunities for professional growth. When teachers presumed that
INVEST was designed to enhance teaching and learning, as opposed to serving primarily
as an accountability tool, they were initially more receptive to the new expectations.
Regardless of perceptions of the system’s purpose at the beginning of the year, teachers
generally appreciated the Danielson Framework’s clear and specific expectations for
performance and anticipated receiving more detailed feedback and engaging in additional
dialogue about their practice.
However, on average, at the end of the year, pilot teachers had lower perceptions
of the evaluation system on the majority of metrics assessed on the end of year survey.
Indeed, after experiencing system implementation, many teachers (particularly veterans
who were no longer performing at the top of the evaluation system) conveyed frustration
with the unattainability and unfairness of INVEST’s requirements. Though there was
considerable variation across individual profiles of teachers and school contexts (which
will be discussed in Part Two), these descriptive results suggest that the new system
would not have an overall positive impact on teacher outcomes – i.e., motivation,
effectiveness, and retention.
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This chapter builds on these descriptive results by examining the impact of the
new INVEST system on teacher motivation, effectiveness, and retention. Using
difference-in-differences (DID) analysis, I estimated the treatment effect of the new
system by comparing pilot schools after the treatment (INVEST) both to the pilot schools
before treatment and to the non-pilot schools in the district. As discussed in Chapter 2,
DID presumes that in the absence of INVEST, the pilot schools would have continued on
the same trajectory as the non-pilot schools. Though pilot and non-pilot schools were
equivalent at baseline on key observables, these impact estimates have the potential to be
biased because I cannot account for possible time-varying unobservable characteristics
between the groups of schools (such as features of the school climate). To attempt to
account for differences in the initial composition, I controlled for individual-level
characteristics (i.e., gender, ethnicity, certification type, and years of experience) in the
models. Since the data were collected at the individual level but the intervention was at
the school-level, I clustered my standard errors at the school level and conducted my
analysis with and without school fixed effects, and present both sets of results. Though
this chapter relies primarily on quantitative data, I supplement the discussion of each
impact – motivation (Section One), effectiveness (Section Two), and retention (Section
Three) – with overall trends from the qualitative interview data.
Section One: Motivation
This section explores the impact the pilot had on teachers’ expectancy and value
over the course of the school year. As discussed in Chapter 1, expectancy-value theory
links motivational choices to two sets of beliefs: an individuals’ expectation of success
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(expectancy) and the importance or value the individual associates with specific actions
(value). At its most basic level, individuals ask two central questions when determining
initial motivation: “Can I do the task?” and “Do I want to do the task?” If teachers doubt
whether they are able to reach desired expectations, they will be unlikely to change
behavior. Further, teachers who believe in their ability to reach expectancy but do not
value the action itself or outcomes associated with it are also unlikely to be motivated to
change behavior.
Expectancy (Can I do the task?). Expectancy theorists distinguish between two
general expectancies – self-efficacy and outcome expectations. Self-efficacy captures an
individual’s (e.g., teacher’s) belief about their own level of competence (e.g., personal
expectancy) while outcome expectations document whether an individual thinks a given
behavior will lead to certain outcomes (e.g., system expectancy). In the case of teacher
evaluation, teachers would have high outcome expectancy if they believed their
improvements would be recognized by the system and high overall expectancy if they
believed in their ability to have a significant impact on their students (regardless of the
new system).
Value (Do I want to do the task?). Motivational theorists contend that the
perceived value of any given activity can be determined by four constructs – (1) the
intrinsic interest (or enjoyment) one expects to get from a specific task, (2) attainment
value, or the extent to which a task is consistent with an individual’s self-image, (3) the
utility value of the task for achieving long-range goals, and (4) the perceived cost of a
particular action. The first construct, intrinsic interest, is influenced by a desire to be
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autonomous, competent, and connect with others and in the case of this analysis, is most
in line with teachers’ personal value for their work. The second, third, and fourth
constructs are more related to an extrinsic desire to be recognized or achieve some greater
end – in the case of this analysis, similar to system value.
Quantitative Results
Descriptive Evidence
Table 4-1 captures the unadjusted trends in motivation (expectancy and value
respectively), for all Aldine ISD schools, the pilot schools, and the non-pilot schools.
Prior to the implementation of INVEST (in fall 2012), levels of personal expectancy and
personal value in pilot schools were virtually identical to non-pilot schools. After the
implementation of the new system, pilot schools’ level of expectancy appeared to drop
slightly (-0.04), compared to non-pilot schools where level of expectancy slightly
increased (0.02). More notably, teachers’ level of expectancy on INVEST (system
expectancy) was considerably lower than any of the other measures (M = 3.24, SD =
1.14), which may mean that lower system expectancy is contributing to lower personal
expectancy in pilot schools. Unlike expectancy, teachers’ value in pilot schools remained
consistent over the course of the year, while value in the non-pilot school slightly
increased (0.02). Pilot teachers’ level of value for performing well on the system (system
value) was similar to their personal value at both the beginning and end of the year (M =
4.21, SD = 0.83).
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Table 4-1
Descriptive Statistics: Teacher Self-Reported Motivation (Captured From Survey Data)
Measure
(On a Scale of 1-5)
Personal Expectancy (start of year)
(Belief in Ability)
Personal Expectancy (end of year)
Personal Value (start of year)
(Value for the Work)
Personal Value (end of year)
System Expectancy (end of year)
(Belief in Ability on INVEST)
System Value (end of year)
(Value for INVEST)

Pilot

Non-Pilot

3.98
(0.58)
3.94
(0.60)
4.21
(0.61)
4.21
(0.58)
3.24
(1.14)
4.21
(0.83)

3.98
(0.56)
4.00
(0.58)
4.20
(0.60)
4.22
(0.58)
---

Note. N = 2662 with the exception of System Expectancy and System Value where N =
1097.
Impact Estimates
Using the difference-in-differences identification strategy, I estimated the effect
of the evaluation pilot on teachers’ personal motivation, measured as two separate
constructs of expectancy and value. For each measure, I ran four models. The first two
models did not include school effects, meaning they did not account for school-level
characteristics that may contribute to observed outcomes. The second two models
included school fixed effects to adjust for these characteristics and created a more robust
estimate of the pilot’s impact on motivation. For each of these sets of models, I ran the
analysis with and without individual-level covariates (i.e., race, gender, certification,
years of schooling) to assess whether the impact of the pilot was significant after
controlling for individual level variation.
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As illustrated in Tables 4-2 and 4-3, the impact of the pilot was inconsistent
across the two sources of personal motivation – expectancy and value. For personal
expectancy, summarized in Table 4-2, the relative change in pilot teachers’ expectancy at
the end of the year (the “difference in differences”) was -0.11 standard deviation units (or
0.06 in unstandardized units) and was statistically significant (p < .05) without including
school-level effects or individual-level controls. In other words, at the end of the year,
teachers in pilot schools had lower personal expectancy (or belief in their ability to
impact students) as a result of having participated in the pilot. As demonstrated in Model
3, this estimate remained robust even with the inclusion of school-level fixed effects.
However, when controlling for individual-level characteristics, as done in both Models 2
and 4, the impact estimate was no longer significant at the p < .05 level, but remained
significant at the p < .10 level. Table 4-3 demonstrates that the pilot also had a negative
(though smaller) impact on teachers’ personal value (importance they place on their
work) and that the relative changes in pilot teachers’ value at the end of the year (the
“difference in differences”) was -0.04 standard deviation units (or 0.02 in unstandardized
units). However, this impact was not statistically significant across any of the four
models. Notably, as was the case with expectancy, these estimates did not appear to be
influenced by the inclusion of school-level effects.
Analyses of both personal teacher expectancy and value revealed that the change
in motivation differed across teachers with various characteristics. White teachers had
lower growth in personal expectancy than their non-white colleagues resulting in end of
year scores of M = 3.87, SD = .61 and M = 4.03, SD = .57 respectively and placed less
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value on their teaching over the course of the year, with end of year scores of M = 4.18,
SD = .59 compared to M = 4.24, SD = .57. Traditionally certified teachers increased their
personal value for their work of the course of the year more significantly than their
alternatively certified counterparts, B = 0.12 (.03). These differences are relatively small
in magnitude but the impacts were statistically significant, p < .001. Since performance
data on the Danielson Framework only existed for pilot schools, it could not be included
in the analysis. However, as suggested in Chapter 3, teachers’ performance on the new
system appeared to influence their personal motivation to improve performance. I will
explore this individual-level variation in more detail in Chapter 5.
Table 4-2
Pilot’s Impact on Teachers’ Self-Reported Personal Expectancy
Without School Effects

With School Effects

Measure

Model 1
Impact of the
Pilot

Model 2
With
Individual
Controls

Model 3
Impact of the
Pilot

Model 4
With Individual
Controls

Impact of
INVEST
(Pilot*Year)
Pilot

-0.10 (0.05)*

-0.09 (0.05)

-0.11(0.06)*

-0.09(0.06)

0.00 (0.04)

-0.02 (0.04)

-0.20(0.12)

-0.32(0.27)

Year

0.02 (0.03)

0.01 (0.03)

0.02(0.03)

0.01(0.03)

Gender (female)

0.05 (0.03)

Ethnicity (white)

-0.23 (.03)***

-0.23(0.04)***

Certification
(traditional)
Years of
Experience

-0.01 (0.03)

-0.03(0.04)

0.00 (0.01)

0.02(0.02)

Note. N = 2662. All continuous variables have been standardized.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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0.00(0.03)

Table 4-3
Pilot’s Impact on Teachers’ Self-Reported Personal Value
Without School Effects
Measure

Model 1
Impact of
the Pilot

Impact of INVEST
(Pilot*Year)
Pilot
Year

With School Effects
Model 3
Impact of
the Pilot

Model 4
With Individual
Controls

-0.04(0.05)

Model 2
With
Individual
Controls
-0.02(0.05)

-0.06(0.05)

-0.03(0.05)

0.01(0.05)

-0.02(0.04)

0.28(0.19)

0.71(0.41)

0.04(0.03)

0.03(0.03)

0.05(0.03)

0.03(0.03)

Gender (female)

0.04(0.04)

0.00(0.03)

Ethnicity (white)

-0.13(0.03)**

-0.12(0.03)***

Certification
(traditional)
Years of Experience

0.12(0.03)**

0.10(0.03)***

-0.02(0.02)

-0.01(0.02)

Note. N = 2662. All continuous variables have been standardized.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
Personal motivation for teaching was related to, but not synonymous with,
motivation to perform well on the new evaluation system. As noted above, teachers’ selfefficacy or belief in their own level of competence (e.g., personal expectancy) is distinct
from whether they believe a given behavior will lead to certain outcomes (e.g., system
expectancy). As demonstrated in Table 4-4, teachers’ personal expectancy and system
expectancy are significantly correlated but the magnitude is relatively small in size, r =
.23, p < .001. This suggests that teachers’ belief in their own ability to impact students is
only moderately associated with whether they believe they can perform well on the new
evaluation system itself. The same trends apply to personal and system value. While
teachers may value being good teachers more likely for intrinsic reasons (personal value),
this does not necessarily translate into a desire to be recognized by the new evaluation
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system (system value); indeed, the correlation between the two measures is significant
but of relatively small magnitude, r = .29, p < .001. Interestingly, teachers’ personal
expectancy and value have a higher correlation, r = .45, p < .001, than their system
expectancy and value, r = .26, p < .001. These trends will be explored in further detail in
the qualitative section below.
Table 4-4
Correlations between Teachers’ Personal Motivation and System Motivation
Measure
1. Personal
Expectancy
2. Personal
Value
3. System
Expectancy
4. System
Value

1.
--

2.
0.45***

3.
0.24***

4.
0.26***

--

0.23***

0.29***

--

0.26***
--

Qualitative Results
Teachers’ responses to the new system varied considerably both across and within
schools, which will be discussed in greater depth in Part 2. Despite this variation, there
are several trends in teachers’ personal motivation that help elucidate the quantitative
analysis described above.
Expectancy (Can I Do It?)
As discussed in Chapter 3, teachers reported that they appreciated the Danielson
Framework’s comprehensive nature and specifically outlined expectations. By providing
a “clear roadmap,” teachers knew what was expected of their performance, which led to
relatively high levels of expectancy at the beginning of the year. As one teacher shared,
“That is like my Bible, you know? My direction. Without this rubric, you don’t know what
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to do. You don’t know your expectation” (School 6, Teacher 2). However, after the
system was implemented, teachers began to view the expectations as unachievable, which
lowered system expectancy. Given the low percentage of teachers reaching Level 4 status
(only 14% in the district as a whole and as low as 0% in some schools), their perceptions
of the challenge associated with reaching Level 4 behavior were quite rational. According
to one teacher, the principal essentially told teachers not to bother trying, “maybe it was
the way it was presented to us by our administration, but they made it seem like it was
going to be almost impossible to get a 4” (School 5, Teacher 3). This lowered system
expectancy also affected teachers’ personal expectancy as educators by making them feel
inadequate. In part, this was due to the terminology associated with the new system,
which referred to teachers meeting standards as “effective” or “proficient,” which several
teachers found to be particularly demeaning: “because the word proficient, even when I
was a first year teacher, kind of sounds like I’m just average. I’m barely good enough.
That’s discouraging” (School 6, Teacher 1).
Value (Do I Want To Do It?)
Despite these frustrations, the majority of teachers expressed a strong desire to
reach the top level of the evaluation system (Level 4 performance). For many veteran
teachers, this was a matter of pride; indeed, achieving highly effective status was
necessary to maintain their self-image. One seasoned veteran compared his system value
to his work with students, “We model that in the classroom, we want our students to be
the best, and we provide them opportunities in the classroom to be the best and to get A’s
and be those distinguished scholars. It should be no different with appraisals” (School 5,
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Teacher 1). Teachers’ frustration with the new system often resulted from not meeting
expectations, which indicated a high level of initial extrinsic attainment value. One
veteran teacher who did not reach Level 4 performance shared, “I thought I was doing
everything that was highly effective. I didn’t change anything I’ve done in the last year
when I was always such a strong teacher. I’ve always been exceeds... It’s very
discouraging” (School 2, Teacher 1).
Though teachers generally valued performing well on the system, this did not
necessarily result in changes in the personal value they placed on their teaching and, in
some cases, may have contributed to lower personal value. Many teachers reported that
they were already motivated to improve their teaching and that evaluation would not have
much of an impact on their personal value for teaching in either direction: “I don’t really
think an evaluation should be a motivation to be a good teacher. I think that’s just part of
my job” (School 5, Teacher 4). Though teachers may have continued to value teaching
regardless of the new system, INVEST often led to a significantly intensified workload,
which decreased many teachers’ level of enjoyment with their daily experience as
educators. As discussed in Chapter 3, these requirements included watching 16 hours of
video (in a prescribed timeframe) and submitting specific documents to provide evidence
of mastery on the Framework. When I asked teachers to describe INVEST, “more
paperwork” was a fairly common initial response. One teacher described how the
increased workload limited her ability to focus on what mattered most: teaching; “I don’t
know. I’m going to be honest here. I just think it’s becoming a bit much. I think what
we’re doing is we’re getting away from what the root cause is, and I think it’s learning…
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INVEST means I do more paperwork than teaching” (School 3, Teacher 6). Teachers
generally did not believe that the extra work (or cost) aligned with valued outcomes,
which for some, decreased their level of interest in their work: “it’s extra responsibilities
being held over my head and keeps me from focusing on my teaching. It’s been a huge
source of stress” (School 5, Teacher 2).
Section Two: Effectiveness
Given INVEST’s limited (and slightly negative) effect on teachers’ expectancy,
we would likely not expect to see positive changes in teachers’ effectiveness as a result of
the new system. However, as theory indicates, teachers’ initial motivation is distinct from
the volition necessary to improve performance and sustain changes over time.
Unfortunately, I do not have a strong measure of teachers’ volition, so as a proxy I will
use the end of year survey question which asked teachers to indicate whether they had
implemented changes in their practice as a result of the new evaluation system. To assess
effectiveness, teachers were evaluated on observations over the course of the year using
the Danielson Framework for Teaching and on their impact on student growth using
Student Growth Percentiles.
Danielson Framework (Danielson). The Framework for Teaching consists of 22
components divided into 4 broader domains – Planning and Preparation, Classroom
Environment, Instruction, and Professional Responsibilities. Over the course of the year,
teachers received several walkthroughs depending on their years of experience and
performance (novices and ineffective teachers received additional walkthroughs) and at
least one formal observation. At the end of the year, these scores were weighted (50%
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walkthroughs, 50% formal observation) to calculate a final score on each of the four
domains and then an average score (on a scale of 1-4). Teachers were also given an
overall rating that differentiated four levels of performance – Ineffective (Level 1), Needs
Improvement (Level 2), Effective (Level 3), and Highly Effective (Level 4). Since this
measure was only available in pilot schools at the end of the year, it cannot unfortunately
be used as a measure in the impact analysis.
Student Growth Percentiles (SGPs). To measure teacher performance based on
student growth, the district used a student growth percentile measure based on the Colorado
Growth Model. The model compared the change in each student’s achievement score to all
other students in Aldine who had similar achievement scores in the previous year and then
assigned the teacher an overall SGP score (on a scale of 1-100) based on the median SGP
of their students. Because the measure could only be calculated for teachers in tested grades
and subjects, the sample of teachers for which the measure was available is quite limited.
Educators outside of tested subjects set Student Growth Objectives (SGOs) to measure
their students’ progress over the course of the year; however, given challenges with
implementation, these results were not available. Given the limited sample for which SGPs
are available (teachers in grades 3 to 9 in tested subjects), analysis of this data was not
restricted to teachers who completed both surveys.
At the end of the year, the “Final INVEST Rating” was supposed to be drawn
from scores on both observation and student growth (either student growth percentiles or
student growth objectives). To be Highly Effective or Effective overall, teachers would
need to be rated Highly Effective or Effective (respectively) on both measures, and
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teachers would be scored as Needs Improvement or Ineffective if they received this rating
in either of the measures. However, since the district leadership decided to only use the
Danielson Framework for consequence (i.e., to put teachers on a professional growth
plan) in the pilot year, many principals did not share SGP data with their teachers. It is
not possible to ascertain how many teachers viewed their SGP results, but according to
the data consultant, very few teachers had logged into the system and of the 36 teachers I
interviewed, only two had seen their results. Given the limited sample and lack of use (as
well as some methodological challenges which will be discussed in Chapter 6), the SGP
effectiveness measure has some notable limitations as a measure of pilot impact;
however, it is the only teacher effectiveness measure that is available prior to and post
INVEST implementation.
Quantitative Results
Descriptive Evidence
Table 4-5 summarizes the effectiveness results (SGPs and Danielson
respectively), for all Aldine ISD schools, the pilot schools, and the non-pilot schools.
Prior to the implementation of INVEST (in the 2011-2012 school year), teachers’ SGP
ratings in pilot schools (M = 50.96, SD = 13.04) were slightly higher than non-pilot
schools (M = 49.70, SD = 12.25). After the implementation of the new system, pilot
teachers SGP ratings dropped slightly (-0.07), compared to non-pilot schools where
teachers’ SGP scores slightly increased (+0.95). In pilot schools, teachers’ scores on the
Danielson Framework averaged 3.19 with a fairly restricted range (as most teachers
scores hovered around an average of 3). As far as reported changes in practice, teachers
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in non-pilot schools had higher scores (M = 3.42, SD = .93), compared to teachers in pilot
schools (M = 3.27, SD = .99), p < .05, which may be one possible explanation for why
they saw slightly improved effectiveness scores.
Table 4-5
Descriptive Statistics: Teacher Effectiveness and Reported Change in Practice
Measure

Pilot

Non-Pilot

Danielson Effectiveness (end of year)
(On a scale of 1-4)

3.20
(0.37)

--

SGP Effectiveness (previous year)
(On a scale of 1-100)

50.96
(13.04)

49.70
(12.25)

SGP Effectiveness (end of year)
(On a scale of 1-100)

50.89
(12.96)

50.65
(13.55)

Reported Changes in Practice
(On a scale of 1-5)

3.27*
(0.99)

3.42*
(0.93)

Note. N = 906 for SGPs (end of year). N = 1097 for Danielson Effectiveness.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
Impact Estimates
As with motivation, I used difference-in-differences analysis to estimate the
impact of the INVEST pilot on teachers’ effectiveness, measured by Student Growth
Percentiles, and ran four models to control for both school-level and individual-level
effects. As demonstrated in Table 4-6, the pilot did not have a significant impact on
teachers’ effectiveness on Student Growth Percentiles. The relative change in pilot
teachers’ SGP effectiveness at the end of the year (the “difference in differences”) was 0.08 standard deviation units (or -1.02 in unstandardized units) without including school117

level effects or individual-level controls. As the descriptive data suggested, teachers in
pilot schools had lower effectiveness on SGPs at the end of the year (and less growth
from the beginning of the year) than teachers in non-pilot schools. However, this
“difference in differences” estimate was not statistically significant with or without
school effects in the model. Additionally, the estimate of the pilot’s impact became
slightly positive (though not statistically significant) when controlling for individual-level
characteristics in both Models 2 and 4.
Several teacher-level characteristics were associated with changes in SGP
effectiveness. Traditionally certified teachers had greater growth which resulted in higher
SGP scores at the end of the year, M = 52.82, SD = 13.06, when compared to their
alternatively certified counterparts, M = 49.93, SD = 12.76, p < .001, and this coefficient
remains significant even with the inclusion of school effects. Though it was not one of
the central research questions, this analysis provides evidence in a contested debate
among scholars about the relative merit of traditionally certified vs. alternatively certified
routes into teaching (Darling-Hammond, Berry, & Thoreson, 2001; Goldhaber & Brewer,
2000). Notably, Aldine ISD has a fairly strategic recruitment process, where they rely on
attracting candidates from highly ranked teacher education schools to do their student
teaching in Aldine and then encourage those student teachers to move into full-time
positions. This may help explain the significant results. Additionally teachers’ years of
experience were negatively correlated with SGP effectiveness (B = -.06); however, this
coefficient was no longer statistically significant when including school fixed effects, as
shown in Model 4. Unlike the case with motivation, the inclusion of school effects
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impacts the overall estimates, indicating the importance of school-level characteristics
(which will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6).
Table 4-6
Pilot’s Impact on Teacher Effectiveness (as measured by SGPs)
Without School Effects

With School Effects

Measure

Model 1
Impact of
the Pilot

Model 2
With Individual
Controls

Model 3
Impact of the
Pilot

Impact of INVEST
(Pilot*Year)
Pilot

-0.06 (0.10)

0.01 (0.11)

-0.03(0.11)

Model 4
With
Individual
Controls
0.02(0.10)

0.08 (0.10)

0.05 (0.11)

0.53(0.10)***

0.34(0.14)*

Year

0.06 (0.07)

0.05 (0.07)

0.07(0.08)

0.08(0.07)

Gender (female)

-0.04 (0.07)

0.02(0.07)

Ethnicity (white)

0.04 (.08)

0.06(0.06)

Certification
(traditional)
Years of Experience

0.24 (0.06)***

0.26(0.02)***

-0.06 (0.04)*

-0.04 (0.04)

Note. N = 906. All continuous variables have been standardized.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
As discussed in Chapter 1, a growing body of research has examined the validity
and reliability of new teacher effectiveness measures. Historically, researchers have
found measuring teachers’ performance to be incredibly challenging given the reality that
quality teaching is influenced by contextual factors and further, that there is considerable
disagreement about the validity of various outcomes (e.g., test scores). To address this
concern, INVEST mirrors most new performance management systems and uses multiple
indicators, which raises questions about the correlation between evaluation measures. As
demonstrated in Table 4-7, there is a significant but relatively low correlation between
SGPs and Danielson, r = .27, p < .001, which is consistent with other recent research
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(Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013). Given the fact that the Danielson
Framework was used as part of the system during the pilot year, it is likely the better
indicator of teacher performance at this stage. However, since it was not available prior to
the start of the pilot, it unfortunately could not be used in impact analysis for this year.
Regardless of the effectiveness measure used, the impact on teachers’
improvement may take longer than a year to translate into changes in practice
(particularly given implementation challenges associated with the pilot). In support of
this postulation, Table 4-7 shows that teachers’ reported change in practice (on the
survey) was not significantly correlated with their performance on either SGPs (r = -.12)
or Danielson scores (r = .04) in the pilot year. Initially, I planned to assess whether
teachers’ motivation mediated teachers’ level of effectiveness, but since the pilot did not
impact teacher effectiveness, I was not able to test for mediation. However, as
demonstrated in Table 4-7, teachers’ level of motivation (both personal and system) was
associated with their Danielson rating at the end of the pilot year. Teachers’ personal
value for teaching, as well as their value for the system, were both positively correlated
with the Danielson rating, r = .14, p < .001, though this is relatively small in magnitude
and does not indicate the directionality in the relationship. In other words, receiving a
higher rating could have increased teachers’ value or teachers’ value could have led them
to perform better on the system. Though both personal and system expectancy are
correlated with the Danielson rating, these relationships are quite small (r = .08 and r =
.11, p < .001 respectively); however the relationship between system expectancy and
reported changes in practice is a considerably greater, r = .25, p < .001. These
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correlations suggest that there is a positive (and statistically significant) relationship
between teachers’ level of motivation, their reported changes in practice, and their
effectiveness (as measured on the Danielson Framework). Interestingly, none of these
motivational measures were correlated with teachers’ performance on the Student Growth
Percentile measure. This finding could be due to limitations in the Student Growth
Percentile measure since it only captures one year of data. Alternatively, since teachers
were not made aware of their results on SGPs, we might also expect a lagged effect and
should examine whether these results are significant in a subsequent year.
Table 4-7
Correlation between Effectiveness Measures
Measure

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

1. SGPs (end of
year)
2. Danielson (end of
year)
3. Changes in
Practice
4. Personal
Expectancy
5. System
Expectancy
6. Personal Value

--

0.27***

0.08

-0.12

0.04

-0.01

0.06

--

0.04

0.08**

0.11***

0.14***

0.14***

--

0 .15***

0.25***

0.20***

0.18***

--

0.24***

0.46***

0.26***

--

0.23***

0.26***

--

0.27***

7. System Value

6.

7.

--

*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001

Qualitative Results
There are several trends in the qualitative data that help elucidate the quantitative
analysis described above. As discussed in Chapter 1, even if teachers are initially
motivated to improve performance, when individuals move from the deliberation to the
implementation phase, they need to commit to a specific goal and develop a plan for
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translating that goal into action. To do so, individuals must engage in deliberate practice
by setting specific interim goals, receiving immediate feedback on performance, and
consistently working towards mastery of internalized goals. As discussed in Chapter 3,
since INVEST utilized a new online system, most teachers initially anticipated receiving
detailed feedback and engaging in more frequent conversations about improving their
practice. Despite the presence of these systems and structures, principals were
overwhelmed by the timeline in the early months of the year and while some schools
provided extensive support for teachers, many schools struggled to implement the new
system with fidelity. As a result, teachers reported that they did not receive adequate
feedback to improve performance over the course of the year. This was particularly
frustrating for teachers who were no longer at the top of the evaluation system and came
to believe that no matter how hard they worked, Level 4 performance would remain
unreachable.
Even when teachers reported receiving the required number of observations, they
questioned whether the evaluation process as a whole was set up to provide feedback that
could result in meaningful changes in practice. When fully implemented, veteran teachers
received three walkthroughs and one formal observation and novices received six
walkthroughs and two formals over the course of the year (with at least a month typically
between observations). One teacher noted how more immediate feedback would have
helped her determine if her instruction was effectively meeting students’ needs: “So if
you are going to come and observe a lesson one day, then to see whether the changes
worked or not, you need to come back the next day…and help me determine what to
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improve” (School 2, Teacher 6). Given administrator time constraints, this type of
immediate and targeted feedback was a fairly rare occurrence. Additionally, though
teachers reported they had a clear picture of where they were performing in relation to the
standards (given the specificity of the Danielson Framework), the feedback they received
on how to improve performance was not necessarily actionable. Teachers needed a
clearer picture of what the next level of performance looked like in practice and more
concrete and specific steps to take to become Level 4 teachers. Though the Teachscape
modules assisted by providing videos of various components, teachers expressed concern
that these videos “weren’t grade-level appropriate” or “of our kids,” and as a result, did
not reflect their experience as a teacher in the district.
Theory suggests that goals are most likely to be achieved when individuals are
engaged in self-reflection and planning. Practically speaking, given the constraints on
administrators’ time, the evaluation process appeared to be more effective when teachers
were able to drive their improvement efforts. For some teachers, INVEST pushed them to
self-reflect and changed the way they approached their teaching: “I’ve had to engage in
self-reflection which has made me a better teacher. It’s made me a more thoughtful
teacher as far as the lessons that I’m delivering, how I’m delivering them and how I’m
planning the interaction around what we’re doing” (Teacher 3, School 1). These teachers
owned their own improvement process; as one such teacher remarked, “I’m one of those
people who puts it on myself. It’s something I need to figure out” (Teacher 3, School 4).
To the contrary, when feedback was viewed as too prescriptive, it had the adverse effect
and reduced the likelihood that it would result in changes in practice. As one teacher
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shared, “I understand they have to have rubrics but sometimes it’s like all the teachers
we don’t all fit in one box. Sometimes we have to deviate from what the rubric says. As
teachers we need to do what’s best for our kids” (School 2, Teacher 3). Though there was
considerable variation in the feedback process (which will be discussed in Chapters 6 and
7), it was more common for teachers to report that it was principal-driven than focused on
building teacher ownership. As a result, it is perhaps not surprising that INVEST did not
have an overall positive impact on teachers’ effectiveness (as measured by SGPs) during
the pilot year.
Section Three: Retention
To sustain improvements over time and commitment to the profession itself,
teachers must stay engaged and avoid experiencing burnout. As theory demonstrates,
burnout is characterized by a state of exhaustion where an individual becomes cynical
about their value and impact in their work, resulting in higher rates of occupational
turnover. It is characterized by three components – (1) emotional exhaustion, which
measures feelings of being emotionally overextended and exhausted by one’s work, (2)
depersonalization, which measures an unfeeling and impersonal response towards the
beneficiaries of one’s instruction (similar to a lack of value), and (3) lack of personal
accomplishment, which measures feelings of competence and successful achievement
(similar to a lack of expectancy). To measure the systems’ impact on burnout, teachers
responded to the burnout scale on the end of year survey, and then teacher turnover was
tracked at the individual level the summer following the implementation of the pilot.
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It is important to note that not all teacher turnover was viewed as negative by the
district. Indeed, one of the goals of INVEST was to remove ineffective educators from
the classroom. Thus, in addition to describing retention in the aggregate, this chapter will
also examine the level of teacher burnout and turnover by effectiveness level.
Quantitative Results
Descriptive Evidence
Table 4-8 captures the unadjusted trends in teacher turnover and burnout for all
Aldine ISD schools, the pilot schools, and the non-pilot schools. The year prior to the
implementation of INVEST (in spring 2012), teachers in non-pilot schools had higher
percentages of teachers leaving the district (M = 10.26, SD = 4.63) when compared to
teachers in pilot schools (M = 9.75, SD = 4.30). After the implementation of the new
system, turnover rates increased in both pilot and non-pilot schools, but grew more
significantly in pilot schools (+3.42), compared to non-pilot schools (+2.00). In terms of
burnout, which is one possible indicator of future turnover, teachers’ burnout in pilot
schools was slightly higher in pilot schools (M = 2.98, SD = .93) compared to non-pilot
schools (M = 2.83, SD = .33).
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Table 4-8
Descriptive Statistics: School-Level Turnover and Teacher-Level Self-Reported
Experiences
Measure

Pilot

Non-Pilot

School-Level Turnover (previous year)

9.75
(4.30)

10.26
(4.63)

School-Level Turnover (end of year)

13.17
(5.20)

12.26
(5.05)

Teacher Burnout
(captured from end of year survey data, scale 1-5)

2.98
(0.927)

2.83
(0.33)

Teacher Turnover Intentions
(captured from end of year survey data, Scale 1-5)

2.33
(0.27)

2.25
(0.33)

Note. N = 74 schools since turnover can only be collected historically in the aggregate at
school level
Impact Estimates
Using the difference-in-differences approach, I estimated the effect of the
evaluation pilot on teachers’ turnover, which only included teachers who left the district
entirely (leavers). Unlike the motivation and effectiveness measures, turnover data preand post-pilot implementation was only available at the school level, so I ran three
instead of four models. The first model did not include individual or school level
covariates, meaning it did not account for individual or school characteristics that may
have contributed to observed outcomes in teacher turnover. The second model included
individual covariates and the third model included individual and school covariates to
create a more robust estimate of the pilot’s impact on teacher turnover.
As demonstrated in Table 4-9, the pilot had a positive impact on teacher turnover
(or in other words, a negative impact on teacher retention). The relative change in pilot
schools’ turnover rates at the end of the year (the “difference in differences”) was 0.29
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standard deviation units (or 1.42 in unstandardized units) though this difference was not
statistically significant in any of three models. It is important to note that since this
analysis was run at the school-level, the small sample size (N = 34 for pilot schools and N
= 40 for non-pilot schools) may be contributing to the lack of statistical significance. As
demonstrated in Models 2 and 3, the magnitude of this estimate is not affected by the
inclusion of individual or school covariates.
Teacher turnover differed across teachers with various characteristics. More
experienced and white teachers had slightly lower rates of turnover then their less
experienced and non-white colleagues; however, the difference in ethnicity was not
statistically significant when controlling for school effects. The influence of teacher
experience persisted even when including school controls, and an increase in one
standard deviation in teachers’ years of experience was associated with a decrease in .11
standard deviations in the rate of teacher turnover, p < .001. Novice teachers had higher
rates of teacher turnover than their experienced counterparts. Indeed, 13.29% of teachers
in their first three years in this dataset left teaching in the district at the end of the 20122013 year, compared to 9.80% of teachers with more than three years of experience, and
this turnover rate was close to 15% for teachers in their first year teaching in pilot
schools.
Though teacher effectiveness data could not be included in this school-level
model, descriptive data suggested that the preliminary results trend in the direction of the
district’s theory of action. The pilot schools had higher turnover rates of Ineffective
Teachers (12.50%) and Needs Improvement Teachers (12.63%) when compared to
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Effective (10.13%) and Highly Effective Teachers (9.00%) on the Danielson Framework
for Teaching. In other words, though turnover rates increased slightly in pilot schools,
this increase appeared to be due to the exiting of a greater percentage of underperforming
teachers. However, it is important to note that without prior years of data, we cannot
know whether this was a continuation of previous years’ trends or a result of the INVEST
pilot. Unlike the Danielson Framework for Teaching, there were no notable differences in
the turnover rates of teachers based on their performance on Student Growth Percentiles.
As noted above, this is likely due to the fact that the majority of teachers had yet to be
made aware of their performance on the student growth metric.
Notably, none of the school level controls were associated with teachers’ level of
turnover. This finding was somewhat surprising given prior research on the influence of
school characteristics on rates of teacher turnover (Ingersoll, 2001). However, the
demographics of Aldine ISD help shed some light on this initially striking finding. As
noted in Chapter 2, more than 84.9% of all Aldine students are classified as economically
disadvantaged and receive Title I support and the racial composition is 95.9% non-white,
so there is very little variation in these measures across campuses. As far as enrollment,
the district is also unique in that it has quite large enrollment across different levels of
schooling. So while there are considerably more students at the high school level (M =
1810) when compared to the Pre-K level (M = 657), there is very little variation in
enrollment size across the other levels of schooling (average sizes of other levels of
schooling range from 819 to 947). This may help to explain why enrollment does not
predict teacher turnover at the school level.

128

Table 4-9
Pilot’s Impact on School-Level Turnover
Measure

Model 1
Impact of the Pilot

Impact of INVEST
(Pilot*Year)
Pilot

Model 2
With Individual
Controls

Model 2
With Additional
School Controls

0.29 (0.32)

0.26 (0.31)

0.29 (0.32)

-0.10 (0.21)

0.04 (0.21)

-0.00 (0.22)

0.40 (0.22)

0.38 (0.21)

0.43 (0.24)

Gender (female)

-0.02 (0.01)*

0.00 (0.01)

Ethnicity (white)

0.01 (0.01)

-0.01 (0.01)

Certification
(traditional)
Years of Experience

0.01 (0.01)

-0.01 (0.01)

Year

-0.11 (0.04)**

-0.13 (0.04)**

Percent African American

0.02 (0.04)

Percent Hispanic

0.04 (0.04)

Economically disadvantaged

-0.02 (0.02)

Limited English Proficient

-0.01 (0.01)

Enrollment

0.01 0(.00)

Performance
(Student Growth
Percentiles)

-0.01 (0.01)

Note. N = 74 (School-Level Analysis). All continuous variables have been standardized.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
Teacher turnover is influenced by a number of different factors, which will be
discussed in more detail in Part 2. However, one cause of turnover which has the
potential to result from new and demanding evaluation systems is employee burnout. As
demonstrated in Table 4-10, teachers’ burnout was significantly correlated with their
turnover intentions (i.e., whether they reported planning to leave teaching), r = .45, p <
.001 and to a lesser extent with actual turnover (i.e., whether they left the district in the
pilot year), r = .08, p < .001. As reported in Table 4-9 above, teachers’ higher rates of
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burnout in pilot schools suggest that burnout may be a potential concern to monitor for
future years of the system.
Teachers’ level of burnout and turnover intentions were negatively correlated with
teachers’ value and expectancy (both personal and system). Overall, teachers’ personal
value for teaching, as well as their personal expectancy, were negatively associated with
burnout, which is r = -.41 (for value) and r = -.34 (for expectancy), both p < .001, and
desire to leave teaching, r = -.38 (for value) and r = -.19 (for expectancy), both p < .001.
Table 4-10
Correlation between Teacher-Level Turnover, Burnout, Turnover Intentions, and
Motivation
Measure
1. Turnover
(teacher-level)
2. Turnover Intentions
(end of year survey)

1.
--

2.
0.33***

3.
0.08***

4.
-0.02

5.
0.01

6.
-0.04*

7.
-0.03

--

0.44***

-0.19***

-0.20***

-0.38***

-0.23***

--

-0.34***

-0.25***

-0.41***

-0.20***

--

0.24***

0.46***

0.26***

--

0.23***

0.26***

--

0.27***

3. Burnout
(end of year survey)
4. Personal Expectancy
(end of year survey)
5. System Expectancy
(end of year survey)
6. Personal Value
(end of year survey)
7. System Value
(end of year survey)

--

*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001
Teachers’ overall motivation for teaching was more associated with burnout and turnover
intentions than their motivation on the system itself; however, both system value and
system expectancy were also negatively correlated with burnout and turnover intentions.
In sum, these correlations suggest that more motivated teachers were less likely to
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burnout and leave the district. The qualitative data help provide a more in depth
understanding of these quantitative trends.
Qualitative Results
Most teachers (as all new employees) began teaching engaged in their practice
and then for some, certain experiences caused this initial enthusiasm to turn into cynicism
and perceptions of ineffectiveness. To avoid this type of burnout, teachers must continue
to place value on their work and believe in their expectancies as educators. By focusing
attention on teachers’ impact on student growth, INVEST had the potential to create a
more personalized connection between teachers and their students and subsequently, to
build value in their work. Indeed, at the beginning of the year, many teachers reported
that they appreciated the fact that the rubric was “student-centered” and believed it would
make them more focused on building relationships with their students.
However, by the end of the year, INVEST had resulted in burnout for a subgroup
of teachers. In particular, INVEST lowered expectancy for teachers who did not reach
Level 4 performance, which challenged their perceptions of competence and led to
heightened frustration. This type of experience with burnout eroded teachers’
professional identify, making them feel unappreciated for their hard work. Several
teachers speculated that these feelings of frustration and exhaustion could lead to higher
rates of teacher turnover:
The morale is going to go down and the people will leave the district and go
somewhere else that doesn’t have INVEST. INVEST is a major problem because
a lot of people here are already looking at other districts to get out of Aldine.
They don’t want to stay in Aldine. And it’s INVEST. Because at first they were
like, oh, OK, let’s see what’s going to happen and then when we got toward the
end, like now, and everyone’s getting their summatives, and even when they were
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getting their walkthroughs throughout the year, they weren’t in agreement with it,
so I think people are not just going to go to different schools, they are going to
leave the district. Like I said, the morale is horrible (School 3, Teacher 1).
As discussed above, this lowered expectancy was exacerbated by the terminology
associated with the new system. Many of the veteran educators who had become
conditioned to performing well on the PDAS evaluation system found it insulting to be
referred to as merely “effective” or “proficient.” This new terminology did not recognize
teachers’ accomplishments, which may have contributed to increased turnover (or may do
so in subsequent years), particularly among veteran teachers.
In addition to feeling frustrated by not meeting expectations, many teachers were
overwhelmed by the increased expectations associated with INVEST (e.g., watching
modules on the Danielson Framework, assembling an artifact binder with results from the
year). INVEST increased expectations for teachers without providing additional time
outside of their other responsibilities, and the demands placed on teachers often
outstretched existing capacity. In particular, INVEST created additional paperwork,
which required additional time from teachers but did not always align with their valued
outcomes. As one teacher shared, “We have to do all the documentation turn in all the
proof... It’s just more work on the teacher. I am so buried in paperwork which means by
teaching falls by the wayside” (School 6, Teacher 2). This frustration, coupled with the
imbalance of demands and resources, left a subgroup of teachers feeling burnt out from
teaching in the district.
However, it is again important to note that these concerns over burnout
disproportionality affected lower-performing teachers. Indeed, teachers performing at the
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Highly Effective level on Danielson had significantly lower levels of burnout
comparatively. This analysis provides preliminary data that suggests the policy may have
promoted what some policymakers have referred to as “strategic retention.” In other
words, the system appears to do a better job of retaining the high performers and
encouraging the low performers to exit the district.
Summary
In sum, this chapter demonstrated that INVEST did not have an overall positive
impact on teachers’ outcomes of interest. For motivation, INVEST had no impact on
teachers’ personal value (or belief in the importance of their work) and a negative impact
on teachers’ personal expectancy (or belief in their own ability as educators). Notably,
teachers’ personal motivation for their work was only moderately correlated with their
motivation for the INVEST system itself. At the beginning of the year, teachers generally
reported that the Danielson Framework offered clear and specific expectations, which
helped build initial personal – and system – expectancy. However, over the course of the
system’s implementation, frustration heightened among teachers who were unable to
meet the Level 4 expectation of creating student-led classrooms, subsequently lowering
both personal and system expectancy. Teachers’ motivation to stay committed in the face
of these challenging new standards was influenced by their value for the system. If
teachers felt the system aligned to their own vision of effective teaching and would
support their growth as professionals, they were more likely to value performing well on
INVEST. However, if they viewed the system as creating an unnecessary additional
workload, these costs contributed to lower overall value.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, given the limited effect on motivation, INVEST did not
have a significant impact on teacher effectiveness (as measured by the Student Growth
Percentile metric). Since the Danielson Framework for Teaching (observation) measure
could not be analyzed longitudinally due to a lack of baseline data, this analysis relied
solely on the Student Growth Percentile (SGP) measure to capture effectiveness. Though
the two measures were significantly correlated, the size of the relationship was relatively
small, r = .27, p < .001. Unfortunately, the SGP measure was limited because it only
applied to teachers in tested subjects and the majority of principals did not share this data
with their teachers during the pilot year. As discussed in Chapter 1, to increase
effectiveness, teachers need to engage in a process of deliberate practice, where they
monitor their progress towards goals and receive immediate, specific, and consistent
feedback throughout the course of the year. Since the SGP data was not made available to
teachers, this was not the kind of metric they could use to actively improve performance.
In contrast, teachers could use the Danielson Framework during the year to set interim
goals and receive feedback on specific aspects of practice. However, due to challenges
with implementation, there was variation in the extent to which teachers reported
receiving targeted support from their principals and making changes in their practice.
The impact on teacher retention was more nuanced. Overall, pilot schools had
slightly higher turnover rates than non-pilot schools, though these differences were not
statistically significant. Qualitative data suggested that this increase in turnover in pilot
schools seemed to be driven in part by the same frustration (and burnout) resulting from
the perceived unattainability of Level 4 performance on the new evaluation system
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coupled with an intensified workload. However, these rates were not consistent across all
subgroups of teachers. In particular, Highly Effective teachers appeared less likely to feel
burnt out by their work and more likely to stay at their schools when compared to their
Ineffective and Needs Improvement counterparts, which suggests that the policy may
indeed be having its intended effect on teacher retention by retaining the higher
performers and encouraging the lower performers to leave the district.
While informative, these overall trends only begin to tell the story of INVEST’s
implementation and impact. Given the limited or null effects, one might conclude that
INVEST did not have much influence on teachers in either direction. In fact, many of the
previous studies on performance management systems have stopped at this stage of the
analysis and reached similar conclusions. Regrettably, these studies leave much to be told
about the realities of implementation. In Aldine ISD, overall trends masked considerable
variation in teachers’ responses to INVEST. As was the case with teacher retention, some
of this variation across outcomes was associated with teachers’ individual characteristics.
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 3, this variation was also driven by teachers’
perceptions of specific design features of INVEST. Both individual and system level
factors were influenced by the climate and fidelity of implementation at the school level.
Indeed, despite these overall trends, this analysis revealed that all three outcomes of
interest – motivation, effectiveness, and retention – were influenced by teachers’
individual characteristics, school organizational factors, and perceptions of system
features. Each of these sets of factors will be examined in turn in part two of this
dissertation.
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PART TWO FINDINGS: VARIATION
The trends presented in Chapter 4 suggested that, overall, INVEST did not have a
positive impact on teachers’ outcomes. In fact, the system had a slightly negative impact
on teachers’ expectancy or belief in their ability to improve their practice and no impact
on the value they placed on their work or their effectiveness in improving student growth.
Though there was no significant impact on teachers’ retention overall, some preliminary
descriptive evidence seems to suggest that the system may have been successful in
exiting lower-performing teachers from the district. However, these overall results are
incomplete, as they do not capture the considerable variation in each of the three
outcomes of interest. As theory would predict, teachers’ attitudes and behaviors were
influenced by their perceptions of how well the system was designed and implemented,
as well as by their individual differences and the contexts in which they worked.
This second part of the dissertation elucidates the results presented in Chapter 4
by exploring how outcomes were influenced by variation in individual, school, and
system characteristics. I used multiple regression analyses to examine which factors (at
the individual, school, and system level) predicted outcomes of interest – i.e., teacher
motivation, effectiveness, and retention. For each outcome, I ran several regression
analyses, where I entered a new set of predictors (i.e., individual characteristics, school
characteristics, system characteristics) sequentially to determine the relative impact of
various types of variables. This quantitative data was supplemented with qualitative
analysis (from interview data) of how variation across individual characteristics, school
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organizational factors, and system design features influenced teachers’ motivational
responses and performance on the new system. Given the interest in the impact and
implementation of INVEST, analysis is limited to data collected on teachers in pilot
schools (N = 1097 for quantitative data and N = 36 for qualitative data) and will primarily
explore how various predictors influenced teachers’ motivation and performance on the
system itself. Correlational results are presented for the Student Growth Percentile
outcome measure as well, but the focus will be on the Danielson Framework measure
since this was shared with teachers during the pilot year of implementation. The analysis
is divided into three chapters to explore each of the sources of variation.
Chapter 5: Individual-level variation. As discussed in Chapter 3, though the most
common teacher survey response regarding the features of INVEST was “neutral,”
teachers’ attitudes differed significantly across subgroups, such as by years of experience
and effectiveness level. Indeed, both the qualitative and quantitative data revealed
considerable variation at the individual level. For veteran teachers, INVEST was a
substantial departure from their typical experience with evaluation. As would be expected
with any meaningful change, individuals responded quite differently. In this chapter, I
use the qualitative data to categorize teachers’ responses into five distinct profiles and
then explore how teachers’ personality characteristics (captured on the teacher survey)
predicted outcomes.
Chapter 6: School-level variation. Chapter 3 demonstrated that teachers had high
expectations for the system’s promise; however, INVEST did not live up to its potential
for many teachers due to challenges with the fidelity of implementation. High school
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teachers and teachers in higher performing schools tended to have less positive attitudes
towards the new system. My sampling strategy for school case studies captured variation
across levels (e.g., elementary, high) and school performance levels (e.g., both higherperforming and lower-performing schools). In addition to varying along level and
performance, these school case studies diverged along school climate indicators. In this
chapter, I describe implementation at the six case study schools and then investigate how
teachers’ perceptions of school climate (captured on the teacher survey) predicted
outcomes.
Chapter 7: System-level variation. In Chapter 3, I explored evaluation attitudes
(more generally) and then attitudes toward the new system (INVEST specifically).
Analysis demonstrated that at the end of the year, teachers in pilot schools had lower
perceptions of evaluation when compared to teachers in non-pilot schools across all
survey metrics. Certain design features of the new INVEST system (i.e., level of
understanding of the purpose of the new system, perceived accuracy of the new
evaluation measures, and the quality of feedback and support) appeared to shape
teachers’ responses to the new policy. In this chapter, I explore how these design features
influenced teachers’ outcomes on the new system.
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CHAPTER 5: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIATION
To influence teacher motivation and behavioral change, theory indicates that
evaluation systems must align with the preferences of the individuals they are designed to
impact. Given this, we would expect motivational responses to vary across subgroups of
teachers – in particular, by years of experience, effectiveness, and personality.
Preliminary evidence from Chapter 3 suggested that newer teachers, as well as highly
effective teachers, were more likely to have positive perceptions of INVEST, and thus,
appeared to be more open to making changes in their practice. Additionally, research has
demonstrated that individual differences in teacher personality shape teachers’
experiences (Somech, 2010; Teven, 2007) and that certain individuals will be more
predisposed to sustain improvements in practice over time (Achtziger & Gollwitzer,
2010). In this chapter, I explore this individual variation by first categorizing teachers’
responses into five distinct profiles (Section One) and then examining which personality
characteristics were most predictive of outcomes under INVEST (Section Two).


Section One: Teacher Personality Profiles. In my interviews, I was struck by
teachers’ varied attitudes towards INVEST and how they processed their
experiences with the new system. Though no two teachers responded identically,
several trends emerged from the data that helped me better understand and
ultimately categorize teachers’ responses. As discussed in Chapter 2, I used the
codes I developed in Atlas.ti to classify teachers into one of five distinct
personality profiles – invested teachers, sponge teachers, burnt-out teachers,
insulted teachers, and skeptical teachers. The majority of teachers I interviewed
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could be easily classified into one of these five profiles. However, several
teachers possessed attributes of multiple profiles. For these teachers, I worked
with two research assistants on the project to discuss the best placement for each
teacher based on the majority of their responses.


Section Two: Key Individual Characteristics. After exploring these personality
profiles, I then set out to systematically investigate how personality influenced
outcomes within the larger population of teachers in the district. Although many
personality inventories exist, the five-factor theory has emerged as the
foundational approach to describing personality traits (Goldberg, 1990; John &
Srivastava, 1999; McCrae & Costa, 1987), so I employed a shortened and
previously validated version of this inventory in my teacher survey. I also used
two measures of grit, defined as passion and perseverance for long-term outcomes
– a teaching-specific measure I developed and an overall domain-general measure
that had been previously validated and used with teachers in a prior analysis
(Duckworth et al., 2009). In this section, I examine how the teacher personality
scales influenced teachers’ motivation, effectiveness, and retention.

Section One: Teacher Personality Profiles
This section provides an overview of the five personality profiles I developed
from the qualitative interview data – invested teachers, sponge teachers, burnt-out
teachers, insulted teachers, and skeptical teachers. Table 5-1 summarizes the key personal
attributes and overall reactions for each of these five types. In the Appendix, I provide
additional information on the survey responses for those teachers I interviewed that also
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completed the survey. As these data make clear, teachers’ responses to INVEST were
notably quite distinct across each of these profiles.
Table 5-1
Teacher Profiles Types (from Interview Data)
Teacher Profiles

Personality Description

Overall Reactions to INVEST

Invested Teachers

Invested teachers were
veterans with over 10 years of
experience (mostly within the
district). They were open to
new experiences, displayed
grit by engaging in strategic
goal-setting, and remained
conscientious in working
towards desired outcomes.

Invested teachers viewed
challenges associated with the
new system as within their
control and set rigorous
performance goals on INVEST.
They were open to feedback
and took ownership over
implementing changes in their
practice. Their motivations
were primarily intrinsically
driven and they valued the
impact they had on students.

Sponge teachers were novices
with a similar profile to
invested teachers. They were
very open and conscientious
which was driven by their
agreeable nature and strong
desire to prove themselves as
new teachers. Though they
were hard working, they
struggled to set long-term
goals, given their inexperience.

Sponge teachers were very open
to the new system. They wanted
to perform well on INVEST,
which was partially driven by
an extrinsic desire to please the
administration. As the term
“sponge” would suggest, they
readily absorbed feedback and
were quick to implement
changes in practice as a result
of the new system.

Though they were primarily
new teachers, burnt-out
teachers were less open and
agreeable than their sponge
counterparts. They were fairly
conscientious in implementing
aspects of the new system, but
they lacked the grit necessary
to stay focused on long-term

Burnt-out teachers were
overwhelmed by the new
system and struggled to keep up
with the requirements of
teaching in the district. INVEST
was not necessarily the source
of their frustration but it
contributed to their overall level
of exhaustion. They did not see

N=5

Sponge Teachers
N=6

Burnt-out
Teachers
N=6
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Insulted Teachers
N=6

Skeptical Teachers
N =13

goals and respond effectively
to challenges.

the value of the new system and
instead viewed it as merely a
source of additional work.

Insulted teachers were
conscientious and reported
being very gritty and focused
on achieving highly effective
status on the new evaluation
system. As a result, when they
did not reach high standards,
they were incredibly frustrated
which made them less open to
change and more negative in
general.

Insulted teachers were
incredibly frustrated by the new
system. Their reactions were
primarily driven by the
perceived unfairness of the new
evaluation measures (in
particular, the unattainability of
Level 4 performance). Instead
of viewing INVEST as an
opportunity to take their
practice to the next level (like
invested teachers), they
questioned the new system’s
intentions.

Skeptical teachers were
primarily veteran teachers who
were generally agreeable in
nature. However, they were
very practical and analytical
individuals, which made them
initially more neurotic in
response to change. Some
skeptical veterans were
entirely apathetic while others
were just less likely to embrace
reform until they had seen how
it played out in practice.

Unlike other groups, skeptical
teachers did not have strong
reactions to INVEST and
remained fairly neutral toward
the system over the course of
the year. They were quite
confident in their abilities but
were not as invested in the new
system and were less optimistic
about whether INVEST could
have an impact on performance.
Given their (often negative)
experience with previous
systems, they raised very
specific and technical questions.

_______________________________________________________________________
Invested Teacher Profile
Overall, the group of invested teachers was extremely positive about their
teaching experience and the new evaluation system. Not only did they start the year off
with a receptive attitude, but invested teachers also remained optimistic throughout the
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entire year and viewed challenges as a necessary obstacle to overcome rather than as
external to their control. For the most part, invested teachers were very confident in their
teaching ability and viewed their students’ performance as a reflection of their own
actions. As a result, they remained open to feedback and committed to doing whatever
they perceived it would take to reach their goals. There were five invested teachers, and
three of them were in School 1 (the other two in Schools 3 and 6). Given their longerterm commitment and perspective, all five of the invested teachers were veteran teachers,
and they all had over 10 years of experience in teaching in the district.
Invested teachers had a distinct personality profile – they were open to new
experiences (like INVEST), displayed grit by engaging in strategic goal-setting, and
remained conscientious in working towards desired outcomes. Though they had questions
about INVEST, invested teachers were open to and excited by the possible impact the
new system would have on their practice. One invested teacher shared, “I was actually
looking forward to it because it was different from our old system and would provide me
feedback on how to grow” (School 1, Teacher 3). For them, INVEST was a tool that
could be used to help accelerate their growth as educators.
Given their investment in the system, these teachers all desired to reach the top
level of performance and consequently set specific goals for their improvement. For the
teachers who did not reach their goals this year, they were confident in their abilities and
expressed an ongoing desire to continue to improve their practice. One invested teacher
shared, “I’m sure I’ll get to level 4 in a couple more domains…I’ll always have
something to work on, to make better” (School 6, Teacher 1). These teachers stayed
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motivated throughout the year and went above and beyond to reach their goals. As one
described, “I need to come to school early because I need to be 100% focused on
students” (School 1, Teacher 6). Indeed, they were very conscientious and recognized the
importance of meeting deadlines and staying on top of all relevant paperwork.
Sponge Teacher Profile
Overall, the group of sponge teachers was extremely open to the new system
because (as entirely first year teachers), INVEST was the only evaluation system they
had experienced. As several sponges shared, “we didn’t know any differently. INVEST
was all we’ve had.” Similar to invested teachers, sponge teachers desired to improve
their instruction; however, their desire to perform well was not only intrinsically driven,
but also appeared to be a result of their desire to be recognized by the administration. As
first year teachers, they felt they had something to prove and this attainment value
influenced their motivation on the new system. There were six sponge teachers in five of
the six schools, all in their first year in the classroom.
Sponge teachers had a similar personality profile to invested teachers – they were
open to new experiences (like INVEST) and remained conscientious in working to
improve their practice over the course of the year. However, since sponges were first year
teachers, they had a more limited ability to set and work strategically towards long-term
goals. Nonetheless, they did express a strong desire to improve their practice towards
specific outcomes and readily absorbed feedback. One sponge teacher shared, “I was
open to it because as a new teacher I do want feedback on how I can become a better
teacher especially to make it more student centered because that is my goal” (School 3,
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Teacher 4). Several of the sponge teachers were so committed to improvement that
teaching had consumed their lives. One shared, “I’m going to do everything all the time. I
kind of have this motto with teaching, there’s always something I could be or should be
doing.” (School 4, Teacher 3). Sponge teachers had particularly high levels of
agreeableness, which meant their desire to perform well on the system also seemed to be
driven by a desire to be perceived by others as competent. They spoke frequently of their
interactions with colleagues and how important it was for them to have a strong
relationship with their mentors and administration. Though the workload was
challenging, they remained conscientious and recognized that extra work was required to
meet valued expectations.
Burnt-out Teacher Profile
Overall, the group of burnt-out teachers was overwhelmed by INVEST and
generally had more negative reactions to the system as a whole. They were all first year
teachers in the district (though some had teaching experience in other districts). Their
negativity stemmed from a general exhaustion associated with the challenges of teaching,
more so than from specific aspects of the new system. Indeed, INVEST was not the
source of their frustration, but only exacerbated challenges; as one burnt-out teacher
shared, “INVEST was just more work. The work is just never-ending. And it’s one more
thing” (School 6, Teacher 3). There were six burnt-out teachers, one in each of five
schools (with the exception of School 4 where the new teachers were primarily sponge
teachers).
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Burnt-out teachers had very different personality profiles than invested and
sponge teachers – they were more neutral to new experiences (like INVEST) and though
they were fairly conscientious, they were often overwhelmed by the challenges associated
with teaching in the district. One burnt-out teacher shared, “like I said, this whole thing
has really just been a thorn in my side” (School 1, Teacher 5). In their mind, the
expectations associated with INVEST were not only unnecessary, they were also
unrealistic. Unlike sponge teachers, burnt-out teachers did not have particularly high
levels of agreeableness, which meant they were not as concerned about raising concerns
with the new system. One burnt-out teacher shared that she had no problem bringing her
frustration to the administration, “I have all of these things and it’s like none of that is
being taken into consideration. I’m just supposed to keep going like the Energizer bunny.
Just keep going and going and going. I’m not willing to do it” (School 1, Teacher 5).
Though they generally valued feedback on their performance, burnt-out teachers did not
always find the system’s goals to be aligned with their own. Perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, the burnt-out teachers all scored in the effective range and outperformed
some of the sponge teachers at the same school. Indeed, their different perceptions were
not driven by their performance, but rather by their perceptions of the feasibility of the
expectations. As this burnt-out teacher makes clear, teachers were being asked to do the
impossible: “Even next year as a second year teacher, it’s not going to happen. There’s
no way I can get a 4” (School 4, Teacher 5).
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Insulted Teacher Profile
Overall, the group of insulted teachers was incredibly frustrated by the new
INVEST system, and their reactions were driven by their perceptions of unfairness and
overall frustration with the expectations. The majority of insulted teachers had achieved
the top level of performance on the old evaluation system, PDAS, but did not reach that
level on INVEST. Instead of looking at the new system as an opportunity to further
develop their practice, like invested teachers had, insulted teachers viewed the
expectations as unfair and felt the system devalued their work. In total, there were six
insulted teachers in five of the six schools, and all but one had multiple years of teaching
experience.
Insulted teachers had similar personality profiles to burnt-out teachers, though
their lack of openness to the system was driven by frustration rather than exhaustion.
Two of the insulted teachers were not open to the system from the beginning of the year
and showed a lack of emotional stability (or neuroticism) by assuming the system was
designed to demean teachers’ work. One of these teachers shared, “it’s given the
administration like basically a way to blackmail teachers into doing all this ridiculous,
ludicrous garbage with the threat hanging over their heads. It’s so completely not
acceptable” (School 6, Teacher 2). These insulted teachers appeared to be quite
conscientious in meeting expectations but resented the additional workload. The same
insulted teacher went on to share, “INVEST is being used as a club against teachers, as a
bullying tactic, as a weapon to get us to do more than we should.”
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Though the remaining three insulted teachers began the year skeptical of
INVEST, it was not until they did not reach Level 4 that frustration materialized. One of
these teachers shared, “I thought it was a good program at the beginning…. But to me
now, I see it’s very unfair. I thought I was doing everything that was highly effective. I
didn’t change anything I’ve done in the last year when I was always such a strong
teacher….So did I get my kids where they needed to be? Did I do everything I was
supposed to do as a teacher? I went above and beyond” (School 4, Teacher 1). These
teachers were very conscientious and had very high expectations for their performance.
When they did not reach Level 4, they took the decision personally and reacted in an
emotional manner.
Skeptical Teacher Profile
Overall, the most common category was the skeptical teacher. Unlike other
groups, skeptical teachers did not have strong reactions to INVEST and remained fairly
neutral toward the system over the course of the year. The majority of the skeptical
teachers appeared to be well-established and respected at their respective schools and had
performed well on the new system. At the beginning of the year, they were initially
skeptical and worried about specific details of INVEST, but over the course of the year,
the system did not appear to have much influence on their practice or attitudes toward
their work. With the exception of one first year teacher (who had done her student
teaching in Aldine), all 13 of the skeptical teachers had more than five years of
experience in the classroom and seemed well versed to changes in district policy. Every
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school had at least one skeptical teacher and it was the dominant type on several
campuses (Schools 4 and 5 in particular).
Skeptical teachers had similarities to other personality profiles but also some
unique differences. Like the majority of teachers, they reported being conscientious and
generally agreeable in their approach to their work with colleagues. As was the case with
invested veterans, they were quite confident in their ability to meet students’ needs and
believed they controlled their practice. However, as distinct from other types, skeptical
teachers appeared to be highly analytical, practical individuals. They raised very specific
questions associated with the system’s implementation and seemed to have a more
realistic attitude as to what type of changes would actually happen as a result of INVEST.
In some cases, this analytic nature bordered on neuroticism (or a lack of emotional
stability), but for the most part, these teachers felt they were being practical about what
types of proposed changes were feasible to implement in practice.
As the year progressed, several skeptical teachers became more open to
implementing changes suggested by INVEST. One teacher shared, “I adjust to whatever
makes sense,” while another commented, “you can always see ways to grow.” Unlike
insulted teachers, they were not frustrated by not meeting the system’s expectations as
long as they were meeting their own expectations, which they viewed as paramount. A
subset of skeptical teachers remained apathetic over the course of the year and unaffected
by any of the system’s suggestions. As one of these teachers shared, he was unfazed
when he did not receive the highest score on INVEST, because the important part was
that he met his own expectations: “I won’t say I don’t care, but I don’t know, if I’m
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proficient, OK. I think that as long as I know I’m doing what I’m supposed to do in the
classroom, I’m OK” (School 5, Teacher 5).
Section Two: Key Individual Characteristics
As these profiles make clear, teachers’ personality and subsequent reactions to
INVEST varied considerably across the sample of teachers I interviewed. In this section,
I used multiple regression analyses to examine which personality characteristics were
most influential in predicting teachers’ motivation, effectiveness, and retention on the
new system in the population of teachers and then revisited these teacher profiles to help
explicate findings. As discussed in Chapter 2 (and presented in Table 2-3), I used the
following personality characteristics listed below (each of these measures is on a scale of
1-5 with 1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree):


Teaching grit – teachers’ passion and perseverance for their teaching. The survey
captured information on teachers’ interest in teaching, whether setbacks have
discouraged them and how important it was to them to improve their teaching.



Overall grit – teachers’ passion and perseverance more generally. The survey
captured information on whether teachers were diligent, stayed focused on goals,
and finished whatever they began.



Conscientiousness – teachers’ desire to do a task well. The survey captured
information on whether teachers were thorough, efficient, and followed through
on their obligations.
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Extraversion – teachers’ energy and level of engagement with others. The survey
captured information on how talkative, outgoing, and sociable teachers are as
individuals.



Agreeableness – the value teachers place on getting along with others. The survey
captured information on how forgiving, considerate, and kind teachers were as
individuals.



Emotional Stability (opposite of Neuroticism) – teachers’ degree of impulse
control and lack of anxiety. The survey captured information on how relaxed
teachers were and how well they handled stress.



Openness – teachers’ appreciation for new ideas and level of curiosity. The
survey captured information on how original, active, and open teachers were to
new experiences.

As we would expect from prior research, these personality characteristics were all
positively correlated with each other, though the magnitude of the correlations were
relatively small in size. Table 5-2 summarizes the correlations between the various
personality characteristics. Interestingly, grit and grit in teaching were only moderately
correlated (r = .32, p < .001), suggesting that grit is somewhat domain-specific, and there
are challenges that are unique to teaching.
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Table 5-2
Correlations between Teachers’ Individual Characteristics
Measures
(Scale 1-5)
1. Teaching Grit

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Overall Grit

Mean
(SD)
3.80
(0.67)

2

3

4

5

6

7

-

0.32***

0.27**

0.04

0.21***

0.15***

0.17***

-

0.58***

0.06**

0.30***

0.29***

0.24***

-

0.09***

0.32***

0.16***

0.28***

0.01

0.04

0.24***

0.25***

0.21***

-

0.08***

3.90
(0.48)

Conscientiousness

4.33
(0.50)

Extraversion

3.39
(0.80)

Agreeableness

1

-

4.20
(0.58)

Emotional
Stability

2.37
(0.87)

Openness

4.12
(0.55)

-

-

*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001
Teachers’ personality characteristics were also associated with their motivation
and performance on the new system. As demonstrated in Table 5-3, these individual
characteristics tended to be more correlated with system motivation (expectancy and
value), reported changes in practice, and burnout than with performance or turnover from
the district. Of the personality characteristics, teaching grit was the most positively
correlated with teachers’ belief in their ability to improve practice on the new system
(system expectancy), r = .29, p < .001, the value they placed on the new system (system
value), r = .28, p < .001, and their reported changes in practice, r = .29, p < .001, as well
as the most negatively correlated with their level of burnout, r = -.53, p < .001, and
turnover from the district, r = -.10, p < .05. In other words, teachers with more long-term
passion and perseverance for their teaching were more likely to be motivated on
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INVEST, to report implementing changes in their practice, and to avoid becoming burnt
out by their work. Though teaching grit was positively correlated with performance on
the Danielson Framework (r = .09, p < .01), other personality characteristics had slightly
stronger associations. In particular, teachers’ conscientiousness was positively correlated
with teachers’ performance on the Danielson Framework, r = .16, p < .001. Conversely,
teachers’ level of emotional stability was negatively associated with their performance on
the Danielson Framework, r = -.11, p < .001. In other words, teachers who were very
Table 5-3
Correlation between Individual Characteristics and Teacher Outcomes
Measure

Individual
Characteristics
Teaching Grit
Overall Grit
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional Stability
Openness
School
Characteristics
Quality of
administration
Positive support
Level of control
Professional
community
System
Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

System
Expectancy

System
Value

Danielson
Framework

Student
Growth
Percentiles

Reported
Changes
in Practice

Turnover

Burnout

0.29***
0.11***
0.09**
0.05
0.09**
0.09**
0.13***

0.28***
0.17***
0.19***
0.07*
0.14***
0.05
0.12***

0.09**
0.08*
0.16***
-0.01
-0.07*
-0.11***
0.00

0.02
0.02
-0.02
0.03
-0.04
0.14*
-0.07

0.29***
0.10**
0.03
0.06*
0.14***
0.02
0.10**

-0.10*
-0.04
-0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
0.02

-0.53***
-0.30***
-0.21***
0.00
-0.13***
-0.27***
-0.05

0.30***

0.25***

0.12***

0.04

0.29***

-0.14***

-0.39***

0.26***
0.23***
0.18***

0.18***
0.22***
0.15***

0.11***
0.12***
-0.04

0.02
0.08*
0.02

0.26***
0.26***
0.27***

-0.10**
-0.09**
-0.05

-0.38***
-0.35***
-0.27***

0.47***
0.44***
0.40***

0.33***
0.37***
0.41***

0.01
0.09**
0.08*

-0.04
0.01
0.02

0.52***
0.45***
0.46***

-0.11***
-0.06
-0.09**

-0.33***
-0.24***
-0.27***

0.45***
0.50***

0.35***
0.34***

0.01
0.05

-0.02
-0.01

0.55***
0.44***

-0.10**
-0.03

-0.25***
-0.31***

0.38***

0.36***

0.03

-0.02

0.54***

-0.09**

-0.25***

Note: For all measures, N=1097, except for Student Growth Percentiles measure, where
N=651. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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diligent performed better on the new system, and teachers who were neurotic and anxious
about the new system also appeared to have been driven to higher levels of performance.
Individual Characteristics and Teacher Motivation
This section explores how the first outcome of interest – teacher motivation – was
influenced by these individual characteristics. Recall that motivational choices are linked
to two distinct (but related) sets of beliefs: an individual’s expectancy (or belief in their
ability) and an individual’s value (or the importance associated with a particular task).
Both are necessary conditions for individual behavioral change. In the case of teachers, if
they doubt their ability to reach certain standards (lower expectancy) or do not find it
important to meet those expectations (lower value), they will not be motivated to improve
their performance. As discussed in Chapter 4, overall motivation for teaching is
associated, but not synonymous, with motivation to perform well on the new evaluation
system. Since this chapter is concerned with the implementation of INVEST, it will
primarily focus on teachers’ expectancy and value on the system itself.
To see which of the personality characteristics predicted teacher motivation above
and beyond other factors, I ran multiple regression analyses where I simultaneously
entered all of the individual characteristics into the model. Then, to assess the predictive
power of individual characteristics, I entered two new sets of predictors (i.e., school
characteristics, system characteristics) sequentially to determine the influence of
individual characteristics when controlling for school and system factors. To account for
other baseline differences, I controlled for individual-level characteristics which were
significant predictors in the difference-in-differences modeling (i.e., ethnicity,
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Table 5-4
Regression Analysis Predicting System (INVEST) Expectancy
Measure

Individual
Characteristics
Teaching Grit
Overall Grit
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional Stability
Openness
School
Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive Support
Level of Control
Professional
Community
System
Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation Factor
Understanding Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth Factor
Goal Factor

Without School Effects
Model 1:
Model 2:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

0.28(0.03)***
-0.02(0.04)
-0.05(0.04)
0.03(0.03)
0.01(0.04)
0.00(0.03)
0.09(0.04)*

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.17(0.04)***
-0.03(0.04)
-0.03(0.05)
0.04(0.03)
-0.01(0.04)
0.00(0.03)
0.09(0.04)*

0.08(0.04)*
-0.02(0.04)
0.00(0.04)
0.04(0.03)
-0.01(0.03)
-0.03(0.03)
0.09(0.04)*

0.16(0.05)**
0.09(0.06)
0.04(0.04)
-0.03(0.04)

With School Effects
Model 4:
Model 5:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

0.15(0.04)***
-0.04(0.04)
-0.03(0.04)
0.02(0.03)
-0.00(0.04)
-0.00(0.03)
0.09(0.04)*

0.08(0.04)
-0.02(0.03)
-0.01(0.04)
0.03(0.03)
-0.01(0.04)
0.04(0.03)
0.08(0.04)*

0.08(0.05)

0.14(0.05)**

0.08(0.05)

0.03(0.05)
-0.01(0.04)
-0.07(0.04)

0.11(0.05)*
0.06(0.04)
-0.02(0.04)

0.02(0.05)
-0.00(0.04)
-0.05(0.04)

0.05(0.09)
0.12(0.06)*
-0.14(0.07)
0.28(0.09)**
0.37(0.10)***
-0.10(0.09)

0.25(0.04)***
-0.03(0.04)
-0.05(0.04)
0.01(0.03)
0.02(0.04)
-0.00(0.03)
0.10(0.04)**

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.03(0.09)
0.08(0.06)
-0.09(0.07)
0.25(0.09)**
0.36(0.09)***
-0.07(0.10)

Note. All continuous variables have been standardized. This analysis was conducted on
teachers in the pilot schools who had completed both the beginning and end of year
survey (N = 1097). It controls for all individual-level demographic characteristics.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
certification, and years of teaching) and conducted my analysis with and without school
fixed effects. Tables 5-4 and 5-5 display the results from multiple regression analyses
used to examine which factors predicted teachers’ system expectancy (or belief in their
ability to perform well on INVEST) and teachers’ system value (or how important it was
for them to perform well on INVEST). In this section, I discuss which individual
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characteristics were most influential in predicting teacher motivation on the new system
and use the qualitative profiles to explicate results.
Table 5-5
Regression Analysis Predicting System (INVEST) Value
Measure

Without School Effects
Model 1:
Model 2:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System Variation

With School Effects
Model 4:
Model 5:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

Individual Characteristics
Teaching Grit
Overall Grit
ConscientiousNess
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional
Stability
Openness

0.26(0.04)***
0.03(0.04)
0.08(0.04)*

0.17(0.05)**
0.03(0.04)
0.09(0.04)*

0.09(0.04)*
0.03(0.04)
0.09(0.04)*

0.24(0.04)***
0.03(0.04)
0.08(0.04)

0.15(0.04)**
0.03(0.05)
0.08(0.04)*

0.09(0.04)*
0.03(0.04)
0.08(0.04)*

0.05(0.03)
0.06(0.04)
0.04(0.04)

0.06(0.02)
0.04(0.04)
-0.04(0.03)

0.04(0.03)
0.04(0.04)
-0.03(0.03)

0.04(0.03)
0.05(0.04)
-0.02(0.04)

0.05(0.03)
0.03(0.04)
-0.01(0.04)

0.05(0.03)
0.04(0.04)
-0.01(0.03)

0.02(0.04)

-0.00(0.04)

0.01(0.04)

0.04(0.04)

0.01(0.04)

0.02(0.04)

0.12(0.05)*

0.06(0.04)

0.15(0.05)**

0.08(0.05)

0.04(0.04)

-0.02(0.04)

0.05(0.05)

-0.05(0.04)

0.05(0.03)

0.02(0.03)

0.07(0.03)

0.02(0.03)

0.01(0.04)

-0.01(0.04)

-0.01(0.05)

-0.04(0.05)

School Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive
Support
Level of
Control
Professional
Community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation
Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

-0.04(0.09)
0.12(0.06)*

-0.00(0.09)
0.13(0.05)*

0.21(0.07)**
0.07(0.08)
0.01(0.10)

0.22(0.08)**
0.08(0.09)
0.02(0.11)

0.10(0.07)

0.09(0.07)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Grit. Teachers’ system motivation – both expectancy and value – was influenced
by their level of teaching grit. In Table 5-4, Model 1 showed that grit in teaching
significantly influenced teachers’ level of system expectancy, B = .28, t(908) = 9.78, p <
.001, and Model 4 revealed that this was robust to the inclusion of school effects. In
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addition to believing in their ability to perform well on INVEST, grittier teachers were
also more likely to value their performance. Table 5-4 Model 1 confirmed that grit in
teaching was a significant predictor of system value, B = .26, t(908) = 10.58, p < .001 and
again, Model 4 validated that this effect was still significant with school effects.
In the qualitative data, invested teachers (the profile type which most exemplified
grit for teaching) valued INVEST and took ownership over ensuring their classrooms
were student directed. When they received a low observation score, they looked
internally to their practice, rather than blaming the system. One invested teacher
explained how she used observation data to reflect on her practice, “Did I not teach you
this? Did you not understand? And that’s what I use to improve myself. What did I do
wrong that they did not get” (School 1, Teacher 6). To the contrary, burnt-out teachers
questioned their ability to reach a more challenging student population, which led them to
give up when faced with obstacles. As one teacher shared, “students have mentally
checked out. I don’t care what you say, they’re 15 year old boys and girls. Sorry. It’s not
a perfect world” (School 6, Teacher 3). In part because of this lack of grit, performing
well on the system did not seem to be a realistic possibility and resulted in lower system
expectancy.
Conscientiousness. Teachers’ system value was also influenced by their level of
conscientiousness. Model 1 in Table 5-4 established that conscientiousness was a
significant predictor, B = .08, t(908) = 10.58, p < .05, and again Model 4 demonstrated
this was still significant with school effects in the model. Across all personality types,
teachers appeared to be organized, dependable, and appreciated structure. Consequently,
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this was one of the reasons they were drawn to the clear and systematic nature of the
Danielson Framework, as it provided them with a thorough understanding of the
expectations. Many teachers displayed an almost dutiful nature when engaging in workrelated tasks. As one teacher shared, “For me, this is where the bar was set. I’ve got to
learn to work with this. This is my baseline here” (School 4, Teacher 3).
Openness. Despite being consistently conscientious, there appeared to be
considerably more variation in teachers’ openness across types which influenced system
expectancy. One skeptical teacher shared, “I’ve been teaching 15 years, at the beginning
of the year, I’m thinking what’s wrong with PDAS. I like PDAS and all of a sudden they
just changed it” (School 2, Teacher 3). Skeptical veterans were traditional in their
outlook and tended to be closed off to new experiences. They may have begun their
teaching more optimistic about new system’s possibilities (as was the case with novices)
but given challenges over the years, their system expectancies had lowered over time.
Insulted teachers (like the one below) felt blamed for challenges, which led to lower
openness to new policies:
It’s a pie in the sky theory which is lovely but it’s impractical…it seems like
teachers are always being told all the time, we’ve got kids who never show up to
school because we’re not building relationships with them. We’ve got kids
dropping out of school, because we’re not offering the proper interventions. There
is only so much we can do and now they’re actually going to ding us for that?
What the hell. Not this again (School 6, Teacher 2).
Model 1 in Table 5-3 showed that teachers’ openness to new experiences was a
significant predictor, B = .09, t(908) = 9.78, p < .05, of teachers’ system expectancy (or
their belief in their own abilities as educators) and this effect remained consistent when
controlling for school effects.
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Individual Characteristics and Teacher Effectiveness
Theory indicates that even if teachers are motivated to improve performance, this
will not necessarily lead to changes in teachers’ effectiveness. Indeed, initial motivation
must be translated into targeted action and that action must be sustained over an extended
period of time. When individuals move from the deliberative to the action phase, they
make a commitment to a specific set of next steps and engage in self-regulatory planning.
This section examines how teachers engaged in this improvement process and how the
second outcome of interest – teacher effectiveness – was influenced by individual
characteristics.
As discussed in Chapter 4, there were limitations to the measures used to capture
teachers’ effectiveness. For volition, I used an end of year survey question which asked
teachers to indicate whether they had implemented changes in their practice as a result of
the new system. Teachers’ effectiveness was captured through two measures – (1)
Danielson Framework, which was the final average of the observation scores throughout
the pilot year and (2) Student Growth Percentiles, which assessed how much teachers’
students grew in relation to other students beginning the year at a similar starting point.
SGPs were only available for teachers in tested subjects (in pilot schools N = 302)
compared to the Danielson measure (N = 1097). Additionally, though teachers were
familiar with the SGP measure, they did not receive their results during the pilot. Since
this chapter is concerned with how teachers responded to INVEST, the Danielson
Framework is the better for that purpose. To see which of the personality characteristics
predicted teacher effectiveness above and beyond other factors, I ran multiple regression
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analyses using the same methods discussed above. Table 5-6 presents the results
examining which factors predicted teachers’ effectiveness (as measured by the Danielson
Framework for Teaching).
Table 5-6
Regression Analysis Predicting Teacher Effectiveness on Danielson Observation
Measure
With School Effects

Without School Effects
Measure

Model 2:
Individual and
School
Variation

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

Model 4:
Individual
Variation

Model 5:
Individual and
School
Variation

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.03(0.05)
0.00(0.04)
0.15(0.04)**

0.03(0.04)
0.01(0.04)
0.14(0.04)***

0.12(0.04)**
0.00(0.04)
0.15(0.04)***

0.07(0.05)
-0.01(0.04)
0.14(0.04)***

0.06(0.04)
-0.00(0.04)
0.13(0.04)**

-0.02(0.04)
-0.10(0.03)**
-0.12(0.03)**

-0.02(0.03)
-0.10(0.03)**
0.12(0.03)***

-0.02(0.03)
-0.10(0.03)**
0.11(0.03)***

-0.01(0.03)
-0.10(0.03)**
-0.09(0.03)**

-0.01(0.03)
-0.09(0.03)**
-0.09(0.03)**

-0.01(0.03)
-0.09(0.03)**
-0.09(0.03)**

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.02(0.03)

0.11(0.04)*

0.08(0.05)

0.12(0.04)**

0.09(0.04)*

0.07(0.03)*
0.09(0.03)**
-0.14(0.04)***

0.08(0.04)*
0.07(0.03)*
-0.12(0.04)**

0.07(0.03)
0.10(0.03)**
-0.19(0.04)***

0.07(0.04)
0.08(0.03)*
-0.16(0.05)**

Model 1:
Individual
Variation

Individual
Characteristics
Teaching Grit
Overall Grit
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional
Stability
Openness
School
Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive Support
Level of Control
Professional
Community
System
Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation
Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

0.09(0.04)*
0.01(0.05)
0.15(0.04)***

-0.07(0.08)
0.11(0.06)*

-0.07(0.08)
0.09(0.06)*

0.13(0.06)*

0.18(0.07)*

-0.16(0.10)*
-0.03(0.08)

-0.15(0.09)*
-0.02(0.08)

0.03(0.06)

-0.01(0.07)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
Results-Driven (Conscientiousness, Grit, and Emotional Stability). As
demonstrated in Model 1 in Table 5-6, conscientiousness and teaching grit both emerged
160

as significant predictors of teachers’ scores on the Danielson Framework, and Model 4
indicated that these results were robust to the inclusion of school effects. In Model 1,
conscientiousness had the largest coefficient (B = .15, t(890) = 7.87, p < .001) followed
by grit in teaching (B = .09, p < .05). This data was confirmed in the qualitative data, as
teachers who reported being driven by results (invested teachers) were more likely to
reach higher levels of performance under the new system. They set specific goals and
filtered feedback they received from their evaluators through this lens. Further, invested
teachers used feedback to track progress on their goals; as one teacher shared: “it’s great
because it gives me a very clear picture from this point forward of what I need to do
differently” (School 1, Teacher 3). When they were at schools where administrator
feedback was limited, invested teachers used the rubric themselves to benchmark
progress and drive improvements. “Myself, I’m driven by results. I’ll say the data drives
me. I’m always asking what could I have done differently and INVEST helps me do that
reflection” (School 1, Teacher 6).
Sometimes teachers’ obsession with goals bordered on neuroticism and led to
increased stress and high levels of anxiety (or lower emotional stability). This level of
ambition made coping with new expectations (which were rolling out over the course of
the year) quite stressful:
It’s too much, don’t add on it. If we are adding on, I’m getting all confused. If it’s
a pilot, let it run. What happens, happens. We’ll change it next year. Add on in the
beginning. You said do this. We’ll do it and see how it goes. And after that, next
year add on whatever. We have to get used to this…I keep going am I asking do I
do this. Am I doing this. So at this time I’m overwhelmed but I’m loving it.
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Though this level of commitment would be hard to sustain over time (see Retention
section below), it appeared to help drive improvements in teacher practice (at least in the
short-term), as demonstrated in Table 5-6.
Individual Characteristics and Teacher Retention
In the aggregate, when asked whether INVEST would influence their retention,
most teachers did not report that it had had much influence over their individual decision.
However, many teachers (particularly burnt-out and insulted teachers) worried about the
long-term impact the new system would have on the district's ability to retain talented
educators. Their concerns were primarily rooted in the system's impact on teacher
burnout. This section explores which individual characteristics were associated with
teachers’ level of burnout and discusses how the third outcome of interest – teacher
retention – may be influenced as a result.
As demonstrated in Table 5-3 above, specific personality characteristics were
associated with teachers’ level of burnout and turnover. To assess the incremental
predictive validity of these individual characteristics, I ran a binary logistic regression
model to examine which factors predicted teachers’ retention while controlling for other
school and system factors. For this analysis, I compared the stayers with the leavers to be
consistent with the analysis conducted in Chapter 5. Additionally, because INVEST was
being implemented in all schools the following year, I was more interested in whether
teachers had left the district entirely, rather than whether they moved to another school
within the district. I conducted these analyses using the same methods discussed for
teacher motivation.
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Table 5-7
Binary Logistic Regression Table Predicting Turnover
Measure

Individual
Characteristics
Teaching Grit
Overall Grit
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional
Stability
Openness

Without School Effects
Model 1:
Model 2:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

With School Effects
Model 4:
Model 5:
Individual
Individual
Variation
and School
Variation

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.79(0.05)**
0.92(0.08)
1.18(0.16)

0.88(0.06)
0.94(0.08)
1.17(0.10)

0.83(0.10)
0.94(0.11)
1.19(0.17)

0.79(0.06)**
0.92(0.08)
1.18(0.12)

0.85(0.07)*
0.93(0.08)
1.17(0.11)

0.82(0.11)
0.91(0.13)
1.25(0.19)

0.92(0.06)
1.01(0.08)
1.04(0.09)

0.92(0.05)
1.04(0.08)
1.05(0.07)

0.99(0.11)
1.11(0.12)
0.96(0.12)

0.90(0.05)
1.01(0.08)
1.09(0.08)

0.90(0.05)
1.03(0.08)
1.10(0.12)

0.99(0.10)
1.10(0.13)
1.01(0.13)

1.04(0.09)

1.04(0.09)

1.09(0.15)

1.05(0.09)

1.05(0.09)

1.11(0.16)

0.82(0.06)**

0.68(0.07)**

0.81(0.06)**

0.70(0.08)**

0.98(0.08)
0.89(0.06)
1.04(0.07)

0.97(0.10)
0.91(0.12)
1.11(0.12)

0.94(0.08)
0.90(0.06)
1.15(0.08)

0.86(0.09)
1.00(0.15)
1.22(0.32)

School Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive Support
Level of Control
Professional
Community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation
Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

0.41(0.15)**
0.98(0.15)

0.40(0.14)*
1.02(0.17)

0.85 (0.19)

0.87(0.20)

1.32(0.32)
3.13(1.07)**

1.22(0.32)
3.38(1.30)**

0.92(0.26)

0.93(0.27)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized. Only 873 teachers had data on
all variables included in each analysis, so this was the final analytic sample used for all
models. Teachers who left the district were slightly less likely to complete end of year
surveys, which explains why the aggregate turnover rates are lower than those reported in
Chapter 4. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
Grit. This analysis confirmed previous research that gritty individuals work
diligently and avoid burnout when confronting obstacles or setbacks in performance. As
demonstrated in Model 1 in Table 5-7, teaching grit was the only personality variable to
emerge as a significant predictor of teachers’ retention. Teachers who were one standard
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deviation higher in grit in teaching were 21% less likely to leave teaching in the district,
OR = .79, p < .01. However this coefficient was not significant when controlling for
school and system characteristics. No other personality variables were significant
predictors of teacher retention. Indeed, stayers had significantly higher grit in teaching, M
= 3.79, SD =.68, when compared to Leavers M = 3.57, SD = .78, p < .01.
In the qualitative data, invested teachers (who reported intending to stay in
teaching for the long-term) remained positive over the course of the year and were not as
overwhelmed as other personality types by the additional workload. Instead of viewing the
paperwork as a nuisance, they found ways to use the process to drive their teaching. One
invested teacher remarked that “If this is for helping me as a teacher, I love it. If I’m not
proficient or excellent, help me. Tell me how to do it. Help me be a better teacher. I think
they are trying to find out more effective to teachers to make more effective students”
(School 1, Teacher 1). As high achievers, they believed they were never perfect and
always wanted to do more to push their practice to the next level. One teacher shared, “In
order for you to grow, you have to be able to accept constructive criticism and see how to
use it to make you better” (School 1, Teacher 3). Not all teachers were as open to feedback
and as a result, many became very discouraged when they did not reach Level 4. As
discussed in Chapter 4, this lowered expectancy resulted in a higher degree of burnout
among a subgroup of teachers.
Emotional Stability. Across all personality types, teachers were very
conscientious individuals, which made them (on the whole) eager to meet expectations.
However, when this level of conscientiousness was taken to an extreme (and was not
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accompanied by the gritty mindset discussed above), it caused anxiety among educators
about the purpose of new INVEST. Many of the skeptical and insulted veterans had
lower levels of emotional stability and believed the system was intended to be a
“weapon” or “tool used to punish teachers.” Several of these teachers had read national
news about efforts in Washington, DC and Chicago to fire ineffective teachers and
believed INVEST was part of a national conspiracy to “blame teachers” for problems of
poverty. Other neurotic teachers assumed the system was merely a way for the district to
get more funds from the state and that it had been mandated, rather than locally
developed. As the teacher’s comment below suggests, these subsets of teachers were not
buying the purpose as it had been communicated to them by their principal. “They want
me to think INVEST is about assessing teachers to see whether or not they’re doing what
they need to do to reach the children. That’s what I think I’m supposed to think. What I
think is though, it’s all about money” (School 5, Teacher 5). Regardless of how they
explained the system to their teachers, every principal shared that they had a few who
remained very skeptical of their intentions.
Summary
In sum, this chapter demonstrated that teachers’ responses to INVEST varied
considerably and could be categorized into one of five distinct personality profiles –
invested teachers, sponge teachers, burnt-out teachers, insulted teachers, and skeptical
teachers. Invested teachers were veteran teachers who were open to new experiences,
displayed grit by engaging in strategic goal-setting, and remained conscientious in
working towards desired outcomes. Sponge teachers were novices who were very open
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and conscientious which was driven by their agreeable nature and strong desire to prove
themselves as new teachers. Though they were primarily new teachers, burnt-out teachers
were less open and agreeable than their sponge counterparts and lacked the grit necessary
to stay focused on long-term goals. Insulted teachers reported being very focused on
achieving highly effective status on the new evaluation system, and as a result, when they
did not reach high standards, they were incredibly frustrated and negative about the
system. Skeptical teachers were practical and analytical individuals, which made them
initially less emotionally stable in response to change. Some skeptical veterans were
entirely apathetic while others were just less likely to embrace reform until they had seen
how it played out in practice.
Of all of the personality characteristics, one emerged as predictive across all key
outcomes of interest – teaching grit. In comparison to other types, the invested teachers
appeared most likely to exemplify gritty traits of passion and perseverance for long-term
goals. Though other types began the year open to the possibility of change, invested
teachers remained committed to the pursuit of enhancing their teaching over time. They
used the Danielson Framework very deliberately to identify specific areas for
improvement and aligned long-term goals with corresponding plans of action. When
faced with challenge, they internalized the need for change and were able to incorporate
feedback into their practice. Rather than being burnt-out by the additional workload,
invested teachers identified how the new expectations reinforced their personalized goals
for improving performance and worked strategically to implement changes in a
meaningful way. Though teachers’ gritty nature seemed to be at least somewhat internal,
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it does appear that their motivation and subsequent performance was also influenced by
contextual features. Indeed, three of the five invested teachers taught in the same school,
and several campuses did not have any teachers falling into this type. While this could be
by chance, it seems likely that context also influenced teachers’ approaches to their work
and responses to INVEST. The next chapter will explore these organizational schoolbased factors in more detail.
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CHAPTER 6: SCHOOL-LEVEL VARIATION
Research has demonstrated that teachers’ motivation, performance, and retention
can be influenced by school-level variables. In particular, prior studies have investigated
how professional community, the quality of principal leadership, and the level of teacher
involvement in decision-making structures influence teachers’ motivation (Kelley et al.,
2000; Rosenholtz, 1989). In order to successfully improve practice, teachers need
consistent feedback on their performance. Given the design of new evaluation systems,
the principal is essential in providing this type of support and driving professional
learning. Moreover, teachers' satisfaction and subsequent decision to remain in the
profession has been shown to be positively associated with measures of autonomy and
faculty influence (Ingersoll, 2001; Ingersoll, 2006). In this section, I explore how
variation in these school-level factors predicted outcomes of interest by presenting a case
study for each of the six schools I visited (Section One) and then examining which school
characteristics were most predictive of outcomes under INVEST (Section Two).


Section One: School Profiles. Though my teacher interviews indicated variation
at the individual level (within schools), I also noticed trends across campuses
(between schools). Indeed, specific profile types of teachers appeared more
frequently on some campuses than others. At certain schools, teachers believed
INVEST would drive improvements, while teachers at other schools worried the
system would drive good teachers out of the district. The principals I interviewed
also expressed varying degrees of comfort with the new system, which
subsequently influenced varied implementation across schools. As discussed in
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Chapter 2, I developed codes in Atlas.ti to help interpret these divergent responses
and created school profiles for each campus I visited.


Section Two: Key School Characteristics. After examining these school profiles,
I then set out to systematically investigate how school climate influenced
outcomes within the larger population of teachers in the district. Although many
school climate surveys exist, I chose to use items from the National Center for
Education Statistics (2012) teacher questionnaire which has been vetted and used
with a nationally representative population of teachers. In this section, I examine
how teachers’ perceptions of school climate influenced teachers’ motivation,
effectiveness, and retention.

Section One: School Profiles
This section describes overall trends in attitudes and perceptions for each of the
six case study schools. Table 6-1 provides a short description of each type and a summary
of their reactions to INVEST. In the Appendix, I provide more information on the schoollevel survey data. After exploring this qualitative data, I use these profiles, as well as the
survey data, to examine how key climate indicators predict teacher outcomes – i.e.,
motivation, effectiveness, and retention.
Table 6-1
School Profiles
School
Profiles

Description

Overall Reactions to INVEST

School 1

School 1 is an underperforming At the beginning of the year, the
elementary school based on the
School 1principal was
state rating system and according overwhelmed by the increased
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to the principal and veteran
teachers. School 1 serves a high
need primarily AfricanAmerican student population.
Despite challenges, School 1 has
a positive and collaborative
culture and teachers place strong
trust in the administration. The
principal gives teachers
considerable control and
autonomy over their practice.

workload associated with the
implementation of INVEST but
had developed new structures by
the end of the year. The principal
used the Danielson Framework to
provide detailed feedback and
empower teachers to drive their
own improvement process.
Overall, teachers had a positive
attitude towards INVEST.
However, many teachers were
overwhelmed by the increased
paperwork associated with the new
system.

School 2

School 2 is consistently one of
the highest performing
elementary schools in the district
and serves a primarily Hispanic
student population. Generally,
the principal is highly respected
by her teachers, though some
teachers expressed concerns
about a cliquey nature at the end
of the year. The principal has
high expectations for
performance and the school has
a clear culture of achievement.

INVEST was implemented with
fidelity at School 2, with the
exception of post-observation
conferences which appeared to be
less frequent. Despite successful
implementation, teachers at School
2 had mixed attitudes towards
INVEST. While many appreciated
the detailed and focused feedback,
others were frustrated by the
unattainability of Level 4
performance on the Danielson
Framework for Teaching. In
particular, teachers expressed
concern over the accuracy of the
observation results.

School 3

School 3 is an intermediate
school that was underperforming
prior to INVEST implementation
but was identified as meeting
standards during the pilot year.
The principal is respected as a
leader and the school has a
strong culture of collaboration.
The principal uses staff
development time to discuss new
initiatives which helps build
teachers’ understanding and

The principal and teachers at
School 3 generally had quite
positive attitudes towards
INVEST. The principal was
extremely organized and able to
scaffold the introduction of the
new system for teachers to build
understanding and investment.
Teachers at School 3 did not
appear to be as concerned with the
additional workload of INVEST
and most teachers felt supported
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trust in new systems.

rather than intimidated by the
observation process.

School 4

School 4 is one of the highest
performing intermediate schools
in the district and serves a
primarily Hispanic population.
The school has a positive
climate, which in large part is
due to the principal’s strong
reputation among his teachers.
School 4 has a significant
percentage of veteran teachers
who have been teaching at the
school for a number of years.

Though there were some
challenges associated with an
increased student enrollment,
INVEST was generally
implemented with fidelity. Yet
teachers had mixed attitudes
towards the new system. Though
they felt empowered by the preconferences and appreciated the
additional observations, many of
the veterans were frustrated by not
attaining the highest level of
performance. Novices were
generally more receptive to the
feedback offered by the new
system.

School 5

School 5 is typically an
underperforming ninth grade
school, but met expectations
during the pilot year for the first
time in many years. School 5 is
half African-American/half
Hispanic and according to the
principal and teachers, serves a
challenging student population.
The principal is well-respected
by the staff, but the school has a
reputation for being
disorganized and having a more
skeptical community of veteran
teachers.

INVEST was not implemented
with fidelity at School 5 and at the
end of the year, many teachers had
yet to receive feedback on their
performance. Teachers appreciated
the opportunity to reflect using
INVEST but felt they were
working harder without being
recognized. In particular, teachers
raised concerns over the
inappropriateness of the Level 4
expectations on Danielson
(student-centered classrooms) and
the unfairness of Student Growth
Percentiles (given the lack of
student accountability) at the high
school level.

School 6

School 6 is a ninth grade school
which has historically been one
of the flagship schools in the
district but for the first time in
many years, it did not meet

School 6 struggled to implement
INVEST with fidelity, in part
because of the significant
percentage of new teachers on
their campus. The principal
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standards. School 6 has a very
structured environment with a
distinct culture. Some teachers
appreciate the orderly
environment, while others are
frustrated by what they perceive
to be unrealistic expectations
imposed by the administration.
School 6 has a consistently high
turnover rate with a significant
percentage of new teachers
each year.

believed that the new system
resulted in constructive feedback
and useful dialogue; however,
teachers’ perceptions were more
mixed. Most teachers reported that
they appreciated receiving
feedback, but the feedback was not
consistently provided. Several
teachers viewed the new system as
additional – and unnecessary work
– and reported that it led to lower
morale among the teachers.

_____________________________________________________________________
School 1 Overview: Lower Performing Elementary School
According to the principal and several of the veteran teachers, School 1 serves a
high need student population. Despite challenges, School 1 had a positive and
collaborative school climate, the principal was held in high regard and teachers generally
felt supported to improve their practice. Additionally, teachers reported they had the
flexibility and autonomy to make decisions in their classrooms that met their students’
needs, which built strong trust with the administration. According to one teacher, it is the
freedom that keeps her teaching at School 1: “I like the freedom because I know what
works so I can best meet the needs of my students.”
On average, teachers at School 1 had 10 years of experience, with 25% of the
faculty in their first five years of the profession. Given the small size of the school, the
teachers had a strong professional community, which met frequently (weekly) to discuss
new initiatives. The six teachers I interviewed at School 1 all had prior teaching
experience but two were new to the school. Three of the six teachers were invested
veterans and remained motivated over the course of the year to use the feedback to
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improve their teaching. Two of the six teachers fell into the skeptical subgroup; in their
minds, INVEST was “something you have to get done just like anything else.” The final
teacher was a burnt out novice – though she had prior teaching experience, she was
incredibly overwhelmed and frustrated by what she considered to be unreasonable
expectations in her first year teaching in Aldine.
The majority of teachers saw the purpose of INVEST as improving teachers’
performance and giving them the tools they needed to succeed. At the beginning of the
year, one teacher shared: “I think it’s trying to help teachers. I honestly believe that.”
When INVEST was presented in initial trainings, the principal focused on how INVEST
was an improvement on PDAS (Professional Development and Appraisal System) and
used time in the school’s strong professional learning community to view the Teachscape
modules together in groups and discuss expectations. As a result of this framing, most
teachers welcomed INVEST as a tool to guide their development. One teacher shares that
“unlike PDAS, INVEST is about providing a straightforward review for teachers
throughout the year and helping them become better.”
This perspective on INVEST stayed fairly consistent over the course of the year,
and teachers still felt positive about the systems’ intentions at the end of the year. Though
the principal struggled with implementation in the fall, she had developed new systems
for staying on track with the process by the end of the year. The principal used the
Danielson Framework to provide specific and detailed feedback on areas to improve
practice and teachers were empowered to drive their own reflection process. However,
though teachers appreciated the comprehensive nature of the evaluation system, this also
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made it very overwhelming. Coupled with what many teachers viewed to be “excessive
and unnecessary paperwork,” INVEST had increased teachers’ workload and left them
feeling somewhat burnt-out at the end of the year.
School 2 Overview: Higher Performing Elementary School
School 2 is consistently one of the highest performing elementary schools in
Aldine ISD. At the beginning of the year, the principal at School 2 was perceived by her
teachers as a hard worker with realistic expectations. However, at the end of the year,
some teachers reported a cliquey school culture. One teacher shared, “It’s very biased. If
you’re not in the clique, or if you’ve had a problem with someone that’s in the clique or
with an administrator or someone thinks you’re causing a problem or anything” (School
2, Teacher 1). One possible explanation for this culture shift could be that teachers at
School 2 received their final ratings right before my interviews, and many were not
happy with their overall scores. Indeed, the principal had very high expectations and gave
very few Level 4 ratings.
On average, teachers at School 2 had seven years of experience, with 41% of
faculty in their first five years of the profession, which is similar to the district average.
Given the school’s strong record of high performance, there were several veteran teachers
who had been teaching at the school for many years. Interviewed teachers had mixed
opinions of the system, which also changed during the course of the year. I interviewed
three novices (two were new to the profession) and three veterans. One of the novice
teachers was consistently positive (a sponge teacher), while the other two novices were
overwhelmed by the system’s expectations and burnt out by the end of the year. Of the
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veterans, two started out the year invested in improving performance. However, by the
end of the year, one was insulted by the system (given its perceived unfairness) and the
other was more skeptical of the system’s impact. The final veteran teacher was very
skeptical at the beginning of the year, but over the course of the year, came to recognize
that the Danielson Framework captured her impact (she was one of the few Highly
Effective teachers at the school), which increased her appreciation for the system.
At the beginning of the year, there was some skepticism toward the system,
though most teachers understood the system as a way to improve teacher performance.
One teacher shared that INVEST was “a good program to see what teachers were doing
in the classroom, what their strengths were, what their weaknesses, because sometimes
teachers think they are doing an awesome job, but it’s always good for someone else to
come in and critique you and let you know there’s some changes or whatever.” In
contrast, some veteran teachers viewed it as designed to dismiss bad teachers. According
to one veteran teacher, “At first, myself, I was like, like most people in the teaching
profession, thinking it is a tool to get rid of teachers or to make it harder for them to
achieve higher standards.”
At the end of the year, teachers’ attitudes towards INVEST were mixed. Some
teachers had a positive interpretation of INVEST as a system to improve student growth.
One teacher shared that “the whole purpose of it was not to penalize teachers, but to
make the students better.” Conversely, many teachers seemed to have a more negative
perception of the system than they did at the beginning of the year. Teachers reported that
the expectations of INVEST were too high and unattainable. As noted above, one teacher
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also shared that there was bias in the system due to a cliquey nature. Another teacher
identified an observation bias depending on the timing of the observation: “On Mondays,
everything is introduction, so I guess if you get observed on a Monday, you’re going to
score lower than if you get observed on a Wednesday or Thursday. And that’s what
happened to me.” This perception of bias could be attributed to the fact that teachers had
different observers who provided varying levels of feedback along with different ratings,
and that many teachers did not reach their desired level of performance.
School 3 Overview: Lower Performing Intermediate School
School 3 is an intermediate school (with only grades 5-6) and was identified as
underperforming in previous years but met standards during the pilot year. The school’s
cohesive leadership team created a friendly and positive atmosphere at the school.
School 3 had a strong culture of collaboration and clear expectations. Teachers reported
that the principal used staff development to discuss new initiatives, which helped build
teachers’ understanding and trust with the administration.
On average, teachers at School 3 had 10 years of experience, with 35% of the
faculty in their first five years of the profession. The teachers at School 3 had a strong
sense of professional community and many reported the value of their grade level or
learning communities. The majority of teachers I interviewed at School 3 had positive
perceptions of the new INVEST system. Two of the three novice teachers were sponges
and remained very enthusiastic about implementing changes in their practice over the
course of the year, while the final novice teacher was overwhelmed by the expectations
of the new system and looking for other employment. All of the veteran teachers were
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committed to improving on the new system, though two were a bit more skeptical about
specific aspects (in particular, the increased workload).
Most teachers saw the purpose of INVEST as improving teachers’ performance
and giving them the tools they need to succeed. At the beginning of the year, one teacher
shared: “I guess the purpose of it was to kind of pinpoint the needs in the classroom as
far as the student growth and teacher growth.” The principal viewed INVEST as a vast
improvement on PDAS; in particular, he found the clarity of expectations and
streamlined timeline of INVEST helpful, both for teachers and for himself. He shared:
“With INVEST, what I like about it is that well, it breaks it down for you. So it kind of
takes some of the guessing out of it.” He used this structure to build strong systems to
help him manage implementation of the system, and as a result, teachers had a clear
picture of the purpose and structure of INVEST. As one teacher shared, “I always knew
the purpose was going to be to improve teacher performance.”
Teachers’ perspective on INVEST remained relatively consistent over the course
of the school year, and teachers still felt positive about the system at the end of the year.
In fact, many teachers reported that they had a better understanding of INVEST due to
the consistent staff development: “Now I understand it way better because we’ve had so
much training on it, but the attitude towards it, no, I still feel it’s pretty good and it’s very
descriptive as to where to improve and where you are doing good, so I like it.” Indeed,
the principal had strong systems in place, both to complete observations and
conversations and support each teacher on the system. For example, he organized each
teacher’s INVEST documents in a binder along with a schedule for development
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detailing when specific INVEST skills would be addressed. As a result, he was able to
build teacher buy-in and understanding of the system and most teachers felt supported,
not intimidated, by administrators’ observations. However, teachers shared similar
concerns over the increased paperwork load caused by INVEST.
School 4 Overview: Higher Performing Intermediate School
School 4 is the highest performing intermediate school and one of the highest
performing overall schools in Aldine ISD. During the pilot year, there was an influx of
students moving into the catchment area, which placed a strain on school operations.
Despite serving an increased student population, School 4 had a positive school climate
given the principal’s strong reputation among his teachers as being a fair and
approachable leader. However, the same did not hold true for the assistant principals, and
teachers reported some concern over variation in observation scores across
administrators. Teachers had a strong sense of professional community, and the skills
specialist noted that the faculty was collaborating even more as a result of INVEST.
On average, teachers at School 4 had 13 years of experience, with 23% of their
faculty in their first five years of the profession. Given the school’s strong record of high
performance, there were many veteran teachers who had been teaching at the school for
several years, and there was a distinct difference between the veteran and novice
teachers’ perceptions. Two of the three novices were sponges, who were receptive to
feedback and motivated to improve their performance on the new system. In contrast, the
three veteran teachers were more skeptical about the new system and had yet to make
changes in their practice. One veteran teacher was insulted by the new system because
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she believed she deserved a higher rating, and the assistant principal reported that this
perspective was fairly common among the more experienced teachers.
At the beginning of the year, teachers were unsure about the purpose of INVEST.
Several perceived the system as top-down, coming from “higher-up,” indicating an
initial lack of buy-in at the school level. The assistant principal noted that INVEST
provided teachers with all the tools they needed to support their development, yet it had
been challenging to find the time to have professional development. She said, “Breaking
it down, I think that’s what they need…but finding the time to help them go through it is
the problem.” She also shared that some teachers were overwhelmed by the unfamiliarity
of the new system, which was being implemented the same year as the new state test
(STAAR): “They just don’t know. And I think that’s been the biggest thing with all of
this is the unknown. They’re used to knowing, ok, this is what I have to do…So between
the STAAR and the INVEST, it’s been challenging.”
By the end of the year, as a result of increased professional development, teachers
had built their understanding of the system and had begun to see INVEST as a system
designed to help both teachers and students improve performance. Teachers also felt they
were given an opportunity to “prove themselves” through conversations with their
administrators during the pre- and post-conferences, which helped them view the tool as a
way to self-reflect and drive their own improvements in practice. However, several
veteran teachers remained frustrated by not attaining the highest level of performance on
the new system, which they were accustomed to receiving on the old system (PDAS). As
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the assistant principal shared, “we have winners in our building who are all leaders and
they all want to be distinguished.”
School 5 Overview: Lower Performing Ninth Grade School
School 5 is traditionally an underperforming 9th grade school; however, it met
standards during the pilot implementation year for the first time in several years.
According to the principal and many of the teachers, School 5 serves a particularly high
need and challenging student population. Teachers reported that the school can be a bit
disorganized which often leads to difficulty implementing new systems with fidelity.
However, the principal had a strong reputation for being a well-respected leader who
communicates regularly with her staff.
On average, teachers at School 5 had 12 years of experience, with 38% of their
faculty in the first five years of the profession. Of the six teachers I interviewed at School
5, three teachers were new to the school (with two new to teaching altogether) and three
had been at School 5 for quite a few years. Of the novices, the two who were new to
teaching were generally receptive to the new system but reported feeling overwhelmed
and burnt out by the end of the year. The veterans’ perspectives varied, though the
majority was skeptical about specific aspects of the system. While this skepticism led
several to feel frustrated by the system, others remained more apathetic. For the apathetic
veterans, INVEST was merely another system that they did not find particularly relevant
to their practice.
At the beginning of the year, INVEST was communicated as a way to improve
teacher performance, but many teachers were skeptical that the system might simply be a
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way to remove poor performing teachers. One teacher shared: “My biggest concern is
you’ll have administrators that will want to use that as a kind of gotcha in the whole
thing instead of them using it as what the district says it’s supposed to be for, which is
helping teachers improve.” Overall, teachers reported feeling nervous and overwhelmed
by the new system.
Over the course of the year, the principal struggled to maintain the timeline and as
a result, INVEST was not implemented with fidelity. New teachers reported appreciating
the feedback they received and indicated that it helped them reflect on their practice and
identify a pathway towards improvement. However, several veteran teachers had not
received feedback, and none of the teachers had completed their summative conference.
Though the timeline was difficult to maintain during the pilot year, the principal believed
strongly in INVEST’s ability to initiate positive changes in teaching practice. She shared
the following: “I believe in the Danielson Rubric, I think it’s amazing. I think it will help
build and grow great teachers.” Though the principal was confident she could help
teachers achieve Level 4 performance, most teachers felt that Level 4 had been
communicated as being unattainable, particularly at the high school level. As the year
progressed, teachers adapted to new expectations of the system and were able to reflect
on their own practice using the Danielson rubric. However, teachers reported working
harder than in years past without being recognized for it, which lowered morale.
School 6 Overview: Higher Performing Ninth Grade School
School 6 has historically been one of the flagship schools in Aldine; however, in
the year of the pilot, it did not meet state standards because it fell short on measures of

181

postsecondary readiness. The school has a very structured environment with a distinct
culture, which has led to differing perceptions among the teacher corps. Half of the
interviewed teachers reported that they really appreciated the structure and that the
orderly environment made it easier to focus on instruction. The other half were incredibly
frustrated and believed the leadership imposed unreasonable expectations and was
generally unsupportive of teachers’ efforts. In particular, several teachers complained that
they were required to do paperwork that was not purposeful and kept them from meeting
their students’ needs.
On average, teachers at School 6 had eight years of experience, with 60% of the
faculty in their first five years in the profession. The teachers I interviewed at School 6
had quite different perceptions of their experience, which subsequently affected how they
viewed INVEST. Two of the six teachers (one novice, one veteran) were incredibly
frustrated by the new system; indeed, one of them wrote a memo titled, “Why INVEST is
a train wreck of epic proportions that needs to be obliterated for the good of all
mankind.” The other two novice teachers were receptive and felt the system provided a
good structure for improving their instruction, while the remaining veteran teachers were
neutral though somewhat skeptical of particular aspects of the new system. For purposes
of this analysis, teachers’ commentary will be categorized as either the “negative” or
“neutral” group.
Among both the negative and neutral groups of teachers, INVEST was perceived
as a new accountability system designed to evaluate teacher performance. One teacher
shared that most teachers saw the purpose of INVEST as “evaluating teachers and their
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performance in the classroom. Going to make sure that you are teaching the material and
your content, you’re managing your students, you’re not taking a free pass every day.”
While the neutral group of teachers believed some level of accountability was necessary
and even desirable, the negative group thought the accountability system was used to
blame teachers. One particularly disgruntled teacher shared, “this is just being used to
basically give people who think we are slaves as opposed to professionals a leg to stand
on when they tell us, well, you need to form relationships with these students and if
they’re not showing up it’s your fault” (School 6, Teacher 2).
The principal struggled with implementation fidelity and reported that the
timeline was difficult with so many increased demands and the number of new teachers
on his campus, “like I said, the only thing is the timelines. Just making sure that’s
thought through. I’m all about providing feedback to the teachers and to the staff. But
you only have 24 hours in the day.” However, he strongly believed that the new system
resulted in constructive feedback and useful dialogue, “allowing individuals to grow,
allowing individuals to really craft what they’re doing and do it well.” At the end of the
year, several teachers had not yet received feedback on their formal observations and the
majority of teachers reported limited conversations about their practice. Additionally, the
administration struggled to implement the new online Teachscape system, which
appeared to contribute to the delay in feedback. When they did receive it, teachers
reported that they appreciated feedback on their performance, but given implementation
challenges, this was not as frequent as they would have desired.
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Section Two: Key School Organizational Factors
As these school profiles make clear, teachers’ reactions to INVEST varied
considerably across schools. In this section, I used multiple regression analyses to
examine which school organizational factors were most influential in predicting teachers’
motivation, effectiveness, and retention on the new system in the population of teachers
and then revisited these school profiles to help explicate findings. As discussed in
Chapter 2 (and presented in Table 2-3), I used the following school climate indicators
listed below (each of these measures is on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being strongly disagree
and 5 being strongly agree):


Quality of administration – teachers’ perceptions of the quality of administration.
The survey captured information on teachers’ opinions on administrators’
supportive behavior, ability to enforce student conduct, and communication about
vision.



Positive support – teachers’ perceptions of the level of support. The survey
captured information on teachers’ opinions on support from parents, the
availability of materials, and the support for work with challenging student
populations.



Level of control– teachers’ perceptions of their level of control and influence over
their work. The survey captured information on teachers’ control over the
selection of content/topics, teaching techniques, and disciplining students.
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Presence of a Professional Community – teachers’ perceptions of the presence of
professional community at the school. The survey captured information on the
level of cooperative effort and shared mission at the school.

Not surprisingly given the important role of the administration in setting the school
culture, perceptions of the quality of administrative leadership were correlated with the
other measures of school climate – in particular, positive support (r = .53, p < .001), the
level control (r = .46, p < .001), and the presence of professional community (r = .54, p <
.001). Table 6-2 summarizes the correlations between the various factors.
Table 6-2
Correlations between School Characteristics

1. Quality of
administration
2. Positive support
3. Level of control
4. Professional
community

Mean
(SD)
3.80
(0.88)
3.18
(0.81)
3.61
(0.77)
3.48
(0.79)

1
-

2

3

4

0.53***

0.46***

0.54***

-

0.43***

0.45***

-

0.34***
-

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
Teachers’ perceptions of school climate were also associated with their
motivation and performance on the new system. As demonstrated in Table 6-3, as was the
case with individual characteristics, these school characteristics tended to be more
correlated with system motivation (expectancy and value), reported changes in practice,
and burnout than with actual system performance or turnover from the district. Of the
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Table 6-3
Correlation between School Characteristics and Teacher Outcomes
Measure

Individual
Characteristics
Teaching Grit
Overall Grit
ConscientiousNess
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional
Stability
Openness
School
Characteristics
Quality of
administration
Positive support
Level of control
Professional
community
System
Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation
Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

System
Expectancy

System
Value

Danielson
Framework

Student
Growth
Percentiles

Reported
Changes
in Practice

Turnover

Burnout

0.29***
0.11***
0.09**

0.28***
0.17***
0.19***

0.09**
0.08*
0.16***

0.02
0.02
-0.02

0.29***
0.10**
0.03

-0.10*
-0.04
-0.00

-0.53***
-0.30***
-0.21***

0.05
0.09**
0.09**

0.07*
0.14***
0.05

-0.01
-0.07*
-0.11***

0.03
-0.04
0.14*

0.06*
0.14***
0.02

0.00
-0.01
-0.02

0.00
-0.13***
-0.27***

0.13***

0.12***

0.00

-0.07

0.10**

0.02

-0.05

0.30***

0.25***

0.12***

0.04

0.29***

-0.14***

-0.39***

0.26***
0.23***
0.18***

0.18***
0.22***
0.15***

0.11***
0.12***
-0.04

0.02
0.08*
0.02

0.26***
0.26***
0.27***

-0.10**
-0.09**
-0.05

-0.38***
-0.35***
-0.27***

0.47***
0.44***

0.33***
0.37***

0.01
0.09**

-0.04
0.01

0.52***
0.45***

-0.11***
-0.06

-0.33***
-0.24***

0.40***

0.41***

0.08*

0.02

0.46***

-0.09**

-0.27***

0.45***
0.50***

0.35***
0.34***

0.01
0.05

-0.02
-0.01

0.55***
0.44***

-0.10**
-0.03

-0.25***
-0.31***

0.38***

0.36***

0.03

-0.02

0.54***

-0.09**

-0.25***

Note: For all measures, N=1097, except for Student Growth Percentiles measure, where
N=651. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
school characteristics, the quality of the administration was the most positively correlated
with teachers’ belief in their ability to improve practice on INVEST (system expectancy),
r = .30, p < .001, the value they placed on the new system (system value), r = .25, p <
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.001, and their reported changes in practice, r = .29, p < .001, as well as the most
negatively correlated with their level of burnout, r = -.39, p < .001, and turnover from the
district, r = -.14, p < .05. In other words, teachers who had better perceptions of the
quality of their administrative leadership were more likely to be motivated on INVEST,
to report implementing changes in their practice, and to avoid becoming burnt out by
their work. Teachers’ perceptions of the level of positive support and control/influence
over their work were also positively correlated with teachers’ motivation and
performance and negatively correlated with their burnout and turnover.
School Characteristics and Teacher Motivation
This section presents the same set of analyses and tables used in the individual
characteristics section, but this time with a focus on how the first outcome of interest –
teacher motivation – was influenced by school characteristics. Again, motivation was
captured from two distinct (but related) sets of beliefs: an individual’s expectancy (or
belief in their ability) and an individual’s value (or the importance associated with a
particular task).In this section, I discuss which school characteristics were most
influential in predicting teacher motivation on the new system and compare the school
profiles to further elucidate these results.
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Table 6-4
Regression Analysis Predicting System (INVEST) Expectancy
Measure

Without School Effects
Model 1:
Model 2:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

Individual Characteristics
Teaching
0.28(0.03)***
Grit
Overall Grit
-0.02(0.04)
Conscientious
-0.05(0.04)
-ness
Extraversion
0.03(0.03)
Agreeableness
0.01(0.04)
Emotional
0.00(0.03)
Stability
Openness
0.09(0.04)*
School Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive
Support
Level Control
Professional
Community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation
Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student
Growth Factor
Goal Factor

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

With School Effects
Model 4:
Model 5:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School Variation

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.17(0.04)***

0.08(0.04)*

0.25(0.04)***

0.15(0.04)***

0.08(0.04)

-0.03(0.04)
-0.03(0.05)

-0.02(0.04)
0.00(0.04)

-0.03(0.04)
-0.05(0.04)

-0.04(0.04)
-0.03(0.04)

-0.02(0.03)
-0.01(0.04)

0.04(0.03)
-0.01(0.04)
0.00(0.03)

0.04(0.03)
-0.01(0.03)
-0.03(0.03)

0.01(0.03)
0.02(0.04)
-0.00(0.03)

0.02(0.03)
-0.00(0.04)
-0.00(0.03)

0.03(0.03)
-0.01(0.04)
0.04(0.03)

0.09(0.04)*

0.09(0.04)*

0.10(0.04)**

0.09(0.04)*

0.08(0.04)*

0.16(0.05)**

0.08(0.05)

0.14(0.05)**

0.08(0.05)

0.09(0.06)

0.03(0.05)

0.11(0.05)*

0.02(0.05)

0.04(0.04)
-0.03(0.04)

-0.01(0.04)
-0.07(0.04)

0.06(0.04)
-0.02(0.04)

-0.00(0.04)
-0.05(0.04)

0.05(0.09)
0.12(0.06)*

0.03(0.09)
0.08(0.06)

-0.14(0.07)

-0.09(0.07)

0.28(0.09)**
0.37(0.10)***

0.25(0.09)**
0.36(0.09)***

-0.10(0.09)

-0.07(0.10)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
School Characteristics and Teacher Motivation
Teachers’ perceptions of their school climate influenced their motivation on
INVEST. Since the principal was the vehicle for implementing INVEST, we would
expect the quality of administrative leadership to influence teachers’ motivation on the
new system. Table 6-4 Model 2 showed that teachers’ reports of administrative
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Table 6-5
Regression Analysis Predicting System (INVEST) Value
Measure

Without School Effects
Model 1:
Model 2:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

Individual Characteristics
Teaching Grit
0.26(0.04)***
Overall Grit
0.03(0.04)
Conscientious0.08(0.04)*
ness
Extraversion
0.05(0.03)
Agreeableness
0.06(0.04)
Emotional
0.04(0.04)
Stability
Openness
0.02(0.04)
School Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive
Support
Level of
Control
Professional
Community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation
Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

With School Effects
Model 4:
Model 5:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.17(0.05)**
0.03(0.04)
0.09(0.04)*

0.09(0.04)*
0.03(0.04)
0.09(0.04)*

0.24(0.04)***
0.03(0.04)
0.08(0.04)

0.15(0.04)**
0.03(0.05)
0.08(0.04)*

0.09(0.04)*
0.03(0.04)
0.08(0.04)*

0.06(0.02)
0.04(0.04)
-0.04(0.03)

0.04(0.03)
0.04(0.04)
-0.03(0.03)

0.04(0.03)
0.05(0.04)
-0.02(0.04)

0.05(0.03)
0.03(0.04)
-0.01(0.04)

0.05(0.03)
0.04(0.04)
-0.01(0.03)

-0.00(0.04)

0.01(0.04)

0.04(0.04)

0.01(0.04)

0.02(0.04)

0.12(0.05)*

0.06(0.04)

0.15(0.05)**

0.08(0.05)

0.04(0.04)

-0.02(0.04)

0.05(0.05)

-0.05(0.04)

0.05(0.03)

0.02(0.03)

0.07(0.03)

0.02(0.03)

0.01(0.04)

-0.01(0.04)

-0.01(0.05)

-0.04(0.05)

-0.04(0.09)
0.12(0.06)*

-0.00(0.09)
0.13(0.05)*

0.21(0.07)**

0.22(0.08)**

0.07(0.08)
0.01(0.10)

0.08(0.09)
0.02(0.11)

0.10(0.07)

0.09(0.07)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
leadership significantly influenced their level of system expectancy (or belief in their
ability to perform well on the system), B = .16, t(908) = 10.24, p < .01, and Model 5 (in
Table 6-4) revealed that this was robust to the inclusion of school effects. In addition to
positively influencing system expectancy, Table 6-5 Model 2 confirmed that teachers’
perception of their leader was also a significant predictor of the value they placed on
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performing well on the system, B = .12, t(908) = 9.89, p < .05 and again, Model 5
validated that this effect was still significant with school effects included in the model.
As demonstrated in Table 6-3, other school organizational factors (besides principal
leadership) were also associated with teachers’ system motivation. However, when
included in the regression analysis, the level of support was the only other factor
predicting either system expectancy or value. This suggests that the quality of
administration at least partially explains the relationship between teachers’ perceptions of
other working conditions and their motivation.
This section will explore which aspects of principal leadership mattered most for
teachers’ motivation by comparing two schools – School 1 and School 2. In School 1, the
principal used the Danielson Framework to empower teachers to drive their own
improvement process, and overall, teachers stayed motivated to improve performance on
INVEST. In School 2, the principal rigorously implemented the system, yet teachers had
mixed attitudes toward INVEST, with many expressing concern over the unattainability
of Level 4 performance. Interview data suggested that differences in motivational
responses resulted from several key factors.
Principal communication and vision-setting. To be motivated to improve practice,
teachers need to believe change is essential and understand how INVEST will support
their growth. In School 1, the principal set aspirational yet realistic expectations for
system implementation at the beginning of the year. She consistently communicated to
teachers that the ultimate goal of the new system was to support teachers’ performance so
they could impact students, which tapped into their intrinsic value as educators. However,
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she was also realistic with her expectations and communicated to her teachers that this
was a “learning process” and that they were going to “grow together.” Since she was
overwhelmed by the timeline herself, she was empathetic to teachers’ concerns about
workload and was careful to scaffold training and provide time for collaborative planning
during the day. In School 2, the principal also believed INVEST was designed to support
teachers, but her initial messaging to teachers did not reflect this understanding. She
warned teachers that the new system was coming in a joking manner:
I went and told them from the very beginning, OK guys, I’m just letting you
know, something’s coming from the district. It’s called INVEST. I would joke
around and I would say, you know, I keep on hiding, but I’m going to let you
know, there aren’t that many principals. There is only a team of principals that’s
part of this whole thing, so more than likely I really think they’re going to be
using those principals to go ahead and pilot it. So I told them from the very
beginning when I got involved in it. And once we got picked, I went ahead and
said, OK, I told you all. They caught me. I couldn’t hide any longer. It was kind
of a big joke.
Consequently, though teachers at School 2 were initially fairly open to INVEST, they
viewed it less as a tool for improvement and more as a way to “measure how well you are
teaching “ (Teacher 4), “appraise you and see how you are teaching” (Teacher 6), and
“see what administrators are looking for” (Teacher 2). This meant that teachers’ system
value did not necessarily connect with their own intrinsic value as educators (as it had in
School 1).
Principal empowerment of teachers. Teachers were more likely to be motivated
by the new system when it provided them with ownership over their practice. In School
1, the principal used the rubric to guide teachers through a self-directed learning process
by asking them to reflect on their practice, “I would ask them, why do you think I gave
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you a two in this area and they were able to tell me…. Where they are proficient I always
ask them what do you think you could have done that would move you to distinguished.”
Teachers reported that the pre-conference was particularly important because it gave
them a chance to share what they were doing in the classroom and guide the observation.
Given their involvement, teachers reported that the process felt more like self-reflection
than evaluation. In School 2, the system was implemented with fidelity and teachers
reported having conversations which were very specific and focused on areas for
improvement. One teacher shared how conversations were typically structured: “She told
me exactly what I needed to have. She used the rubric. It was right in front of her. It was
straightforward.” Though teachers appreciated the feedback, conversations were more
administrator-driven, which left teachers feeling like they did not have as much control
over the process. Compared with School 1, this contributed to lower levels of value.
School Characteristics and Teacher Effectiveness
Once teachers are initially motivated to improve performance, their ability to
sustain improvements in practice is, in part, a function of their working environment.
According to the theory of deliberate practice, teachers need targeted, immediate, and
consistent feedback to enhance performance. This section examines how school
characteristics influenced teachers’ effectiveness on the new system, as measured by the
Danielson Framework for Teaching (the observation measure). I present the same set of
analyses discussed in the previous section on individual characteristics, with a new focus
on school characteristics.

192

Table 6-6
Regression Analysis Predicting Teacher Effectiveness on Danielson Observation
Measure
Without School Effects
Model 1:
Model 2:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

Measure

Individual
Characteristics
Teaching Grit
Overall Grit
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional
Stability
Openness

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

With School Effects
Model 4:
Model 5:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.09(0.04)*
0.01(0.05)
0.15(0.04)***

0.03(0.05)
0.00(0.04)
0.15(0.04)**

0.03(0.04)
0.01(0.04)
0.14(0.04)***

0.12(0.04)**
0.00(0.04)
0.15(0.04)***

0.07(0.05)
-0.01(0.04)
0.14(0.04)***

0.06(0.04)
-0.00(0.04)
0.13(0.04)**

-0.02(0.04)
-0.10(0.03)**
-0.12(0.03)**

-0.02(0.03)
-0.10(0.03)**
0.12(0.03)***

-0.02(0.03)
-0.10(0.03)**
0.11(0.03)***

-0.01(0.03)
-0.10(0.03)**
-0.09(0.03)**

-0.01(0.03)
-0.09(0.03)**
-0.09(0.03)**

-0.01(0.03)
-0.09(0.03)**
-0.09(0.03)**

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.02(0.03)

0.11(0.04)*

0.08(0.05)

0.12(0.04)**

0.09(0.04)*

0.07(0.03)*

0.08(0.04)*

0.07(0.03)

0.07(0.04)

0.09(0.03)**

0.07(0.03)*

0.10(0.03)**

0.08(0.03)*

-0.14(0.04)***

-0.12(0.04)**

-0.19(0.04)***

-0.16(0.05)**

School Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive
Support
Level of
Control
Professional
Community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation
Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

-0.07(0.08)
0.11(0.06)*

-0.07(0.08)
0.09(0.06)*

0.13(0.06)*

0.18(0.07)*

-0.16(0.10)*
-0.03(0.08)

-0.15(0.09)*
-0.02(0.08)

0.03(0.06)

-0.01(0.07)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

As was the case with teacher motivation, the quality of administration again
emerged as the most important influence on teachers’ effectiveness on the new system.
As demonstrated in Table 6-6, Model 2, quality of administration, support, and control
over practice all emerged as positive and significant predictors of teachers’ scores on the
Danielson Framework. In Model 2, administration had the largest positive coefficient (B
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= .11, t(886) = 8.14, p < .05) followed by control (B = .09, p < .01) and support (B = .08,
p < .05) and with the exception of level of support, these coefficients were robust to the
inclusion of school effects in Model 5. Interestingly, the level of professional community
was a negative predictor of Danielson scores, B = -.14, t(886) = 8.14, p < .001, which was
also significant with the inclusion of school effects.
To explicate these results, I explored how features of principal leadership and
school climate influenced teachers’ system improvement by comparing two schools –
School 3 and School 5. In School 3, the principal scaffolded the introduction of the new
system and provided consistent support, which led teachers to feel supported on the new
system. In School 5, INVEST was not implemented with fidelity, which meant that
teachers did not receive the necessary feedback to improve performance. Interview data
suggested that these differences in teachers’ ability to increase effectiveness resulted
from several school-level factors discussed below.
Principal conscientiousness. In line with the theory of deliberate practice, quality
feedback should diagnose specific needs and offer immediate and explicit strategies for
improving instruction. Principals’ ability to manage the complexity of the new INVEST
system was influenced by their attention to detail, as well as their organizational and time
management skills. At School 3, all teachers reported that they received specific and
detailed feedback from their appraisers: “It had comments on just about every domain
that I got observed on and he had a level on it. He gave me a breakdown of everything.”
(School 3, Teacher 4). Further, this feedback was “simple and quick” focusing on discrete
pieces of the lesson and what teachers could do to make immediate changes in practice.
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Conversely, at the end of the year, most teachers at School 5 had yet to receive feedback
from their observations and the feedback that was received was fairly general, focusing
on instituting “group-work” or “conducting student-driven lessons.” Unlike the principal
at School 3, the principal at School 5 reported being overwhelmed by the new system and
struggled to conduct observations and provide feedback in a timely manner.
Systems for support and reflection. Performance can only be improved when there
are structures in place to support ongoing reflection and improvements in practice. At
School 3, weekly staff meetings were focused on different components of the Danielson
Framework (aligned to observation results) and skills were scaffolded over the course of
the year based on difficulty and teacher need. Further, the principal intentionally
structured conversations to gradually develop teachers’ self-reflective capabilities. School
5’s principal agreed that the developmental aspect of the new system was critical to the
process. However, she did not have the same structures in place to ensure consistent
implementation and reported being very overwhelmed by the expectations of the new
system:
We need to reduce that number of walkthroughs. Also, it’s the Teachscape. For
every walkthrough it takes an hour, literally, it takes an hour to put the stuff in
Teachscape. OK, you put it in, you send it to the teacher, you got to wait for the
teacher to accept it, review it. The time. We don’t have the time.
As a result, teachers at School 5 reported turning to one another for support. Engaging in
deliberate practice is incredibly challenging and at least initially, cannot be done alone.
Indeed, principals played an integral role in supporting teachers through the process.
Since the principal was such a critical component of implementation, this may help
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explain why the presence of professional community did not have a positive influence on
teachers’ performance.
School Characteristics and Teacher Retention
To increase effectiveness, teachers must sustain improvements in practice over
time and avoid becoming burnt out by their work. As the school profiles demonstrated,
teachers on some campuses seemed more concerned about the increased workload and its
potential impact on teacher retention. To evaluate which school-level characteristics
Table 6-7
Binary Logistic Regression Table Predicting Turnover
Without School Effects
Measure

Model 1:
Individual
Variation

Individual Characteristics
Teaching Grit
0.79(0.05)**
Overall Grit
0.92(0.08)
Conscientious1.18(0.16)
ness
Extraversion
0.92(0.06)
Agreeableness
1.01(0.08)
Emotional
1.04(0.09)
Stability
Openness
1.04(0.09)
School Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive Support
Level of Control
Professional
Community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation
Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

With School Effects

Model 2:
Individual and
School
Variation

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

Model 4:
Individual
Variation

Model 5:
Individual
and School
Variation

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.88(0.06)
0.94(0.08)
1.17(0.10)

0.83(0.10)
0.94(0.11)
1.19(0.17)

0.79(0.06)**
0.92(0.08)
1.18(0.12)

0.85(0.07)*
0.93(0.08)
1.17(0.11)

0.82(0.11)
0.91(0.13)
1.25(0.19)

0.92(0.05)
1.04(0.08)
1.05(0.07)

0.99(0.11)
1.11(0.12)
0.96(0.12)

0.90(0.05)
1.01(0.08)
1.09(0.08)

0.90(0.05)
1.03(0.08)
1.10(0.12)

0.99(0.10)
1.10(0.13)
1.01(0.13)

1.04(0.09)

1.09(0.15)

1.05(0.09)

1.05(0.09)

1.11(0.16)

0.82(0.06)**

0.68(0.07)**

0.81(0.06)**

0.70(0.08)**

0.98(0.08)
0.89(0.06)
1.04(0.07)

0.97(0.10)
0.91(0.12)
1.11(0.12)

0.94(0.08)
0.90(0.06)
1.15(0.08)

0.86(0.09)
1.00(0.15)
1.22(0.32)

0.41(0.15)**
0.98(0.15)

0.40(0.14)*
1.02(0.17)

0.85 (0.19)

0.87(0.20)

1.32(0.32)
3.13(1.07)**

1.22(0.32)
3.38(1.30)**

0.92(0.26)

0.93(0.27)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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influenced teachers’ turnover, I present the same analysis discussed in the individual
characteristics section, with a focus on school characteristics, below.
Teachers who chose to stay at their school had more favorable perceptions of the
school’s administration and working conditions across all survey measures. As
demonstrated in Table 6-7, Model 2, the quality of administration was the only schoollevel variable to emerge as a significant predictor of teachers’ retention. Even when
including school effects and system characteristics in the model, Model 6 illustrates that
teachers who were one standard deviation higher in perceptions of administrator quality
were 30% less likely to leave teaching in the district, OR = .70, p < .01.
This section will explore which features of principal leadership appeared to
influence teachers’ level of burnout and retention decisions at two schools – School 4 and
School 6. At School 4, while some teachers appreciated the principals’ strict
requirements, it contributed to higher rates of burnout among a subset of teachers on the
campus. At School 6, the principal built strong trusting relationships with his teachers.
Rather than use INVEST to impose expectations, he empowered teachers to use the
rubric to drive their own reflective process. This level of trust and recognition helped
teachers avoid burnout and remain committed to teaching.
Trust. Teachers’ level of trust in their principal influenced their thinking about
whether to stay teaching in Aldine. School 4 teachers had a great deal of respect for the
principal and found him to be both caring and encouraging of their development. As one
teacher put it, “They all like him and he likes all of them. He’s very laid back. He’s very
calm, has an aura” (School 4, Teacher 2). Teachers felt that Principal 4 was focused on
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supporting their practice and always available to discuss challenges in a non-threatening
manner, which meant INVEST wasn’t viewed as a “gotcha” system. Though he already
took this approach prior to the pilot, Principal 4 shared that INVEST had further
supported his work with teachers by helping him “to bond with the teachers, to talk to
them, to get them to share.”
In contrast, teachers’ perceptions of their administration at School 6 ranged
significantly. Some teachers appreciated the principal’s no nonsense leadership style,
which led to a disciplined school environment. One such teacher shared, “Here at
[School 6], everything is extremely structured, disciplined, and the students are afraid of
Principal 6 so that makes a big difference because you don’t want to go to the office”
(School 6, Teacher 5). In contrast, other teachers found the principal to be unsupportive
and felt pressured by the rigid school culture. One of these teachers explained, “I don’t
even bother saying anything anymore because I know that my idea will be shot down”
(School 6, Teacher 2). Additionally, this teacher perceived the principal at School 6 as
being dismissive, “He asked me how I was doing and I said I had been under much
pressure and stress and he basically said I need to learn to manage my time better.”
Teachers reported that Principal 6’s polarizing leadership style contributed to the school’s
lower retention rate and a revolving door of new teachers every year.
Recognition. Teachers appeared more likely to avoid burnout when the new
system aligned with their personal values and helped them to recognize their impact on
students. At School 4, the principal helped teachers feel recognized for their
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accomplishments by hosting pre-conferences in their classroom or “in their element” as
he phrased it:
One of the things that I think is neat for us is I’m doing the pre-conferences in
their room. Instead of them coming to me and bringing all their stuff, I decided,
you know what, to relieve a little bit of stress, we’re scheduling these things, the
administrators go and schedule a time they can go to the classroom. So we can be
there, we’re in the teachers’ element, and while we’re discussing things, we’re in
the classroom.

At these conferences, teachers were able to showcase their work and ensure that the new
system aligned with their own personal goals. As one teacher noted, “it allowed me to
know where I need to work personally, my personal goals as a teacher and how
successful I’m going to be delivering the instruction to students” (School 4, Teacher 3).
Teachers at School 4 reported that they were more likely to stay in teaching because their
principal really took the time to understand – and recognize– their work and INVEST
helped them see their impact, which made the additional work worth the effort. In
contrast, School 6 teachers reported that INVEST felt “dictated from the top” and
“administrator-driven.” Instead of sharing artifacts in their classroom, they were required
to assemble an “access to excellence” binder with a set of mandated resources so the
principal could monitor their activities and ensure they were meeting expectations. Rather
than feeling recognized for their work, School 6 teachers reported that the process was
nothing more than “unnecessary paperwork” or “redundant crap.” Though the process
alone was not enough to drive them out of teaching, they believed INVEST compounded
an already punitive culture that made teaching less rewarding.
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Summary
In sum, even when taking individual characteristics into account, teachers’
responses varied considerably across schools. We already know from Chapter 3 that
teachers in high schools and on higher performing campuses appeared to have lower
perceptions of INVEST. This chapter extended this analysis by exploring differences in
teachers’ attitudes across the six case study schools. School 1 (underperforming
elementary) had a collaborative culture and teachers placed strong trust in the principal
because she gave them considerable control over their practice. In School 2 (higher
performing elementary), the principal had very high expectations for performance, and
some teachers expressed concerns about a cliquey nature and unreasonable standards.
School 3’s (underperforming intermediate) principal used staff development time to
discuss the new system which helped build teachers’ understanding and trust in INVEST.
School 4 (higher performing intermediate) had a positive climate which in large part was
due to the principal’s strong reputation among his teachers. School 5 (underperforming
ninth grade) had a reputation for being disorganized and having a more skeptical
community of veteran teachers. School 6 had a very structured environment with a
distinct culture. Some teachers appreciated the orderly environment, while others were
frustrated by what they perceived to be unrealistic expectations imposed by the
administration as part of INVEST.
Of all the school characteristics, the quality of administrative leadership was
consistently the most important influence on teachers’ outcomes. More effective
principals (like the ones in Schools 1, 3, and 4) communicated a clear and compelling
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vision for INVEST which was focused on professional growth and empowered teachers
to drive their own improvement efforts. Additionally, these principals were not as
overwhelmed by the new requirements and as such, effectively managed the
implementation process to ensure that teachers received targeted, meaningful, and
consistent feedback over the course of the year. As a result, they developed trusting
relationships with their staff, which helped teachers feel recognized for their hard work.
In contrast, less effective principals (like the ones in Schools 5 and 6) struggled to
efficiently manage the new evaluation process, which meant teachers received limited
feedback on their performance. Additionally, these principals failed to communicate that
INVEST was about growth, and instead, teachers were more likely to view INVEST as a
“gotcha” system designed to hold them accountable to unreasonable standards. Teachers’
beliefs about the purpose and usefulness of INVEST certainly appeared to influence their
motivation and performance. This variation in system perceptions will be more
systematically explored in the subsequent chapter.
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CHAPTER 7: SYSTEM-LEVEL VARIATION
To influence behavioral change, individuals must be motivated by the system
itself. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, teachers’ personal motivation differed from their
motivation to perform well on INVEST. In other words, teachers could believe in their
own abilities but question whether or not those abilities would be enough to meet system
expectations and/or whether the system expectations were worth meeting in the first
place. In addition to varying across individual and school level characteristics discussed
in the prior two chapters, attitudes were also influenced by teachers’ perceptions of the
system itself.
As discussed in Chapter 2, I collected information on teachers’ overall
perceptions of evaluation (in both pilot and non-pilot schools) and then asked more
specific questions on pilot teachers’ perceptions of INVEST. Given this chapter’s focus
on INVEST, I analyzed the INVEST specific variables as a source of system variation. I
conducted exploratory factor analysis so that I could explain the larger number of survey
questions with a smaller set of latent constructs (discussed in Section One). After
conducting factor analysis, I used these factors as variables in subsequent analyses to
investigate how system-level characteristics predicted teachers’ outcomes in the district
when controlling for individual and school characteristics (discussed in Section Two).
Section One: System-Level Exploratory Factor Analysis
I employed exploratory factor analysis to determine which theoretical constructs
underlay the 19 survey questions collected on INVEST (outlined in Table 2-3) and then
examined the extent to which these constructs represented the original scales I had
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developed for the analysis. To begin, I first used Varimax (orthogonal rotation) followed
by Promax (oblique rotation) to better approximate simple structure. As demonstrated in
Table 7-1, the analysis of INVEST attitudes yielded six factors, using the Kaiser criterion
(Eigenvalue >1) and the Scree test. The factor loadings for each item are reported, as well
as the uniqueness of each item and the Eigenvalue and total variance explained by each
factor. These latent factors aligned closely to the scales I developed.


Factor 1 (Impact Factor) represented teachers’ perceptions of the possible
positive impact of the new system due to the high loadings (> .4) by the following
items – the system’s impact on teaching, teacher development, and student
growth, and overall. Factor 1 explained 69% of the total variance in the dataset.



Factor 2 (Observation Factor) represented perceptions of the accuracy and
fairness of the Danielson observation measure and process. Factor 2 explained
67% of the total variance in the dataset.



Factor 3 (Understanding Factor) represented perceptions of the quality of
communication and training and how this built system understanding. Factor 1
explained 60% of the total variance in the dataset.



Factor 4 (Support Factor) represented perceptions of the quality of feedback and
opportunities for professional growth and support under the new system. Factor 1
explained 52% of the total variance in the dataset.



Factor 5 (Student Growth Factor) represented perceptions of the accuracy and
fairness of the Student Growth Percentile Measure. Factor 1 explained 47% of the
total variance in the dataset.
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Finally, Factor 6 (Goal Factor) captured information on the quality of the goalsetting process teachers went through as part of INVEST. Factor 1 explained
46% of the total variance in the dataset.

The uniqueness of the variables was small to moderate (.15 to .48) with one fairly unique
variable (thoughts on the online Teachscape system) which did not load onto any of the
factors.
Table 7-1
Exploratory Factor Analysis: INVEST-Specific Attitudes

Variable

Factor 1

Factor 2

Loadings
Factor 3
Factor 4

Understanding
Initial understanding
Ongoing communication
Observation training
Teachscape online system
Student growth training

0.09
0.03
0.09
0.05
-0.05

0.02
0.07
0.06
0.04
0.01

0.66
0.72
0.67
0.27
0.57

Goal-setting
Goal-setting focused efforts
Set challenging goals

0.10
0.19

0.10
0.04

Accuracy of INVEST Measures
Overall Danielson
Danielson Domain 1
Danielson Domain 2
Danielson Domain 3
Danielson Domain 4
Student growth percentiles

0.14
0.05
0.10
0.03
0.02
0.24

Growth & Improvement
Quality of feedback
Level of support
Impact on my teaching
Impact on teacher development
Impact on student growth
Overall impact
Eigenvalue
% of variance

Factor 5

Factor 6

Uniqueness

0.06
0.01
-0.04
0.11
-0.06

-0.07
0.04
-0.02
0.02
0.15

-0.00
-0.02
0.05
-0.08
0.07

0.46
0.42
0.37
0.75
0.48

0.27
0.02

-0.01
0.07

-0.08
0.05

0.48
0.52

0.41
0.42

0.53
0.87
0.91
0.84
0.81
-0.02

0.09
0.04
-0.03
0.02
0.02
0.04

-0.00
0.01
-0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02

0.18
-0.03
-0.10
-0.00
0.08
0.41

0.01
0.01
0.02
-0.01
0.00
-0.01

0.28
0.18
0.17
0.18
0.25
0.62

0.23
0.36
0.86
0.79
0.85

0.13
0.04
0.04
0.11
0.02

0.08
-0.04
0.01
0.11
0.00

0.48
0.46
0.02
0.05
-0.03

-0.03
0.05
-0.05
-0.00
0.07

0.02
0.09
0.07
-0.08
0.03

0.34
0.27
0.16
0.18
0.15

0.74

0.11

-0.00

-0.03

0.10

-0.00

0.18

8.23
69.17%

7.99
67.12%

7.18
60.31%

6.20
52.11%

5.54
46.55%

5.45
45.76%
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Section Two: Key System Characteristics
Given the relationship between INVEST’s features discussed in Chapter 3 (for
example, teachers’ understanding appeared to influence their perceptions of the purpose
and impact of the system), we would expect these factors to be correlated. As
demonstrated in Table 7-2, these correlations were, in fact, relatively large in magnitude.
Though teachers had varying opinions about specific features of INVEST, this analysis
suggests that their perceptions were significantly associated with each other.
Table 7-2
Correlations between System Characteristics
Measures
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1
Impact Factor
Observation Factor
Understanding Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth Factor
Goal Factor

-

2

3

4

5

6

0.68***
-

0.71***
0.72***
-

0.81***
0.74***
0.78***
-

0.87***
0.74***
0.74***
0.72***
-

0.76***
0.69***
0.78***
0.84***
0.66***
-

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
In addition, teachers’ perceptions of system features were associated with their
motivation, performance, and turnover. As demonstrated in Table 7-3, system perceptions
were more correlated with teachers’ system expectancy (or belief in their ability to meet
standards on INVEST) than their system value (or importance they placed on INVEST).
However, the correlations with system characteristics were greater for both sources of
motivation than they were with either individual or school characteristics. Additionally,
teachers’ perceptions of system characteristics were highly correlated with reported
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changes in practice. One of the limitations of the Danielson measure is that we do not
know how teachers performed at the beginning of the year, so it is not possible to track
progress over the course of the year. Based on the large correlations between specific
system features and reported changes in practice, we might expect system features to be
more associated with improvements on the Danielson rubric than with actual scores.
Table 7-3 also demonstrated that teachers who chose to stay in the district had more
favorable perceptions of INVEST, particularly when it came to the perceived impact and
support provided by the new system. Additionally, quality positive support, level of
Table 7-3
Correlation between System Characteristics and Teacher Outcomes
Measure

Individual
Characteristics
Teaching Grit
Overall Grit
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional Stability
Openness
School Characteristics
Quality of
administration
Positive support
Level of control
Professional community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation Factor
Understanding Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth Factor
Goal Factor

System
Expectancy

System
Value

Danielson
Framework

Student
Growth
Percentiles

Reported
Changes
in Practice

Turnover

Burnout

0.29***
0.11***
0.09**
0.05
0.09**
0.09**
0.13***

0.28***
0.17***
0.19***
0.07*
0.14***
0.05
0.12***

0.09**
0.08*
0.16***
-0.01
-0.07*
-0.11***
0.00

0.02
0.02
-0.02
0.03
-0.04
0.14*
-0.07

0.29***
0.10**
0.03
0.06*
0.14***
0.02
0.10**

-0.10*
-0.04
-0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
0.02

-0.53***
-0.30***
-0.21***
0.00
-0.13***
-0.27***
-0.05

0.30***

0.25***

0.12***

0.04

0.29***

-0.14***

-0.39***

0.26***
0.23***
0.18***

0.18***
0.22***
0.15***

0.11***
0.12***
-0.04

0.02
0.08*
0.02

0.26***
0.26***
0.27***

-0.10**
-0.09**
-0.05

-0.38***
-0.35***
-0.27***

0.47***
0.44***
0.40***
0.45***
0.50***
0.38***

0.33***
0.37***
0.41***
0.35***
0.34***
0.36***

0.01
0.09**
0.08*
0.01
0.05
0.03

-0.04
0.01
0.02
-0.02
-0.01
-0.02

0.52***
0.45***
0.46***
0.55***
0.44***
0.54***

-0.11***
-0.06
-0.09**
-0.10**
-0.03
-0.09**

-0.33***
-0.24***
-0.27***
-0.25***
-0.31***
-0.25***

Note: For all measures, N=1097, except for Student Growth Percentiles measure, where
N=651. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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understanding, and teachers’ engagement in goal-setting were also negatively correlated
with burnout and turnover, though to a slightly lesser extent.
System Characteristics and Teacher Motivation
As discussed in Chapter 3, teachers’ attitudes toward INVEST were influenced by
system design features and the implementation process. When teachers believed INVEST
was designed to support their growth, they were more invested in making changes in
Table 7-4
Regression Analysis Predicting System (INVEST) Expectancy
Measure

Model 1:
Individual
Variation

Individual Characteristics
Teaching Grit
0.28(0.03)***
Overall Grit
-0.02(0.04)
Conscientiousness
-0.05(0.04)
Extraversion
0.03(0.03)
Agreeableness
0.01(0.04)
Emotional
0.00(0.03)
Stability
Openness
0.09(0.04)*
School Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive Support
Level of Control
Professional
Community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation
Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

Model 2:
Individual and
School
Variation

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

Model 4:
Individual
Variation

Model 5:
Individual and
School
Variation

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.17(0.04)***
-0.03(0.04)
-0.03(0.05)
0.04(0.03)
-0.01(0.04)
0.00(0.03)

0.08(0.04)*
-0.02(0.04)
0.00(0.04)
0.04(0.03)
-0.01(0.03)
-0.03(0.03)

0.25(0.04)***
-0.03(0.04)
-0.05(0.04)
0.01(0.03)
0.02(0.04)
-0.00(0.03)

0.15(0.04)***
-0.04(0.04)
-0.03(0.04)
0.02(0.03)
-0.00(0.04)
-0.00(0.03)

0.08(0.04)
-0.02(0.03)
-0.01(0.04)
0.03(0.03)
-0.01(0.04)
0.04(0.03)

0.09(0.04)*

0.09(0.04)*

0.10(0.04)**

0.09(0.04)*

0.08(0.04)*

0.16(0.05)**

0.08(0.05)

0.14(0.05)**

0.08(0.05)

0.09(0.06)
0.04(0.04)
-0.03(0.04)

0.03(0.05)
-0.01(0.04)
-0.07(0.04)

0.11(0.05)*
0.06(0.04)
-0.02(0.04)

0.02(0.05)
-0.00(0.04)
-0.05(0.04)

0.05(0.09)
0.12(0.06)*

0.03(0.09)
0.08(0.06)

-0.14(0.07)

-0.09(0.07)

0.28(0.09)**
0.37(0.10)***

0.25(0.09)**
0.36(0.09)***

-0.10(0.09)

-0.07(0.10)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized. Controlling for all individuallevel demographic characteristics . *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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practice. Additionally, when they viewed the evaluation measures as providing an
accurate picture of their performance, they seemed more likely to believe in their abilities
to increase effectiveness. Finally, when they received quality feedback, teachers had
better overall perceptions of INVEST’s potential to bring about meaningful change.
Table 7-5
Regression Analysis Predicting System (INVEST) Value
Measure

Without School Effects
Model 1:
Model 2:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School Variation

Individual Characteristics
Teaching Grit
0.26(0.04)***
Overall Grit
0.03(0.04)
Conscientiousness
0.08(0.04)*
Extraversion
0.05(0.03)
Agreeableness
0.06(0.04)
Emotional
0.04(0.04)
Stability
Openness
0.02(0.04)
School Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive Support
Level of Control
Professional
Community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation
Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System Variation

With School Effects
Model 4:
Model 5:
Individual
Individual
Variation
and School
Variation

0.17(0.05)**
0.03(0.04)
0.09(0.04)*
0.06(0.02)
0.04(0.04)
-0.04(0.03)

0.09(0.04)*
0.03(0.04)
0.09(0.04)*
0.04(0.03)
0.04(0.04)
-0.03(0.03)

0.24(0.04)***
0.03(0.04)
0.08(0.04)
0.04(0.03)
0.05(0.04)
-0.02(0.04)

0.15(0.04)**
0.03(0.05)
0.08(0.04)*
0.05(0.03)
0.03(0.04)
-0.01(0.04)

0.09(0.04)*
0.03(0.04)
0.08(0.04)*
0.05(0.03)
0.04(0.04)
-0.01(0.03)

-0.00(0.04)

0.01(0.04)

0.04(0.04)

0.01(0.04)

0.02(0.04)

0.12(0.05)*

0.06(0.04)

0.15(0.05)**

0.08(0.05)

0.04(0.04)
0.05(0.03)
0.01(0.04)

-0.02(0.04)
0.02(0.03)
-0.01(0.04)

0.05(0.05)
0.07(0.03)
-0.01(0.05)

-0.05(0.04)
0.02(0.03)
-0.04(0.05)

-0.04(0.09)
0.12(0.06)*

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

-0.00(0.09)
0.13(0.05)*

0.21(0.07)**
0.07(0.08)
0.01(0.10)

0.22(0.08)**
0.08(0.09)
0.02(0.11)

0.10(0.07)

0.09(0.07)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
These findings suggest that specific system features influenced teachers’ system
expectancy (or belief in their ability on the system) and system value (or the importance
associated with the system). This section explores which system characteristics were
most influential in predicting teacher motivation on the new system using the same
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analyses discussed in Chapter 5 (individual characteristics) and Chapter 6 (school
characteristics).
Understanding. During the pilot year of INVEST, teachers’ value was influenced
by their understanding of the new system and whether they felt it was intended to support
their development. Table 7-4 Model 3 showed that the Understanding Factor (capturing
teachers’ reported understanding of the system and quality of communication and
training) was a significant predictor of system value, B = .21, t(908) = 12.23, p < .05, and
Model 6 (in Table 7-4) validated that this effect was still significant with school effects
included in the model. Teachers who saw INVEST as designed for professional growth
reported being more optimistic about their ability to control outcomes on the new system
and generally, more positive about their abilities to improve practice. To the contrary,
when teachers assumed the system was created primarily to hold educators accountable
and make their jobs impossible, this appeared to lower their system – and personal –
value.
Teachers’ perceptions of the quality of training and communication over the
course of the year improved teachers’ perceptions of the purpose of the new system.
When the messaging focused on the importance of “teacher growth and development,” it
increased teachers’ value for INVEST. If teachers believed that INVEST was designed to
support their growth as professionals, this activated their intrinsic desire to experience
success (competence). Conversely, when teachers believed that INVEST devalued their
work and served purely an accountability function, this limited their desire to improve
practice for their own purposes (autonomy). As one teacher shared, “it wasn’t like I
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wanted to do better because I want to be a better teacher, it was like, omg, if I don’t do
better, I’m going to be kicked out on my butt” (School 5, Teacher 5). Many teachers
reported that they were already motivated to improve their teaching and that evaluation
would not have much of an impact on their overall value for teaching in either direction:
“I don’t really think an evaluation should be a motivation to be a good teacher. I think
that’s just part of my job” (School 5, Teacher 4). Since evaluation was not yet being used
for compensation, very few teachers discussed the “utility value” or long-term benefit of
performing well on the new evaluation system.
Accuracy and fairness of the measures. During the pilot year of INVEST,
teachers’ expectancy was influenced by their perceptions of the accuracy and fairness of
the measures and evaluation process. Table 7-4 Model 3 showed that the Observation
Factor (capturing teachers’ perceptions of the accuracy of the observation criteria and
process) was a significant predictor of system expectancy, B = .12, t(908) = 19.64, p <
.05; however, this predictor was no longer significant when including school effects.
Table 7-4 Model 3 also demonstrated that the Student Growth Factor (capturing teachers’
perceptions of the accuracy of the growth measure) was an even more influential
predictor of system expectancy, B = .37, t(908) = 19.64, p < .05 and that this factor was
robust even with the inclusion of school effects. Indeed, teachers’ perceptions of the
accuracy and fairness of the measures were critical to their initial expectancy on the new
system.
Most teachers reported that the Danielson Framework captured a comprehensive
and accurate picture of their performance. In particular, they appreciated the specificity of
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the Danielson Framework because it provided them with very concrete steps to take to
improve practice, which increased their level of system expectancy. However, as
discussed in Chapter 4, teachers were very concerned about the achievability of Level 4
performance on the Danielson Framework. As one teacher shared, “Level four is like
ideal. It’s like what I’ve heard from teachers and other administrators is that it’s harder
to get to level four in INVEST than it is to get that same level with whatever else we were
using before” (School 5, Teacher 1). These concerns over the unattainability of Level 4
performance were often rooted in perceptions of unfairness. One novice teacher shared
that she wanted to a Level 4 teacher, but felt it was not feasible as a new teacher: “To
score a four you almost have to be in a leadership position. You have to be a lead
teacher…I know that as a first year teacher I’m probably not going to get a four”
(School 2, Teacher 4). Even if teachers believed they were capable of achieving Level 4
performance, many questioned whether the process would provide them with the support
they needed to take their practice to the new level. As one teacher remarked:
I think using those if you could be in the classroom or video it all the time it
would be accurate but because you’re still only being looked at for those 45
minutes or those 15 minute walkthroughs, you never know when they’re going to
do that walkthrough. So if it’s a Monday and you’re introducing a new topic,
which to me makes most sense to do as a whole group, then your INVEST is
going to reflect poorly because it’s not student centered… But then maybe if
they’d come in on Friday when we’ve been doing this, it’s not a new skill
anymore and now they can do activities in small groups or centers. It kind of
depends on the week, and it depends on the topic (School 2,Teacher 5).
Many teachers believed in their ability to reach Level 4 performance, yet questioned
whether the observation process would fairly assess those abilities. Teachers expressed
concern about how the timing of observations contributed to their accuracy and were
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particularly concerned about the walkthroughs (which were unannounced). Since teachers
had no way of anticipating when they would occur, this resulted in lowered expectancy
that the observation would fairly capture their capabilities.
Teachers also consistently shared concerns with the SGP measure though these
concerns remained hypothetical (as SGPs had yet to be fully implemented), rather than
based on experience. Most concerns about the accuracy of SGPs were rooted in the lack
of student and parent accountability. Teachers raised several specific issues which
lowered expectancy on the measure:


Special education students. How is the system fair if SPED students will
not be treated as a different sub-group but compared with the general
student population?



Severe behavior problems or other issues. How will the system account
for situations where there are a few students in the class who have severe
behavior or home-life challenges and disrupt the entire class?



Attendance. How is the system fair if it doesn’t factor in student
attendance?

The principal at School 5 anticipated SGPs being a major concern for teacher expectancy:
“They’re not going to like it. Until we can get it figured out for all the particulars, like
the teachers who work with special education students, our co-teachers, the teachers who
work with bump up students…you’re always going to have teachers who do not think it’s
fair.” Since many teachers perceived student progress on standardized tests to be
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influenced by factors outside of their control, this suggests that those teachers will have
lower system expectancy.
When INVEST measures aligned with teachers’ own definitions of effective
teaching, this reinforced their intrinsic value and built overall motivation. For Danielson,
this meant valuing student-led classrooms, while for SGPs, it required viewing students’
progress on standardized assessments as a meaningful measure of teacher performance.
Though many teachers questioned the feasibility of creating student-centered classrooms,
they generally valued student-led instruction and believed it was a worthy (though
perhaps, unattainable) goal. Though there was considerable variation in teachers’
perceptions of the validity of SGPs, more teachers expressed concerns over whether the
measure would actually capture valued outcomes. Some teachers pointed out that
students would get nervous on the day of the test and not demonstrate their capabilities:
“Just the testing. I don’t know. In ways I do feel like a test measures student growth, but
in a way I don’t. Like it should be more like what they can do in class and how they’re
thinking. Because some of them when they get to a test, they just clam up. It’s not really
accurate” (School 3, Teacher 1). Others went further and questioned whether test
performance was actually the goal of education (as opposed to moral/civic development
or higher level critical thinking) regardless of whether students performed their best on
assessment day.
Support. In addition to their level of understanding and perceptions of the
accuracy of the measures, teachers were also influenced by the perceived quality of
support associated with the evaluation process. Table 7-4 Model 3 showed that the
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Support Factor (capturing teachers’ perceptions of the quality of feedback and support)
was a significant predictor of system expectancy, B = .28, t(908) = 19.64, p < .05 and that
this was robust even with the inclusion of school effects, B = .25, t(874) = 12.90, p < .01.
As discussed in Chapter 6, when teachers received quality support to help them reach
standards, they were more likely to report believing in their ability to improve on the new
system (i.e., higher system expectancy).
System Characteristics and Teacher Effectiveness
As discussed in Chapter 6, teachers’ ability to improve their performance on the
new system depended on the principal’s ability to create systems of support and
reflection. Indeed, targeted support is essential to the theory of deliberate practice. When
individuals move from the deliberation to the action phase, they commit to specific goals
and translate intentions into changes in practice. Yet increased effort is not sufficient to
improve performance. Individuals must work at the edge of their abilities and receive
immediate and targeted feedback on specific areas of practice. This section examines
how system characteristics influenced teachers’ ability to engage in deliberate practice
and improve on the Danielson Framework for Teaching (the observation measure). I
present the same set of analyses discussed in the previous chapters on individual and
school characteristics, this time with a focus on system characteristics. Qualitative data
confirmed that several system features were particularly important in influencing
teachers’ ability to improve their effectiveness on INVEST.
Goal-Setting. As theory demonstrates, setting and achieving interim goals
increases motivation and in turn, builds interest (or value) in the task itself. Table 7-3
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demonstrated that teachers’ perceptions of the quality of the goal-setting process were
positively related to whether the evaluation system led them to implement changes in
practice, r = .54, p < .001. With the use of the Teachscape technology, one advantage of
the feedback principals provided was that it was very detailed so teachers could set goals
related to particular components of the Danielson Framework. When teachers were able
to successfully implement these incremental changes, the evaluation process enhanced
their feelings of competence and helped them maintain commitment.
Table 7-6
Regression Analysis Predicting Teacher Effectiveness on Danielson Observation
Measure
Measure

Without School Effects
Model 1:
Model 2:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

Individual Characteristics
Teaching Grit
0.09(0.04)*
Overall Grit
0.01(0.05)
Conscientiousness
0.15(0.04)***
Extraversion
-0.02(0.04)
Agreeableness
-0.10(0.03)**
Emotional
-0.12(0.03)**
Stability
Openness
-0.01(0.03)
School Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive Support
Level Control
Professional
Community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation Factor
Understanding
Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

With School Effects
Model 4:
Model 5:
Individual
Individual and
Variation
School
Variation

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.03(0.05)
0.00(0.04)
0.15(0.04)**
-0.02(0.03)
-0.10(0.03)**
0.12(0.03)***

0.03(0.04)
0.01(0.04)
0.14(0.04)***
-0.02(0.03)
-0.10(0.03)**
0.11(0.03)***

0.12(0.04)**
0.00(0.04)
0.15(0.04)***
-0.01(0.03)
-0.10(0.03)**
-0.09(0.03)**

0.07(0.05)
-0.01(0.04)
0.14(0.04)***
-0.01(0.03)
-0.09(0.03)**
-0.09(0.03)**

0.06(0.04)
-0.00(0.04)
0.13(0.04)**
-0.01(0.03)
-0.09(0.03)**
-0.09(0.03)**

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.02(0.03)

0.11(0.04)*

0.08(0.05)

0.12(0.04)**

0.09(0.04)*

0.07(0.03)*
0.09(0.03)**
-0.14(0.04)***

0.08(0.04)*
0.07(0.03)*
-0.12(0.04)**

0.07(0.03)
0.10(0.03)**
-0.19(0.04)***

0.07(0.04)
0.08(0.03)*
-0.16(0.05)**

-0.07(0.08)
0.11(0.06)*
0.13(0.06)*

-0.07(0.08)
0.09(0.06)*
0.18(0.07)*

-0.16(0.10)*
-0.03(0.08)

-0.15(0.09)*
-0.02(0.08)

0.03(0.06)

-0.01(0.07)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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One teacher described how she found the specific nature of the process especially
valuable for her own goal-setting:

My post conference right here, you can see I did lots of reflection to see exactly
what it is I could have done a little bit differently. Just looking at the question –
comment on your classroom procedures – all of these components right here. I
have to go back and see what is 2C, what is 2D and what is 2E and I need to at
least touch on all of those right here…. The level of detail is very important
because it tells me what to do (School 1, Teacher 6).
In theory, the specificity of the Teachscape system meant that teachers could
isolate specific areas and work strategically to develop those strengths; however, in
practice, teachers were often too overwhelmed by the quantity of the feedback to
implement changes. While the feedback from PDAS had been confined to one sheet of
paper (with check boxes and a few notes), principals had been trained through INVEST
to “script” lessons and provide a detailed account of student and teacher interactions. As
a result, the feedback obtained through INVEST could be as long as five to ten pages and
to access it, teachers had to log-in to the online Teachscape system. Several principals
shared that the technology was a challenge for many of their teachers: “They’re very
intimidated by it. They couldn’t find their information half the time. They didn’t know
how to use the tool. And they struggled with understanding, for instance, when you score
and you have the statements and then the component score, what does all the information
actually mean?” (School 4, Principal).
Understanding. Though the online system had the potential to provide quality
feedback, teachers reported needing a better picture of what Level 4 looked like in
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practice. As discussed in Chapter 6, principals who developed strong systems of support
were able to build teachers’ understanding and confidence in the accuracy and fairness of
the Danielson Framework. As demonstrated in Table 7-6 Model 6, when individual,
school, and system characteristics were simultaneously entered into the regression
analysis (and school effects were included), teachers’ level of understanding was the
strongest predictor of Danielson performance, B = .18, t(847) = 4.90, p < .05, followed
by their perceptions of the accuracy of the Danielson observation measure, B = .11, p <
.05. When system characteristics were included in Model 3, the quality of administration
was no longer a significant predictor, suggesting that administrators influenced their
teachers’ performance on INVEST through their ability to build teachers’ understanding
and confidence in the new system.
Support. Theory indicates that teachers will only be able to sustain their work
towards goals when they not only understand the performance criteria but also receive
consistent information about how their performance relates to a specific set of standards.
Though the Support Factor was not a significant predictor in the regression analysis in
Table 7-6 (likely because of its sizeable correlation with other system features), it was the
most correlated with reported changes in practice of any of the system features in Table
7-3, r = .55, p < .001. Additionally, in interviews, teachers reported that the immediacy of
feedback was essential in helping them improve their practice. At the beginning of the
year, principals experienced a fairly steep learning curve with the technology, which
meant that feedback was often not received within the expected one week time frame. For
principals who were technologically savvy, the immediacy of the feedback loop
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accelerated over the course of the year, and when feedback was received in a timely
manner, it helped teachers make incremental adjustments in practice. One new teacher
shared more about how this feedback process benefited her development:
He told me specifically what he wanted to see each time.…He would send me the
feedback that day and when we met…he just had a printout of his observation and
he just basically walked through it and told me what he thought about it and how I
should improve and if I had anything to say to him about his observation and if he
missed anything before he walked in and stuff like that. It had a positive impact
because I feel that, like I said, at the beginning it’s very specific. I like that about
the INVEST program. It is very specific and you get it right away. It doesn’t leave
you wondering where can you improve or where you’re doing good or what
things are not so good. I like that and I like how everything stays online so you
can go back to it.
Though some principals improved the immediacy and consistency of their
feedback, others struggled to complete observations in a timely fashion. When teachers
did not receive quality feedback on their performance, they were frustrated and did not
see the value in the new system. One particularly disgruntled first year teacher noted:
“When we first met [referring to our initial interview], I didn’t have much of an idea. I
hadn’t been observed…I’m like, OK, I thought the idea was to get feedback, especially as
a first year teacher. What am I doing wrong? What am I doing right? I’d like to modify
what I’m doing. If not, then what’s the point of the new system” (School 6, Teacher 3).
System Characteristics and Teacher Retention
Teachers must sustain improvements in practice by avoiding becoming burnt out
by their work. Burnout stems from teachers’ motivational responses and is characterized
by exhaustion, cynicism about one’s value or impact, and frustration over lack of
competence. As Chapter 6 made clear, teachers had varied perceptions of how INVEST
might impact teacher burnout and turnover across schools, and these diverse opinions
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appeared to be based on differing perceptions of system features. To evaluate which of
these features were most influential in predicting teachers’ turnover, I present the same
analysis discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 with a focus on system-level characteristics.
Table 7-7 presents the results when these variables were simultaneously entered
into a binary logistic regression model while controlling for individual and school level
factors. As demonstrated in Model 3, perceptions of the perceived impact of INVEST
emerged as a significant predictor of teachers’ retention, and teachers who were one
Table 7-7
Binary Logistic Regression Table Predicting Turnover
Measure

Without School Effects
Model 1:
Model 2:
Individual
Individual
Variation
and School
Variation

Individual Characteristics
Teaching Grit
0.79(0.05)**
Overall Grit
0.92(0.08)
Conscientiousness
1.18(0.16)
Extraversion
0.92(0.06)
Agreeableness
1.01(0.08)
Emotional Stability
1.04(0.09)
Openness
1.04(0.09)
School Characteristics
Quality of
Administration
Positive Support
Level of Control
Professional
Community
System Characteristics
Impact Factor
Observation Factor
Understanding Factor
Support Factor
Student Growth
Factor
Goal Factor

Model 3:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.88(0.06)
0.94(0.08)
1.17(0.10)
0.92(0.05)
1.04(0.08)
1.05(0.07)
1.04(0.09)

0.83(0.10)
0.94(0.11)
1.19(0.17)
0.99(0.11)
1.11(0.12)
0.96(0.12)
1.09(0.15)

0.82(0.06)**
0.98(0.08)
0.89(0.06)
1.04(0.07)

With School Effects
Model 4:
Model 5:
Individual
Individual
Variation
and School
Variation

0.79(0.06)**
0.92(0.08)
1.18(0.12)
0.90(0.05)
1.01(0.08)
1.09(0.08)
1.05(0.09)

Model 6:
Individual,
School, and
System
Variation

0.85(0.07)*
0.93(0.08)
1.17(0.11)
0.90(0.05)
1.03(0.08)
1.10(0.12)
1.05(0.09)

0.82(0.11)
0.91(0.13)
1.25(0.19)
0.99(0.10)
1.10(0.13)
1.01(0.13)
1.11(0.16)

0.68(0.07)**

0.81(0.06)**

0.70(0.08)**

0.97(0.10)
0.91(0.12)
1.11(0.12)

0.94(0.08)
0.90(0.06)
1.15(0.08)

0.86(0.09)
1.00(0.15)
1.22(0.32)

0.41(0.15)**
0.98(0.15)
0.85 (0.19)
1.32(0.32)
3.13(1.07)**

0.40(0.14)*
1.02(0.17)
0.87(0.20)
1.22(0.32)
3.38(1.30)**

0.92(0.26)

0.93(0.27)

Note: All continuous variables have been standardized. Only 873 teachers had data on
all variables included in each analysis, so this was the final analytic sample used for all
models. Teachers who left the district were slightly less likely to complete end of year
surveys, which explains why the aggregate turnover rates are lower than those reported in
Chapter 4. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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standard deviation higher in perceptions of INVEST’s potential impact were 59% less
likely to leave teaching in the district, OR = .41, p < .05. Model 6 indicated that this
finding was robust to the inclusion of school effects.
Impact (Aligning with Teachers' Values). INVEST had the potential to comport
with teachers' desire to have a positive impact on students. For teachers who saw the
primary purpose of INVEST as encouraging their professional growth, they stayed
energized by the system. As one invested teacher shared, “I have never been asked to do
this type of reflection before. This is making me a better teacher and keeping me
energized to improve” (School 1, Teacher 3). For this teacher (and others who recognized
INVEST's ability to support their development), the new system helped sustain their level
of engagement in teaching. To the contrary, when teachers saw the primary purpose of
INVEST as "holding teachers accountable,” this did not align with their intrinsic values.
One teacher shared, "Yes, I am staying next year but not over the long term. Important to
work with the kids, but we don't have enough time to work with the kids. Less testing.
Less paperwork. I feel like I'm a secretary"(School 2, Teacher 2). As this quote suggests,
teachers struggling to adapt to – and find meaning in – the additional workload from
INVEST were more likely to report wanting to leave the district.
This value conflict was particularly problematic for teachers who associated
INVEST with more “unnecessary paperwork" and "testing." While these teachers
expressed frustration with the additional workload, their concerns primarily arose from
the fact that they did not value the specific type of work principals asked them to engage
in under the new system. As one burnt-out teacher shared, "Just the testing. I don't know.
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In ways I do feel like a test measures student growth, but in a way, I don't. Like it should
be more about what they can do in class and how they're thinking. That's what matters to
me" (School 3, Teacher 2). Teachers like the one above, felt that “teaching” had become
too focused on “testing” which was not why they had joined the profession.
Summary
In sum, this chapter reinforced the initial descriptive findings, presented in
Chapter 3, which suggested that teachers’ attitudes influenced their experiences with the
new system. In fact, perceptions of system features were more highly correlated with
teachers’ motivation on the system and reported changes in practice than either individual
or school characteristics. Even when controlling for these factors, teachers’ system
perceptions explained considerable variation in motivation, effectiveness, and retention.
Though teachers’ perceptions of system characteristics were highly correlated
with each other, several emerged as particularly influential. Specifically, teachers’ level
of understanding of the new system seemed to positively affect their motivation and
performance. Indeed, teachers who believed INVEST was designed to support their
professional growth as educators and understood the system’s expectations were more
empowered to take ownership over their practice and reached higher levels of
performance on the new system. Teachers’ perception of the accuracy of the evaluation
measures (both the Danielson Framework and Student Growth Percentiles) was
associated with their initial motivation. Teachers’ system value was more influenced by
their perceptions of the Danielson Framework, which is consistent with the fact that this
measure was the focus during the pilot year. However, teachers’ system expectancy was
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more influenced by their perceptions of the Student Growth factor. This suggests that
teachers’ belief in their ability to improve performance on INVEST was influenced by
whether they had confidence that they could impact students’ progress. Finally, the level
of support and quality of feedback teachers received was a significant predictor of their
initial motivation to improve performance over the course of the year.
The second part of this dissertation has demonstrated that teachers’ motivational
responses varied considerably depending on individual, school, and system
characteristics. Indeed, the overall improvement process (from motivation to volition to
commitment) depended on features of individual teachers’ personality, conditions within
the school, and how teachers’ reacted to specific system attributes. Though some
characteristics consistently served as positive predictors across all outcomes (i.e., grit in
teaching, administration, level of system understanding), other individual characteristics
(e.g., openness), school conditions (e.g., level of control) and system features (e.g.,
accuracy of measures) influenced some outcomes but not others. The final chapter will
synthesize these findings in the context of expectancy-value theory to build a stronger
understanding of how new teacher evaluation systems influence teachers’ motivational
responses.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of this study is to build a better understanding of the factors
influencing teachers’ responses to new performance management policies and explore
how these responses translate into teacher effectiveness and retention. To investigate
these issues, I used mixed methods analysis to examine the impact and implementation of
INVEST, a new teacher performance management system which was piloted in Aldine
ISD during the 2012-2013 school year. My quantitative analysis captured broad-based
results through a survey of the population of teachers in the district and an examination of
administrative records. To supplement this analysis, my qualitative research provided a
more in depth account of how a subset of individuals experienced policy implementation
across different contexts. My findings highlighted that during the pilot year, INVEST had
a negative impact on teachers’ personal expectancy, but did not have a statistically
significant impact on either teacher performance or retention. However, there was
considerable variation across all three outcome measures, which was influenced by
teachers’ perceptions of system features, their individual personality characteristics, as
well as elements of school context.
Although a growing body of research has begun to examine the impact of recent
evaluation systems, we have very limited knowledge of how individual, school, and
system characteristics influence teachers’ motivation and improvement process. This is
the first study to systematically examine each of these factors and situate findings within
a motivational framework. It is my hope that education stakeholders will use these
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findings as a means to better understand how teacher evaluation systems impact teachers’
motivation, performance, and retention, and how various characteristics influence the
implementation process. In this concluding chapter, I return to the literature to compare
my findings from this study to the nascent body of research on teachers’ responses to
performance management systems, as well as the conceptual framework presented on
motivational theory, depicted in Figure 8-1 below. I then state the limitations of this
analysis and explore broader implications for researchers and policymakers.

Teacher Personal
Motivation
-Expectancy
_-Value

Teacher System
Motivation
-Expectancy
_-Value

Teacher
Outcomes of
Interest

New
Performance
Management
System

-Effectiveness
-Retention

-INVEST

Sources of Variation
Individual
Characteristics
(e.g., teaching grit)

Organizational
Factors
(e.g., leadership)

Figure 8-1. Motivational framework based on analysis
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System Features
(e.g., understanding,
accuracy, feedback)

Discussion
Understanding Teachers’ Responses within Motivational Theory
Teachers’ Personal Motivation for Teaching
In the existing psychological literature, expectancy-value theory links
motivational choices to two sets of beliefs – the belief an individual has in their own
abilities (expectancy) and the value they associate with various tasks (value). Research
has demonstrated that more efficacious teachers have a greater influence on student
learning than teachers with lower efficacy (Goddard, Hoy, & Woolfolk Hoy, 2004;
Tschannen-Moran,Woolfolk Hoy, & Hoy, 1998). In this analysis, teachers’ expectancy
was shown to influence their performance on the Danielson Framework for Teaching, but
this did not translate into their impact on Student Growth Percentiles during the pilot
year. When teachers believed in their abilities as educators, they set ambitious goals for
their students’ performance; conversely, teachers with lower expectancy expressed
concerns about how they could get through to the most difficult students who did not
come to school motivated or ready to learn.
To be motivated, individuals must not only believe they can make changes in their
behavior but also value their work. Value can be intrinsically motivated, based on the
level of enjoyment teachers get from a specific task or the extent to which a task is
consistent with their self-image (attainment value) or they can be extrinsically motivated,
based on perceived utility value or pressure from external sources. Teachers in this
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analysis reported very high levels of value for teaching, which was primarily driven by
intrinsic motivation for their work. The majority of teachers shared that they entered the
teaching profession because they wanted to make a difference in the lives of their
students. This is consistent with the first element of self-determination theory, which
demonstrates that individuals have a basic desire to experience competence in their work.
Additionally, many teachers reported that they appreciated being recognized by their
administrators as a source of attainment value or validation of their hard work, which
aligns with the second element of self-determination theory, relatedness, or a desire to
positively connect with others. Very few teachers mentioned utility value (or some
external benefit) associated with their teaching. When asked about the desirability of
performance-based pay, most teachers shared that while they would appreciate extra
money, it was not what motivated them. What they appeared to value more was being
given ownership over their practice, which is consistent with the third psychological need
discussed in self-determination theory, autonomy.
From Personal to System Motivation
Even if teachers were motivated by their work, this study demonstrated that
teachers’ personal motivation for teaching did not necessarily translate into their
motivation to perform well on the new system, which is reflected in Figure 8-1. When the
new evaluation system rolled out, teachers received information and made judgments
about their belief in their abilities to meet system standards and determined the value they
placed on performing well on the new system. This system level motivation was
influenced by a number of key system features.
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Level of Understanding and Perceived Purpose. Teachers’ personal motivation
was only activated into system motivation if teachers understood how to improve their
performance under the new system and believed it was designed to support their
professional growth. Previous research has documented that teachers often react
negatively to policies because they do not understand how the policy is designed to
operate or they perceive performance metrics to be unattainable. In an analysis of
Florida’s Merit Award Program (MAP), 61% of teachers reported having little
understanding of how MAP measured high quality teaching which contributed to the fact
that only 35% believed it was fair for teachers to receive pay based on value-added
results (Jacob & Springer, 2007). Teachers’ overall level of understanding of the new
INVEST system was similarly quite low, with only 53% agreeing or strongly agreeing
that they had a solid initial understanding of the system’s expectations at the beginning of
the year. This analysis also demonstrated that teachers who believed that INVEST was
designed to support professional growth were more optimistic about their ability to
improve outcomes on the new system. When the messaging associated with INVEST
focused on “teacher development” as opposed to “teacher appraisal or accountability,”
this activated teachers’ expectancy.
Accuracy and Fairness of the Measures. Expectancy theory makes clear that an
individual’s motivation will be strengthened when performance goals are clearly defined.
This clarity will allow individuals to determine the value they attribute to particular goals
and assess how likely they are to achieve them with increased effort (Locke & Latham,
1990). If systems become too complex, they run the risk of resulting in a lack of clarity
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and a corresponding decrease in motivation (Heneman, Milanowski, & Kimball, 2007).
As such, teachers’ perceptions of accuracy and fairness of the measures are essential to
building teachers’ system expectancy. This study corroborated prior research that
performance management systems are only motivating when teachers believe that the
criteria used to gauge effectiveness are fair (Johnson & Papay, 2009). Though most
teachers believed the Danielson Framework was both accurate and comprehensive, they
questioned how fair it was to expect teachers to create student-driven classrooms (the
hallmark of the top performance level, Level 4, on the new system). Teachers also
questioned whether it was fair to hold them accountable for students’ progress (through
the SGP measure) when there was a lack of student and parent accountability. Though
teachers generally had better perceptions of the Danielson Framework than SGPs, they
did not consistently prefer one over the other and expressed concerns with both
performance measures.
Given the complexity of teaching, it has historically been extremely challenging
to develop measures for evaluating teacher practice as part of performance management
systems. Often referred to as the “nature of teaching” hypothesis, the fundamental
challenge in determining teacher quality has always been how to clearly define outcomes
and separate the impact of the teacher from other influences on student learning
(Podursky & Springer, 2006). As discussed in Chapter 1, a considerable body of existing
research has focused on validating performance measures. However, less research has
investigated teachers’ value for these metrics. This analysis revealed that teachers’
definition of validity and reliability differed from those of statisticians. Without advanced
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statistical knowledge, teachers did not fully understand how growth models attempted to
estimate teacher effects or how inter-rater reliability was calculated. Instead, they cared
about face validity and were motivated when measures aligned with their individual
values.
Feasibility of the Expectations. For the Danielson Framework, it was not the
measure itself that concerned some teachers; indeed, they generally believed that it
captured a comprehensive picture of their performance. Instead, they raised expectancy
concerns about whether achieving top performance on the measure was a feasible
expectation, which in turn, appeared to influence the value they placed on their system
performance. For SGPs, many teachers were resistant to the idea of including student
growth as part of their evaluation regardless of how they performed on the measure.
These teachers questioned whether standardized tests accurately capture student learning
and believed the goal of education should be focused on higher order thinking skills and
performance throughout the year, rather than reduced to performance on a single day of
testing. In a prior study of teachers in Washington State, only 17% of those surveyed
were in favor of incentive pay based on test score gains (Goldhaber et.al, 2007). Though
the question was not phrased in terms of incentive pay, the results were similar in Aldine
ISD – only 30% of teachers agreed or strongly agreed that SGPs were a fair and accurate
measure of their performance (compared to 37% for the Danielson Framework).
High Level of Attainment Value. Despite concerns over performance measures,
the majority of teachers still expressed a strong desire to reach the top level of the
evaluation system (82% of teachers reported valuing performing well on the new
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system). This is consistent with other research in Texas which examined teachers’
motivation on a previous performance management system, TEEG (Springer et al.,
2008). For many teachers, this was a matter of pride; indeed, achieving highly effective
status was necessary to maintain their self-image. Teachers’ frustration with the new
system often resulted from being labeled as “proficient” or “effective” which indicated a
high level of initial attainment value. This finding suggests that the variation in value was
in part driven by teachers’ responses to the labeling of their effectiveness on the system
itself.
From System Motivation to Effectiveness
Several recent studies have found that teacher evaluation can lead to increased
student learning. For example, in Cincinnati, a student instructed by a teacher after
participation in the new evaluation system was projected to score about 11% of a
standard deviation or 4.5 percentile points (for a median student) higher. Though the
authors were not able to identify the mechanisms driving these improvements, they
speculated about several possible factors based on the system’s design – the usefulness of
feedback, the self-reflective process, and the quality of conversations between teachers
and administrators about practice (Taylor & Tyler, 2011). Though the analysis of
INVEST did not reveal a similarly positive impact on teacher effectiveness overall,
similar factors did emerge as particularly influential in the improvement process. Indeed,
teachers in schools with high implementation fidelity received more targeted feedback
and ongoing support, and further, were empowered to take ownership over their own
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goal-setting process. As a result, they reported being more likely to implement changes in
their practice under the new system.
Implementation Fidelity. Many principals experienced a steep learning curve
during the first few months of INVEST implementation and struggled to provide teachers
with timely and targeted feedback that could be used to improve performance.
Additionally, while some principals empowered teachers to self-reflect and guide the
dialogue about their practice, others adhered to a top-down structure and overly managed
the evaluation process. Much like teachers struggled to create student-driven classrooms
(or reach Level 4 performance), many principals were similarly unable to invest teachers
in the improvement process. As such, only 45% of teachers in pilot schools agreed or
strongly agreed that the new system led them to improve their practice.
The Feedback Loop. In addition to receiving feedback about how their
performance relates to a specific set of standards, individuals need to use this information
to set goals for future performance (Bandura, 1982; Bandura & Schunk, 1981) and
engage in deliberate practice (Ericsson, 1993). This analysis provided evidence in support
of this theory. Indeed, teachers’ level of engagement in the goal-setting process and their
perceptions of the quality of feedback were both associated with whether they reported
the evaluation system led to changes in practice. Since the Danielson Framework was
very specific, it allowed teachers to effectively set interim goals over the year. For
teachers who actively participated in this goal-setting process, achieving interim goals led
to increased satisfaction, which, in turn built value for the task itself.
From System Motivation to Retention
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To sustain commitment to their work over time, teachers must avoid experiencing
burnout. In Aldine ISD, teachers’ ability to stay engaged with INVEST was influenced
by the implementation of the new system, in particular, the extent to which teachers
believed the new system was designed to support their professional growth and
empowered them as professionals. It is important to note that not all retention is
desirable. Indeed, one of the goals of INVEST (as is the case with most other
performance management systems) was to increase the attrition rate of ineffective
teachers. The study conducted of Washington, D.C.’s IMPACT system found that
dismissal threats increased the voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers by .27 of a
standard deviation (Dee & Wycoff, 2013). This analysis also discovered that pilot schools
participating in INVEST had an increase in the rate of teacher turnover and that these
rates of turnover were higher among teachers identified as Needs Improvement or
Ineffective under the system. However, since these differences were not statistically
significant, they can only be used as suggestive confirmatory evidence.
Perceptions of purpose. Though one of the goals may indeed be to exit
underperforming teachers, it is not motivating for teachers if this is how they perceive the
system’s primary purpose. When teachers believed INVEST was designed to support
their development as professionals, they were more likely to stay energized by their work
and committed to improving performance. Conversely, when they viewed the system as a
mechanism for accountability and dismissal of underperformers, they were more likely to
feel threatened and demeaned by INVEST. Indeed, teachers’ ability to sustain their
motivation and improvements in performance on INVEST appeared to be driven by their
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understanding of the system’s purpose as well as the value they placed on the additional
requirements of the new system. When teachers were not invested in the value of these
additional requirements, it just felt like more unnecessary paperwork or the imposition of
unfair expectations.
Empowerment. Across the board, the timeline was too rushed at the beginning of
the pilot year, which led teachers to feel overwhelmed by new system requirements and
had an overall negative impact on expectancy. As the year progressed, certain principals
developed systems to better structure implementation and provide teachers with
ownership over the improvement process, which led teachers in these schools to increase
commitment. In other schools, teachers complained that training was not aligned with
other expectations, and though teachers reported having more work than in previous
years, they did not feel any more recognized for their contributions. In fact, under
INVEST, at the same time teachers were being asked to take on more work, they were
simultaneously being told they were no longer at the highest level of the system (which
challenged many veterans’ sense of competence). Given the many requirements placed
upon teachers, the imbalance of demands and resources left a subgroup of teachers
feeling burnt out. Conversely, when principals empowered teachers to become agents of
their own improvement process, INVEST had the opposite effect and appeared to result
in improvements in teacher commitment.
Contributing Factors
As this analysis has made clear, throughout the process, teachers’ motivation,
effectiveness, and retention were influenced by both individual and school characteristics.
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Indeed, there was considerable variation in teachers’ responses to the system both within
and between schools. This section will explore how teachers’ responses and behavior
under the new system were influenced by the nature of the worker (individual
characteristics) and nature of the working conditions (school characteristics).
Nature of the Worker (Individual Characteristics). To impact motivation,
performance management systems need to be congruent with the needs, values, and
capabilities of the people they attempt to influence (Lawler, 1983; Vroom, 1964). Yet,
most performance management systems treat teachers as a monolithic entity. At the same
time policymakers are calling for new systems to differentiate teachers based on their
performance level, the assumption seems to be that their motivational responses to
specific policies will be consistent.
This study demonstrates that teachers’ responses to INVEST varied considerably
based on teacher demographics and personality characteristics. Newer teachers were
more likely to value performing well on INVEST, though their expectancies were not
significantly different from their veteran counterparts as previous research has suggested.
Since they received additional feedback and support, reaching higher levels of
performance seemed more feasible. Additionally, for many veterans who had always
been at the top level of the prior evaluation system, INVEST was a significant adjustment
and when they did not reach Level 4 performance, this resulted in increased frustration
and lowered expectancy. The exception, of course, was highly effective teachers (on the
Danielson Framework) who were considerably more confident in their ability to perform
well on the system and in turn, valued that attainment.
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In terms of personality characteristics, teachers’ grit in teaching was the only
variable to influence all three outcomes of interest – motivation, effectiveness (on the
Danielson Framework) and retention. This finding corroborates prior research, as well as
anecdotal observation, that teaching can be incredibly discouraging work. In a national
survey, teachers identified enthusiasm, energy, and effort as critical qualities for
classroom success and encouraged only those with a “true sense of calling” to pursue the
profession (Farkas, Johnson, & Foleno, 2000). Given challenges associated with
teaching, it seems logical that grit would have a positive influence on teacher motivation,
performance, and persistence. Consistent with other psychological research, the domainspecific (teaching) grit scale, which was modified slightly from the domain-general
(overall) grit scale was more predictive of outcomes.
Though previous research has demonstrated that grit was a significant predictor of
teacher performance and retention (Duckworth et al., 2009; Robertson-Kraft &
Duckworth, 2014), this is the first study to explore the specific mechanism by which grit
translates into teachers’ motivation and behavioral change. Of the five personality types
described in this analysis, the invested teacher closely captured what we would
characterize as a “gritty” teacher. Invested teachers were able to maintain high levels of
expectancy and commitment even in the face of significant challenge. Rather than dwell
on obstacles outside of their control, they set clear goals for performance and maintained
a strong sense of purpose over the course of the year. These goals were not general and
aspirational (e.g., “reaching a Level 4”). Rather, they were targeted and specific (e.g.,
“improve student participation through more strategic questioning techniques”) and
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embedded in all aspects of their practice. Invested teachers were self-reflective and
actively sought out feedback and professional development opportunities to work towards
their goals. Instead of becoming discouraged by critical feedback, they relished it as an
opportunity for personal growth and stayed optimistic about their abilities to impact
student learning over the course of the pilot year.
Particularly in low-income districts, the multiplicity of factors outside a teacher’s
control (e.g., parental support, available resources, working conditions) obscures the link
between hard work and positive student outcomes. According to Lortie, these “endemic
uncertainties” associated with teaching have led many teachers to develop a resistance to
change because they believe their work environment has never permitted them to
demonstrate their effectiveness (Lortie, 1975). In support of Lortie’s theory, skeptical
teachers, who were practical and analytical individuals who remained fairly neutral
toward the system, were by far the most common type of teacher (and much more
common than the invested teacher). As veterans, they had seen systems come and go and
as a result, were more conservative and focused on their short-term success with students.
According to Lortie, since teachers’ time is their most precious resource in their quest for
psychic reward, teachers resent interruptions and prefer to be left alone (Lortie, 1975).
Consistent with this theory, several skeptical teachers became insulted by the end of the
year when INVEST did not reinforce their belief in their impact and added what they
perceived as unnecessary and additional work to their already overwhelming
responsibilities.
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In sum, though teachers’ gritty nature was internal (as one invested teacher shared
“It’s just my personality to be this way”), this study also provides support for Lortie’s
analysis of the importance of working environment, as teachers’ responses to systems
also appeared to be influenced by their school context. Indeed, it is likely not coincidental
that several of the invested teachers were clustered within School 1 and that several
schools did not have any teachers of this type. The next section will explore how the
nature of working conditions influenced teachers’ responses to the new evaluation
system.
Nature of the Working Conditions (School Characteristics). Both theory and
research demonstrate that the effectiveness of a performance management system will
ultimately depend on how well it fits within a particular context. Unfortunately,
policymakers typically focus most intently on the design features of performance
management systems and neglect to address equally important context issues. This study
demonstrated that teachers’ motivation and subsequent behavioral change were
influenced by a variety of enabling conditions, and that the principal was central to
developing the climate for effective implementation.
Consistent with prior research (Kelley et al., 2000), principal quality influenced
teachers’ system motivation, as well as their subsequent performance and retention
decisions. Highly effective principals were able to create supportive environments that
helped their teachers feel it was possible – and important – to meet new system
expectations. However, rather than just implement the new system with fidelity, they
used INVEST to empower teachers to reflect on their practice and drive their own
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improvement. Rather than present INVEST as another tool for teacher accountability,
highly effective principals communicated that the new system was a way to support
teachers in their own professional growth and to maximize their ability to impact
students. As a result, this activated teachers’ value for their system and encouraged them
to set meaningful long-term goals.
This analysis demonstrated that if teachers were going to be motivated to improve
practice, they needed to be invested in the purpose of the new evaluation system. Highly
effective principals clearly communicated that the system was designed to support
professional growth and subsequently empowered teachers to take ownership over setting
and monitoring progress on their own goals. To support the self-reflective process, they
created structured time for teachers to meet with each other to discuss practice in
professional learning communities and also utilized the evaluation pre- and postconferences to develop teacher’s self-reflective abilities. As a result, highly effective
principals forged strong trusting relationships with their staff, which helped teachers feel
more supported in reaching their goals and in turn, ensured they avoided burnout.
Conversely, teachers in schools with less effective principals reported that INVEST was
top-down and exacerbated an already punitive school culture. Given their frustration
with their teaching experience, these teachers were less likely to be motivated to
implement changes in practice and stay committed to the profession over the long term.
This study confirms prior research that the distribution of influence and control in
schools profoundly affects how they function. Historically, whether districts can
successfully adopt reforms has been shown to depend on teacher buy-in and investment
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in the process (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008). In Who Controls Teachers’ Work,
Ingersoll demonstrates that teachers have more control over academic issues (e.g.,
curriculum) than they do over administrative and policy decisions (e.g., professional
development, evaluation); in fact most teachers have little influence over anything but
instructional matters (Ingersoll, 2006). If policies are too top-down in their nature, they
limit teachers’ flexibility to make decisions about what is best for their students. When
implementing INVEST, highly effective principals were able to successfully balance the
need for accountability (inherent with any teacher evaluation system) with efforts focused
on teacher empowerment.
Once teachers were initially motivated, highly effective principals provided
targeted feedback and offered opportunities for ongoing support to accelerate their
development. In line with the theory of deliberate practice, these principals diagnosed
very specific deficiencies in a timely fashion and aligned their feedback with meaningful
suggestions for improvement. When teachers did not receive this type of feedback and
consistent support, it proved more challenging to develop practice on the new INVEST
system. Given the increased expectations associated with implementation, more
organized and conscientious principals were better able to effectively manage the
demands of the new evaluation system.
Limitations
Several limitations of the current investigation are worth noting. First, given the
non-experimental nature of the school selection, third variable confounds pose a potential
threat to the internal validity of the impact analysis. The available data made it possible to
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demonstrate that the pilot and control schools were equivalent at baseline and to adjust
for individual and school level characteristics in the analysis. Thus, the most obvious
third-variable confounds were accounted for in the present investigation, though there
could have been unobservable variables impacting outcomes. It is important, therefore,
that future research continue to investigate the impact of new teacher performance
management systems with more rigorous experimental designs.
Second, although the Student Growth Percentile measure captured information on
teachers’ impact on student progress (rather than absolute achievement), it had several
shortcomings. First, the ratings were not adjusted for student or school characteristics,
which some research demonstrates has the potential to influence student academic gains.
Second, because the ratings were only based on one year of data, they presented a limited
picture of teachers’ impact on student progress. As history makes clear, defining quality
teaching is an incredibly challenging task, and scholars have contested the validity and
reliability of various performance metrics. From a motivational perspective, it is perhaps
even more important to note that teachers in pilot schools did not receive their SGP
ratings during the pilot year, and thus were not able to use them to understand their
performance or improve their practice. As a result, the SGP measure may not have been
the best mechanism for capturing information on teachers’ improvement over the course
of the pilot year, and future research should use multiple measures (including
observational measures like the Danielson Framework for Teaching) to assess the impact
of new policies.
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Additionally, this investigation only examined the impact of the new teacher
performance management system during the pilot year of the initiative. As the descriptive
analysis demonstrated, many principals faced considerable challenges with INVEST
implementation, and teachers noted that it would take time to adjust to the new
expectations. As a result, it is certainly possible that with additional support – or just
additional time – the results of an impact analysis would be different in subsequent years.
However, it is unlikely that the drivers influencing variation in responses at the system,
school, and teacher level will change considerably. Indeed, qualitative research on
INVEST has carried into the second year of implementation and we have discovered
similar trends in teachers’ responses both across and within schools.
Finally, it is important to note that the external validity of these findings is limited
by the nature of the sample. Since I studied the implementation of a new teacher
evaluation system in a relatively large urban district in a non-bargaining state, these
findings may not generalize to teachers in different types of districts. Research has
demonstrated that rates of teacher turnover are much higher in urban contexts, suggesting
that the experience of urban teachers differs in important ways from those in suburban or
rural districts. In addition, scholars have historically documented that performance
management policies encounter intense resistance from teachers unions. Since Texas is
not a bargaining state, Aldine ISD did not have to negotiate the design or implementation
of the new teacher evaluation system. In districts with strong unions, we might expect
that the collective bargaining process would influence the policy design, as well as how
teachers responded to the new initiative during implementation.
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Implications
Despite these limitations, the current analysis makes a significant contribution
toward understanding how system, individual, and school characteristics influence
teachers’ motivation, performance, and retention under new teacher performance
management systems. The growing interest in these systems offers an important
opportunity for further policy development and research as these initiatives proliferate
across the country. This section provides several important recommendations for
policymakers and researchers.
Future Policy
Focus on the perceived accuracy and fairness of performance measures. During
the pilot year of INVEST, teachers’ expectancy and value were both influenced by their
perceptions of the accuracy and fairness of the measures and evaluation process. When
INVEST measures aligned with teachers’ own definitions of effective teaching, this
reinforced their intrinsic value and contributed to overall motivation. Teachers were also
motivated by measures when they were clearly articulated and provided a pathway for
improvement. Though they appreciated the specificity of the Danielson Framework,
many teachers were concerned about the achievability of Level 4 performance and
insulted by only being able to achieve “proficient” or “effective” status. Teachers
concerns with the fairness of SGPs were rooted in how the measure would capture factors
they perceived were outside of their control (e.g., student or parent accountability). The
challenge for policymakers will be to employ measures that produce results teachers view
as accurate and provide sufficient training to help them interpret and utilize data to
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improve their instructional practice. Additionally, policymakers should carefully consider
how to label performance levels, so as not to be demotivating for teachers. To accomplish
this, initiatives will likely need to include multiple measures that provide a more
comprehensive picture of teacher effectiveness and focus intently on communication
efforts during the early months of implementation.
Embed evaluation as part of broader development effort and message the
system’s purpose. Improved evaluation is not a panacea; indeed, it will not lead to
increased teacher effectiveness unless it is accompanied by conditions that build teacher
expectancy and value. Scholars contend that today's attempts at performance
management are not narrowly focused but instead include other initiatives (e.g.,
development, compensation) that directly influence the objective of increasing teacher
quality (Odden & Wallace, 2004). This study supports prior research which has shown
that new teacher evaluation systems will be more effective if they spur teachers’
investment in their own long-term development (Taylor & Tyler, 2011). As these systems
proliferate, it is essential that policymakers do not view evaluation as an isolated strategy,
but instead, as part of a comprehensive system designed to recognize and improve
instructional expertise. Most importantly, they must communicate this purpose to
teachers. When teachers view new systems as designed to support their professional
growth, as opposed to hold them accountable for performance, they are more likely to be
motivated to sustain changes in behavior over time.
Develop principals to support their teachers to engage in deliberate practice.
Motivational theory demonstrates that goals will be more motivating when individuals
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not only value the performance criteria but also believe that through hard work, they can
successfully improve their own effectiveness on these measures. In other words,
evaluation cannot lead to improvements in performance unless teachers also have the
capacity to implement necessary changes in their practice. This study demonstrated the
important influence of principal leadership on teacher motivation, performance, and
retention. To improve performance, teachers need to not only know the expectations, but
also be given specific and consistent feedback to implement changes effectively in their
own classroom. Policymakers should provide principals with training around coaching
and reflective conversations, so they can support teachers to engage in the process of
deliberate practice. Additionally, they should support principals to develop the
organizational management systems necessary to effectively implement the new policy
with fidelity.
Differentiate systems to meet teachers’ and schools’ varying needs. This analysis
revealed that teachers have divergent reactions to performance management systems both
within and across schools. Given the influence of individual and school characteristics on
outcomes, it is challenging to design a one-size-fits-all approach to performance
management. To maximize teachers’ motivational responses, policymakers need to
gather data to ascertain what is of value to teachers in their district and construct new
(and likely, multiple) performance metrics and incentives to adequately reflect these
values. To maximize teachers' motivational responses, policymakers should design
differentiated tracks that can be better customized to meet the needs of specific subgroups
of teachers and provide differentiated support to principals based on the needs of their
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campus. For example, since they are new to the classroom, novice teachers will require
additional guidance and likely be more open to adopting new practices. In contrast, more
experienced teachers (particularly skeptical and insulted teachers) will be less likely to
embrace change. Policymakers can increase the likelihood that the new initiative will be
responsive to teachers' needs by developing varying communication messages and
support structures depending on teachers’ and schools’ needs.
Involve teachers in the process. This study demonstrated that individuals’
motivational responses were influenced by teachers’ level of ownership over the
evaluation process. Increased involvement built trust and engendered overall commitment
to the system. Unfortunately, historical attempts to implement performance management
systems have typically neglected to take into account teachers' perspectives and
consequently, reforms have not been sustained over time (Tyack & Cuban, 1997). To
increase the likelihood of sustainability, policymakers should seek to ensure that teachers
play an active role in designing and implementing new performance management
initiatives. Indeed, if the goal of these initiatives is to improve the quality of teaching,
policymakers must recognize that history has repeatedly shown that those most directly
affected by policy must be invested in and empowered by the process of change.
Future Research
Evaluate new teacher performance management policies in the context of
motivational theory. As this analysis makes clear, teachers’ responses to new
performance management systems will vary considerably as a function of differences in
system features, individual teacher characteristics and school-based contextual factors.
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Unfortunately, most studies do not investigate these types of variation, and when they do,
results are not analyzed within the context of motivational theory. In this analysis, I
developed a conceptual framework, derived from the literature on motivational theory, to
frame how we might expect teachers to respond to new performance management
initiatives and then explored how design features, individual differences and schoolbased organizational factors influenced these motivational reactions. It is my hope that
this framework will serve as an analytic tool for future researchers as they seek to
understand teachers’ responses to new systems.
Use mixed methods analysis. This study indicates that perceptions of new
evaluation systems vary considerably based on specific teacher characteristics and
contextual factors. Unfortunately, most studies do not take into consideration how
individual and school characteristics affect teacher attitudes and subsequently influence
motivation and performance. Current performance management policies include a variety
of components in their design. To study this complexity, researchers will need to strike
the appropriate balance between rigorous quantitative impact research and systematic
qualitative analysis that explores how teachers’ perceptions influence outcomes.
Researchers need to employ mixed methods to develop a better understanding of how
new performance management influence subgroups of teachers in different types of
contexts.
Validate system measures and outcomes. When exploring teachers’ motivation
and attitudes towards their work, researchers should pay particularly close attention to
how they measure and validate specific constructs. This analysis employed existing self-
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report measures for individual and organizational characteristics and also used
exploratory factor analysis to develop several new scales for capturing teachers’ attitudes
toward new evaluation systems. Researchers should validate these scales and determine
how they apply across different contexts. Given the demonstrated influence of
individual, school, and system characteristics, future research should also examine how
these factors moderate the impact of new systems on outcomes of interest. Additionally,
given limitations associated with the reliability and validity of various performance
measures (e.g., SGPs, Danielson Framework of Teaching), studies should also examine
the impact and implementation of new initiatives using multiple measures and then,
compare results across outcomes.
Conduct multi-year studies across multiple contexts. This analysis only examines
the impact and implementation of one performance management system during its pilot
year, which as noted above, limits the external validity of the results. Though there is
growing interest in performance management systems nationally, the existing research
base is considerably more limited. Researchers should continue to investigate the impact
and implementation of these systems across contexts and employ consistent measures
(such as the survey metrics used in this analysis) and examine similar subgroups, so that
results can be more easily compared across studies. Research should be longitudinal so
that we can also build a better understanding of teachers’ motivational responses and
behavioral changes as they become more accustomed to new systems.
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Conclusion
Historical evidence has demonstrated that teacher acceptance will ultimately
contribute to the effectiveness and survival of teacher performance management policies.
Recent initiatives are also beginning to demonstrate that the success of these new systems
can hinge on teachers’ reactions to new performance measures and incentives. Yet, the
body of research on how teachers respond to new performance management policies
remains surprisingly underdeveloped. To complicate matters, the research that does exist
reveals mixed results about the validity of performance measures, as well as the impact
new systems have on teacher perceptions and student outcomes.
Though many policy briefs purport to inform policymakers of the essential factors
to consider when creating performance management initiatives, this is the first analysis to
systematically examine the influence of individual, school, and system characteristics on
teachers’ motivation, performance, and retention on a new teacher evaluation system.
Given how widespread implementation of these new systems has become, it is critical
that as these initiatives proliferate, they are designed in a way that is amenable to
evaluation. Evaluators of current performance management initiatives must pay careful
attention to how different design decisions influence teacher expectancy and value and
ultimately translate into motivation and behavioral change. Researchers should also
consider how these reactions are influenced by individual characteristics of teachers, as
well as organizational conditions in schools. In turn, as they implement new systems,
policymakers will need to be prepared to revise initiatives as they learn more about
teachers’ motivational responses to changes in performance management policies.

248

Appendix
Table 5-1 Supplement
Descriptive Data by Individual Teacher Profile Type (From Survey Data)
Profile
Type

%
Female

%
White

Yrs
Exp

INVEST
Expectancy

INVEST
Value

INVEST
Perceptions

SGP

DAN

E

C

O

N

A

G

Invested
Teachers

80%

40%

18

4.20

4.70

3.82

20%

60%

3.42

4.58

4.17

1.88

4.50

4.08

4.56

Sponge
Teachers
Burnt-out
Teachers

50%

33%

1

3.50

4.25

3.61

17%

0%

3.56

4.22

4.45

2.17

4.56

4.00

3.85

83%

83%

3

2.75

4.62

3.04

17%

0%

3.56

3.96

3.67

2.50

4.11

3.67

3.53

Insulted
Teachers
Skeptical
Teachers

83%

33%

6

1.50

3.50

2.44

0%

0%

3.60

4.73

4.13

1.90

4.47

4.53

3.40

85%

15%

12

3.60

4.10

3.31

31%

30%

3.06

4.06

4.12

2.73

4.33

3.80

3.91

Note: N = 26, as only 72% of the 36 teachers completed both surveys.
Demographics and Performance

Personality

% Female and % White = % of teachers who are female and white
Yrs Exp = Average years of experience in teaching
INVEST Expectancy = Belief in ability to perform well on INVEST (Scale of 1-5)
INVEST Value = Value placed on performing well on INVEST (Scale of 1-5)
INVEST Perceptions = Average score of perceptions of INVEST (Scale of 1-5)
SGP and DAN = % reaching Highly Effective status on Student Growth
Percentiles and Danielson

E = Extraversion
C = Conscientiousness
N = Neuroticism
A = Agreeableness
O = Openness
G = Grit
TG = Teaching Grit
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TG

Table 6-1 Supplement

Descriptive Data by School Case Study (From Survey Data)
Measure

Mean
(SD)

School 1
(102)

Individual Personality Characteristics
Teaching Grit
3.80
3.94
(0.67)
(0.54)
Grit
3.90
3.89
(0.48)
(0.61)
Conscientiousness
4.33
4.37
(0.50)
(0.54)
Extraversion
3.39
2.89
(0.80)
(0.67)
Agreeableness
4.20
4.33
(0.58)
(0.47)
Neuroticism
2.66
2.56
(0.87)
(0.88)
Openness
4.12
4.19
(0.55)
(0.44)

School 2
(111)

School 3
(69)

School 4
(63)

School 5
(83)

School 6
(81)

3.81
(0.66)
3.75
(0.63)
4.22
(0.58)
3.07
(0.94)
4.24
(0.56)
2.86
(0.82)
4.12
(0.60)

3.86
(0.61)
3.87
(0.41)
4.39
(0.52)
3.59
(0.76)
4.27
(0.48)
2.52
(0.88)
4.24
(0.51)

3.88
(0.63)
3.91
(0.44)
4.24
(0.46)
3.24
(0.72)
4.11
(0.55)
2.71
(0.80)
3.99
(0.47)

3.68
(0.77)
3.90
(0.54)
4.22
(0.54)
3.43
(0.87)
4.04
(0.69)
2.53
(0.95)
4.23
(0.59)

3.91
(0.67)
3.88
(0.51)
4.31
(0.56)
3.29
(0.83)
4.22
(0.56)
2.56
(0.85)
4.02
(0.64)
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School Working Conditions
Quality of
3.80
Administration
(0.88)
Positive support
3.18
(0.81)
Level of control
3.61
(0.77)
Professional community 3.48
(0.79)
Teacher Perceptions of Evaluation
Evaluation Measures
3.77
(0.82)
Evaluation Process
3.70
(0.91)
Frequency
3.83
(0.96)
Feedback and Growth
3.54
(0.83)
Teacher Perceptions of INVEST
Understanding
3.31
(0.82)
Goal-setting
3.16
(0.91)

4.04
(0.67)
3.29
(0.73)
3.43
(0.73)
3.51
(0.70)

3.87
(0.84)
3.19
(0.80)
3.74
(0.63)
3.61
(0.75)

4.12
(0.72)
3.30
(0.79)
3.95
(0.76)
3.74
(0.63)

3.54
(0.93)
3.29
(0.64)
3.71
(0.69)
3.38
(0.76)

4.25
(0.54)
3.38
(0.69)
3.53
(0.70)
3.94
(0.55)

4.20
(0.68)
3.23
(0.82)
3.56
(0.81)
3.75
(0.71)

3.72
(0.63)
3.75
(0.70)
3.94
(0.63)
3.39
(0.86)

3.39
(0.86)
3.27
(1.06)
3.90
(0.93)
3.30
(1.01)

3.90
(0.70)
3.71
(0.91)
4.01
(0.86)
3.65
(0.85)

3.93
(0.63)
3.48
(0.84)
3.86
(0.82)
3.43
(0.90)

3.95
(0.71)
3.79
(0.74)
3.95
(0.81)
3.70
(0.75)

3.70
(0.78)
3.30
(0.92)
3.51
(1.00)
3.36
(0.85)

3.36
(0.88)
3.38
(0.87)

3.20
(0.72)
2.95
(1.12)

3.65
(0.64)
3.36
(0.82)

3.55
(0.62)
3.24
(0.82)

3.25
(0.82)
3.15
(0.88)

3.53
(0.67)
3.11
(0.93)
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INVEST Measures
INVEST Growth and
Impact
Teacher Outcomes
Motivation
Expectancy
Value
INVEST Expectancy
INVEST Value
Effectiveness
Observation (Danielson)
% Highly Effective
Danielson
Student Growth
Percentile
Retention
Teacher Burnout

3.26
(0.79)
3.20
(0.81)

3.45
(0.88)
3.19
(0.86)

3.02
(0.85)
3.07
(0.85)

3.58
(0.60)
3.60
(0.70)

3.57
(0.91)
3.44
(0.70)

3.39
(0.66)
3.35
(0.63)

3.34
(0.79)
3.31
(0.77)

3.97
(0.59)
4.22
(0.58)
3.24
(1.14)
4.20
(0.83)

3.78
(0.62)
4.31
(0.57)
3.41
(0.94)
4.29
(0.59)

3.96
(0.66)
4.27
(0.64)
3.15
(1.29)
4.17
(0.90)

3.98
(0.59)
4.25
(0.42)
3.76
(1.03)
4.36
(0.72)

4.10
(0.62)
4.25
(0.46)
3.24
(1.00)
4.52
(0.60)

3.88
(0.66)
4.05
(0.67)
3.44
(0.79)
3.95
(0.70)

3.85
(0.61)
4.24
(0.50)
3.43
(1.13)
4.30
(0.76)

3.19
(0.33)
14%

3.39
(0.36)
54%

3.12
(0.42)
13%

3.22
(0.35)
27%

3.18
(0.26)
29%

3.21
(0.31)
18%

3.24
(0.31)
14%

51.61
(13.07)

52.00
(19.44)

60.17
(19.15)

52.10
(12.33)

53.95
(10.42)

55.06
(10.20)

55.50
(11.81)

2.95
(0.97)

2.98
(0.99)

3.10
(0.95)

2.92
(0.92)

2.92
(1.08)

2.99
(0.94)

2.99
(0.84)
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Teacher Turnover
Intentions
Teacher Turnover (from
the District)
Sample Size

2.31
(1.01)
13%

2.55
(1.06)
20%

2.46
(0.96)
13%

2.13
(0.90)
9%

2.24
(1.14)
14%

2.39
(0.97)
11%

2.39
(0.86)
22%

17

52

44

21

53

46

N = 2662. For pilot measures, N = 1097 and for Student Growth Percentile measure, N = 651.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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